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ABSTRACT 
THE IMPACT OF BID-ASK SPREADS 
ON RETURN COMPUTATIONS AND EMPIRICAL ANOMALIES 
SEPTEMBER 1988 
DAVID P. ECHEVARRIA, B.A., CHAPMAN COLLEGE 
M.B.A., UNIVERSITY OF WEST FLORIDA 
Ph,D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
Directed by: Professor Ben Branch 
A substantial body of literature on security market anomalies has 
emerged since the general acceptance of the Efficient Markets 
Hypothesis. Two major areas are observed in this literature. The 
first examines information effects on security price behavior. This 
literature analyzes the price adjustment lags in response to new 
information. The second investigates empirical anomalies; size 
effects, weekend effects, and January effects. Studies in both areas 
have largely depended on an analysis of returns computed from closing 
prices. 
This study examines the impact of alternative specifications of 
the return generating process in testing previous findings of empirical 
anomalies. Specifically, the study assesses the usefulness of returns 
generated in a manner consistent with the use of "market” and "limit" 
orders by public traders. Accordingly, returns measured ask-to-bid and 
bid-to-ask are utilized to test the persistence of the empirical 
anomalies. The empirical results support the hypothesis that the 
misspecification of the return generating process in previous market 
vi 
studies is in part the cause of anomalous findings of market 
inefficiencies. 
This study also examines whether more efficient estimates of 
relative risk (beta) can be estimated when returns are measured using 
alternative price structures (i.e., means of closing bid-ask prices) 
for market index construction. These alternative return models are 
expected to produce more efficient estimates of beta. The empirical 
results demonstrate that small increases in beta estimation efficiency 
can be achieved when the mean of the closing bid-ask price quotes are 
used in the place of closing prices. 
Empirical evidence is presented which sheds further light on the 
nature of the negative serial correlations observed in discrete price 
series. The evidence supports the hypothesis that market behavior is 
substantially predictable in the very short term. The ability to 
forecast the direction of the next day's return is, however, of 
negligible economic value due to costs and institutional restraints. 
• • 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The Valuation Problem 
The central problem in finance is the valuation of financial 
assets. The inputs into the analytical framework for valuation are 
the size of anticipated returns, the dates those returns are to be 
received, and the risk undertaken to obtain those returns. The last 
input, risk, is the most difficult variable to measure and incorporate 
into the valuation process. The simplest definition of risk is the 
variance of the income stream of a financial asset over time. The 
greater the variation in anticipated income streams, the greater the 
risk. The level of risk is critically important as it helps to fix 
the level of the required or expected rate of return. 
A significant advance in asset valuation was the development of 
the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). The CAPM decomposes risk into 
two categories; systematic risk and nonsystematic risk. Systematic 
risk is that portion of total security return fluctuations (including 
dividends) resulting from the co-movement of individual security 
prices with the market. Nonsystematic risk is the residual after 
subtracting the systematic portion. It is largely that portion of 
total security return fluctuations (including dividends) resulting 
from news about a particular issuer. Security prices move with the 
broader market in response to changes in important economic forces 
(macro economic variables) or change in response to new information 
regarding the company’s prospects (micro economic variables). The 
effects of nonsystematic risk can be minimized by combining different 
2 
securities into a portfolio. Thus, within the framework of the CAPM, 
only systematic sources of risk are priced. 
The CAPM assumes that investors are risk averse. They prefer 
less risk to more for a given level of return. The normative 
imperatives of the CAPM suggests that investors will hold a mean- 
variance efficient (well diversified) portfolio (the market portfolio) 
in combination with a risk free asset. The proportions of the market 
portfolio and risk free asset are determined by the risk preferences 
of each investor. An investor unwilling to undertake risk will hold a 
larger proportion of his (her) wealth in the risk free asset. The 
CAPM also states that the trade-off between (beta) risk and return is 
linear. 
1.2 Market Efficiency 
An important association in the CAPM framework is the 
relationship between information and prices. In efficient markets, 
observed prices accurately reflect all publicly available and 
historical information. This is the theoretical content of the 
Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH). The CAPM explicitly assumes that 
markets are efficient; observed prices are true prices. At the center 
of efficient market dynamics is the question of whether observed 
prices accurately reflect all the information necessary to allocate 
capital efficiently among competing uses. Thus tests are performed to 
ascertain if observed prices incorporate all information contained in 
past prices (weak form efficiency), if all publicly available 
information is incorporated in observed prices (semi-strong form 
efficiency), and if observed prices accurately anticipate inside 
information (strong form efficiency). 
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1.2.1 Weak Form Efficiency 
Early research in security markets revealed the presence of 
serial dependencies in returns generated using daily closing prices, 
and regularities in the variation of intraday prices. The 
independence of successive returns is at the heart of efficient 
markets theory. Returns are assumed to follow a random walk. The 
random walk model, a restrictive form of the EMH, assumes that 
successive returns are independently and identically distributed over 
time. The existence of positive or negative correlations implied the 
possibility of potentially exploitable patterns in sequential returns; 
the correlations could be used to earn (abnormal) risk-adjusted 
profits. Alexander (1961), and Fama and Blume (1966) examined the 
presence and magnitude of serial price dependencies and concluded that 
the small magnitudes of the serial dependencies precluded 
opportunities for earning abnormal profits after transaction costs. 
The transaction costs specified in these studies consisted of 
brokerage fees and did not specifically include liquidity costs. 
1.2.2 Semi-Strong Form Efficiency 
The incorporation of new public information in security prices is 
at the heart of the semi-strong form of the EMH. Testing of the semi¬ 
strong form EMH is facilitated with the use of event studies. These 
studies examine the speed with which security prices adjust to new 
information. In an efficient market, prices rapidly adjust to new 
information; no opportunities should exist for earning abnormal 
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profits by acting on new information. The market model and returns 
generated from closing prices are utilized to test for semi-strong 
form market efficiency. Early security market research generally 
supported the semi-strong form of the EMH (Cf. Ball and Brown [1968], 
Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll [1969]). More recent studies, however, 
have identified abnormal profit opportunities existing beyond an 
information event when the information is unexpected. Ball (1978) 
reviewed fifteen separate event studies reporting excess returns 
persisting beyond the unexpected information event. The inconsistency 
of semi-strong form market efficiency research results have generally 
been attributed to misspecifications of the two parameter model used 
to describe equilibrium in the stock market. 
1.2.3 Strong Form Efficiency 
The EMH holds that security prices fully reflect not only public 
information but also properly anticipate inside information. Most 
studies examine the ability of professional portfolio managers to 
outperform the market averages. The most frequent research result is 
that professionals are unable to outperform the market averages on a 
consistent basis. The important exceptions to these general studies 
are the profits obtained by corporate insiders and stock exchange 
specialists. Studies by Jaffe (1974), Finnerty (1976), and Nunn, 
Madden, and Gambola (1983) indicate that insiders are able to 
outperform the market averages on a consistent basis. 
1.3 Market Microstructure and Trading Behavior 
In perfect and efficient markets, each asset trades at one price 
at a given point in time. Also, the price at which a trade is 
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consummated is assumed to be equal to the true or intrinsic value of 
the asset. Efficient markets are also liquid: Financial assets may 
be readily bought and sold at their intrinsic values. An implicit 
assumption of the asset pricing models pertains to the nature of 
liquidity. Liquidity obtains when buyers are ready to transact with 
sellers at a price equal to the intrinsic value of the asset being 
traded; if a seller cannot find a buyer, the market is not (perfectly) 
liquid. The asset pricing models generally assume that buy and sell 
orders for the same security occur simultaneously through time; both 
orders reach the point of transaction at the same time (Cf. Garman 
[1976]). In the language of real markets, orders are "crossed." This 
should not be interpreted to mean that all orders are crossed, but 
that the average transaction price is equivalent to the intrinsic 
value of the security. If markets are illiquid, transaction values 
might have to differ substantially from intrinsic values to facilitate 
desired trades. Illiquidity implies an undesirable cost. The 
existence of liquidity can only be sustained with synchronous 
(continuous) trading and a sufficient number of market participants. 
Real security markets are characterized by nonsynchronous buying 
and selling; matching buy and sell orders do not arrive at the trading 
point at the same time. The nonsynchronous nature of trading requires 
the establishment of liquidity services in order to provide the 
essence of a continuous market (Cf. Demsetz [1968], Smidt [1971]). 
Liquidity services are especially important for traders in stocks 
characterized by low daily volumes of shares traded. Thus a buyer 
(seller) may not always have a seller (buyer) to balance the 
transaction. Accordingly, institutional (i.e., stock exchange) 
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arrangements are made for the provision of liquidity services. 
Liquidity (or immediacy) services are provided by specialists on the 
floor of the NYSE or by market maker-dealers in the over-the-counter 
(OTC) market. The cost of liquidity services are the mark-ups or 
mark-downs buyers or sellers incur when trades are consummated. In 
such trading, the specialist represents the other half of the trade. 
The costs of immediacy services provided by the specialist are 
important because they affect the cost of capital for firms in 
accordance with the level of prices and daily trading volume. 
Moreover, the prices at which immediacy transactions occur may not be 
equilibrium prices. 
The prices utilized to generate returns in the asset pricing 
models are usually the last trade (closing) prices of a security. The 
implicit assumption of this particular return generating process is 
that the closing price is the price which would be obtained in buying 
or selling the asset at that particular point in time. The formal 
structure of the CAPM does not directly address the operating dynamics 
of the market at the micro-structure level. The asset pricing theory 
is cast in terms of perfect capital markets; no transaction costs and 
taxes, buyers and sellers are price takers in a competitive market, 
and all economic players have equal and costless access to 
information. General treatment of these assumptions suggest that they 
may be relaxed without impairing the [theoretical] results. Real 
markets are imperfect. Transactions costs and taxes are nonzero. All 
players do not have equal and costless access to price relevant 
information. Also, the general equilibrium CAPM has nothing to say 
about the possibility of trading opportunities. Finally, and most 
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importantly, buyers and sellers are not atomistic price takers 
exchanging assets at intrinsic values. The nonsynchronous nature of 
trading in real markets impose additional burdens on public traders; 
they frequently transact with the market maker/ specialist at prices 
favorable to the latter (Cf., Bagehot [1971]). 
The empirical examination the CAPM treats the closing price as an 
equivalent of intrinsic value. Also, this closing price is implicitly 
assumed to be the (market clearing) price which would prevail in 
trading activity. Thus any deviations of actual (trading) prices from 
the intrinsic price structure would necessarily result in measurement 
errors or biases in computed returns. The probability is high that 
returns computed from observed (closing) prices are inconsistent with 
the assumptions of the CAPM. We note, however, that the CAPM is a 
general equilibrium model which is not affected by the type of return 
utilized; thus any reasonably constructed return could be used to test 
the two-parameter asset price model. 
An important part of the assumption content of the asset pricing 
theory holds that equilibrium prices are (by definition) market 
clearing prices. Observed transaction prices may be viewed as being 
market clearing prices but such prices are not necessarily equilibrium 
prices. Thus the possibility exists that some of the observed closing 
prices are inconsistent with intrinsic values. The implication of 
this potential inconsistency is that it casts doubt on the suitability 
of returns computed from observed closing prices when those returns 
are used in the [equilibrium] asset pricing model. If returns 
computed from closing prices are not equilibrium returns, then the 
asset pricing models may not be correctly pricing real or financial 
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assets. The incorrect pricing of assets would result in the 
misallocation of capital. 
1.4 Market Anomalies 
A considerable number of security market researchers have 
attempted to explain the behavior of its participants by studying the 
behavior of prices in the context of an asset pricing theory. The 
theoretical components of that framework are efficient markets theory 
and the capital asset pricing model. Efficient market theory suggests 
that observed prices are equal to intrinsic values. This result 
obtains from the informational efficiency said to characterize the 
market for investment assets. The capital asset pricing model 
outlines the method for utilizing observed returns together with 
variance and covariance structures to price securities. 
A substantial body of literature on security market anomalies has 
evolved since the general acceptance of the Efficient Markets 
Hypothesis (EMH). This literature may be dichotomized into two 
distinct areas. The first examines information effects on security 
price behavior (event studies). This literature analyzes price 
adjustment lags in response to new information. The second examines a 
different set of empirical anomalies; size effects, weekend effects, 
and January or turn-of-the-year effects. These empirical anomalies 
demonstrate price and return behavior inconsistent with that suggested 
by efficient markets theory and the capital asset pricing model. 
i 
Weekend and January effects reflect systematic regularities in stock 
returns inconsistent with the EMH. Size effects result in returns 
incompatible with those predicted by the capital asset pricing model. 
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Most of these studies utilized returns computed from closing prices. 
The possibility that returns computed from closing prices differ 
significantly from equilibrium returns may underlie findings of market 
anomalies when [joint] tests are made of market efficiency and the 
specification of the CAPM. 
1.5 Research Objectives 
Two observations may be made at this point. First, the case 
against the EMH as a realistic theory explaining the behavior of 
prices appears to be substantial. One possible explanation is that 
the capital asset pricing model is inadequate or misspecified. 
Another possibility is that the return generating process is 
misspecified yielding incorrect estimates of risk and return. Of the 
three forms of the EMH, only the weak form stands relatively 
unchallenged. The semi-strong form has been repeatedly challenged in 
the event study literature, although without a completely unqualified 
result. Research on abnormal returns accruing to traders with inside 
information is widely regarded as negating the strong form EMH. 
The second observation concerns the specification of the return 
generating process. Virtually all empirical security market research 
has been based upon returns computed from closing prices. While 
readily available on the major data tapes, such returns may not 
accurately reflect what a real world trader would earn. As the last 
reported transaction, the "close” may take place at the closing bid 
(highest unexercised offer to buy), closing ask (lowest unexercised 
offer to sell) or somewhere within or even outside the end-of-day bid- 
ask range. Indeed, stocks can "close" (last trade) at any time during 
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the day. Thus closing prices may bear relatively little relation to 
the market situation at the end of the day. Also, closing prices may 
not adequately reflect prices obtainable by traders. Results reported 
by Branch and Echevarria (1986) suggest a significant bias is 
introduced into returns when those returns are generated using closing 
prices. These biases are the result of a misspecification of the 
return generating process. 
The general objectives of the current study are: 
1. to determine the effects of biases introduced by the 
use of closing prices to compute returns. 
2. to examine the effects of alternative specifications 
of the return generating process on market anomalies. 
3. to examine the effects of alternative specifications 
of the return generating process on measures of risk 
and return. 
The alternative specifications of the return generating process are 
useful in determining the effects of specialist/market maker spreads 
on obtainable returns and the implicit effects on the cost of capital. 
1.6 The Theoretical Model 
In economic theory, the equilibrium price is the price which 
equilibrates the supply of commodities with the demand for those 
commodities. In the basic Walrasian model, equilibrium is assumed to 
be attained through a process of tatonnement with recontracting. No 
trades are consummated until buyers and sellers agree on the 
equilibrium set of prices for commodities to be exchanged. In theory, 
equilibrium prices and quantities for all commodities are 
simultaneously determined. Moreover, in equilibrium, neither excess 
demand nor excess commodities exist. The incidence of production and 
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consumption are identical in time. This theoretical structure has 
been extended to the market for financial assets (claims on future 
sums of money). The essence of the theory is the suggestion that 
markets move from one point of equilibrium to the next without 
intervening activity. 
In general equilibrium, the equilibrium price is also termed the 
market clearing price. The critical assumption in this general scheme 
is the instantaneous determination of equilibrium prices and 
quantities. If we vacate or relax this price adjustment assumption, 
then we cannot maintain that market clearing prices are necessarily 
equilibrium prices. Transaction prices can be deemed to be transitory 
market clearing prices as markets move from one equilibrium point to 
the next. All asset pricing theories assume that market clearing 
prices are equilibrium prices. This relationship results from 
instantaneous price adjustments in response to new information in a 
perfect and efficient market. Moreover, these relationships form the 
theoretical content of the efficient markets hypothesis. 
The realities in the securities marketplace require alternative 
arrangements when time preferences do not coincide. This adjustment 
takes the form of third parties who stand ready to buy into their 
inventories the output of producers and to sell from those inventories 
to consumers. The implicit fees charged by these third parties (mark¬ 
ups or mark-downs) are the compensation for the risk undertaken in 
providing all economic players flexibility from having to coincide 
perfectly their production and consumption decisions. As a 
consequence, the prices received or paid are affected by the magnitude 
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of the fees charged. The magnitudes of the fees are in turn 
determined by the perceived levels of risk. 
Observed security prices (closing prices) are explicitly assumed 
to be market clearing prices. Also, the structure of the [security] 
valuation theories assume that these values are equilibrium prices 
readily obtainable in markets which are continuously trading or are 
characterized by synchronous trading. When markets do not trade on a 
continuous or synchronous basis, arrangements are made similar to 
those existing in commodity markets. Third parties, specialists, 
stand ready to transact, for a fee, with traders desiring immediate 
execution of their orders. The result is a change in the prices 
received or paid. These prices are market clearing prices in the 
context of individual trades, but these prices are not necessarily 
equilibrium prices. Also, the returns computed from these prices are 
not necessarily the equilibrium returns envisioned in the asset 
pricing theory. The fees charged by the specialists affect the level 
of transaction prices and the returns realized or expected. Further, 
these fees affect the realized rates of return and, by implication, 
the cost of capital. Any valuation model would be misspecified if it 
did not include a provision for the effects of the fees charged by 
providers of liquidity. 
The essence of the models to be defined in the current study stem 
from the assumption that markets do not equilibrate instantaneously. 
Instead, market transactions are viewed as the process by which 
markets seek to establish equilibrium values under general conditions 
of uncertainty. The levels of uncertainty are not only affected by 
investor perceptions about the true state of nature, but also by the 
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specialist. In this sense, market activity appears as a series of 
transactions at prices simply viewed as transitory market clearing 
prices. This view is supported by the observation that many 
transactions are completed at prices different from the theoretically 
defined equilibrium price. 
1.7 Methodology and Sample 
One method for investigating the nature of market efficiency and 
the asset pricing models is to examine the implications of alternative 
assumptions about the form of the return generating process. The form 
of the existing return generating models are constructed in a 
normative sense; they assume informational efficiency in a perfect 
market, general equilibrium in the commodity markets and an extension 
of that equilibrium to the capital markets. Consequently, closing 
prices are assumed to be identical with equilibrium prices. Also, 
returns computed from these closing prices are assumed to be 
equilibrium returns. Alternative specifications of the return 
generating process would be driven by a positive view of market 
behavior; an imperfect market which strives to be informationally 
efficient. The set of prices used will reflect the prices most likely 
to be obtained by a public trader. Accordingly, we will not assume 
that observed transaction prices are equilibrium prices. This inquiry 
will treat observed prices as transitory market clearing prices. The 
imperfections of the market for financial assets are held to be 
captured in the bid and ask spreads which reflect the discontinuous 
nature of trading activity. 
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The general focus of this research is the examination of the 
effects on computed returns when those returns are measured for 
positions that are bought and sold with market orders. These are the 
returns most likely to be earned by public traders. For comparative 
purposes, this analysis will also examine the results of using prices 
from a limit order strategy to compute returns. Both sets of returns 
will be compared to returns measured in the traditional manner. The 
degree to which biases are induced in returns computed using closing 
prices will be measured as the difference between the returns measured 
close-to-close and returns measured ask-to-bid (assuming a market 
order to buy and sell). Close-to-close returns will also be compared 
with returns measured bid-to-ask (assuming execution of a limit 
order). 
The current study will examine the effects of alternative return 
generating models on previous findings of empirical anomalies. We 
will determine if mis-specifications of the return generating process 
are the cause of the size effects, January effects, and weekend 
effects. The inquiry will utilize and compare all three methods 
examined by Roll (1983) for computing mean returns; buy and hold, 
rebalanced, and arithmetic average portfolio returns using close-to- 
close, ask-to-bid, and bid-to-ask price information. This comparison 
will provide additional insight into the effects of measurement bias 
introduced by the use of close-to-close returns in size effect 
studies. 
One issue related to market efficiency studies is the 
autocovariance properties of observed prices. Accordingly, we 
utilize the data sample to examine next day behavior of prices and 
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returns when today’s closing price distribution is known. 
Specifically, we are interested in the relation between today's close 
and tomorrow's return. This work builds on earlier studies by 
Neiderhofer and Osborne (1966) reporting the presence of serial 
dependencies in intraday price movements. The presence of 
autocorrelation in sequential price series is a statistically 
troublesome phenomena. Herein we examine the phenomena to determine 
if any additional characteristics of the regularities exist beyond 
those previously reported. 
The availability of a sample containing the closing bid and ask 
price quotes in addition to closing prices will permit comparisons of 
the DJIA constructed in the usual manner and one constructed with 
closing ask quotes, bid quotes, or the average of the two. These 
indexes will then be compared to the traditional index and the 
differences will be noted. The reconstructed indexes will then be 
used as a proxy for the market portfolio and betas will be estimated 
for various portfolios and individual securities. The primary purpose 
of these estimates will be to determine whether more efficient 
estimates of relative volatility are possible using indexes 
constructed under alternative methods. This inquiry does not 
reexamine the market efficiency issue. What is germane in this 
particular study is how alternative measures of price might influence 
the construction of an index (ie., the DJIA). Also, if alternative 
constructs are possible, they may allow for better tests of market 
efficiency regarding efficient betas or a stronger relationship 
between risk and return 
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The current investigation utilizes two data samples. The first 
sample includes 42 days of closing, bid, and ask price quotes for 1134 
NYSE issues for initial testing of the research hypotheses. This 
sample is referred to as the ’’test sample one.” A second sample 
includes 43 days of closing, bid, and ask price quotes for 1205 NYSE 
issues. This second sample is referred to as the ’’test sample two.” 
The two samples cover a bear (December 1981 - January 1982) and a bull 
(December 1982 - January 1983) move in the market. The two samples 
may help to make somewhat stronger generalizations than would a single 
two month sample. 
The two samples combined, however, are still smaller than most 
samples typically used in market studies. Two arguments can be made 
to support the results of this study. First, the current samples are 
the largest ever used in examining market microstructure behavior and 
trading effects. Second, the strength of statistical tests suggests 
that an extremely large sample is not necessary to ascertain the 
general characteristics of the population. This is particularly true 
if the behavioral characteristics of two sub-samples can be 
demonstrated to be similar. The strength of this study derives at 
least in part from that demonstration. 
1.8 Research Implications 
This investigation is expected to provide several useful insights 
into the behavior of security markets and the problems engendered by 
attempting to demonstrate normative abstractions too far removed from 
empirical realities. First, this investigation should provide useful 
data on the extent of biases induced in returns when those returns are 
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computed solely with the use of closing prices. Second, this study 
will provide an alternative analysis of the nature of empirical 
anomalies. In particular, this study will demonstrate how results 
vary when alternative specifications of the return generating process 
are utilized to define price structures and measure returns. The use 
of alternative price structures result from the imperfections of the 
market. 
This investigation will also provide additional information 
regarding the nature of serial price correlation in observed prices. 
The degree to which regularities exist will bring into question the 
putative randomness of security prices. The nature of the results 
will permit certain characterizations to be reformulated about the 
efficiency by which capital is allocated and its costs determined. 
Finally, the most important implication of this study concerns the 
manner in which security market research has been conducted. This 
implication is particularly germane in the area of market efficiency 
and asset pricing. 
This study will offer results which are likely to be critical of 
efficient market theory. The intent of this research is to emphasize 
differences in the results achieved in this study and those of prior 
studies. We seek to increase our understanding of the limitations to 
what we think we know about security market behavior. Accordingly, 
the results reported herein are seen as important contributions to our 
knowledge of the operations of security markets. 
A significant amount of work still remains to be done in 
reviewing tests of the efficient markets hypothesis as a unified 
theory explaining the behavior of security prices. The nonrandom 
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behavior of security prices and the potential for biases in returns 
measured from closing prices suggest that alternatives be considered. 
While the articulation a of new asset pricing paradigm is not 
suggested, the use of alternative return measures to confirm or deny 
the strength of market efficiency theory and the asset pricing models 
is suggested. Returns should be generated in a manner which most 
closely reflects the actual operation of the market. Thus realistic 
testing of these anomalies should assume the use of market orders (the 
only type that assures a trade). 
1.9 Outline of the Study 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows: Chapter II 
reviews the relevant body of literature relating to spreads, 
specialist behavior, and empirical anomalies. Chapter III presents 
the principal hypotheses to be examined and the form of the test 
procedures. Chapter IV describes the research methodology and the 
sample data set. Chapter V contains a detail description of the 
characteristics of the data set and the initial set of empirical 
results. Chapter VI contains the empirical results of the market 
anomaly tests. Conclusions and implications of the study are 
contained in chapter VII 
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Transaction Costs on the NYSE 
In imperfect markets, securities may trade at more than one 
price. As described in chapter I, stocks may trade at the bid, ask, 
or inside the bid-ask spread. Bid and ask prices are necessary 
because of the nonsynchronous nature of trading activity in real 
markets. Bid-ask spreads are transaction costs incurred when services 
are provided which free transactors from the requirement for a 
matching order on the other side of the transaction: One essence of 
perfect markets is costless, synchronous trading. Given the 
structural arrangements of imperfect security markets, security 
transactions are subject to two sources of transaction costs; 
brokerage fees and bid-ask spreads. Brokerage fees were previously 
set by general agreement among member firms of the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE). Since May 1, 1975 fees have been largely set by 
competitive forces. These fees are based on share price and number of 
shares traded; the higher the price of the stock and the greater the 
number if shares traded, the greater the brokerage fee. The relative 
(%) cost of transacting, however, per dollar exchanged is lower for 
higher priced stocks and larger size trades. 
The relevant characteristic of brokerage fees is that they do not 
consider the riskiness of any particular security or its level of 
trading activity. Thus securities appear "equal" when brokerage fees 
are considered; two securities trading at the same price would incur 
the same brokerage fee from the same broker. This "equality" does not 
extend to the structure of bid-ask spreads. Bid-ask spreads (the 
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difference between the highest unexercised offer to buy and the lowest 
unexercised offer to sell) are observed to be substantially less 
homogeneous than brokerage fees due to the sensitivity of bid-ask 
spreads to price levels, trading volume, and specialist perceived 
levels of risk. This study does not address the impact of brokerage 
/ 
fees on realized returns. The primary focus of this research is the 
effects of bid-ask spreads. Accordingly, this study will assume a 
uniform schedule of brokerage fees for a single round lot (100 shares) 
at intervals similar to the price stratified deciles utilized in this 
study. However, when spreads are analyzed with a price stratified 
sample, certain general relationships between price and bid-ask 
spreads are apparent. Figure 2.1 (p. 21) demonstrates the nature of 
these relationships for test sample one (TS1). 
Stocks in TS1 (1134 issues covering 42 days of trading) are 
classified by price into deciles and decile averages calculated for 
share price, percentage bid-ask spread and dollar spread. The 
logarithm (log) of the average percentage spread (left-side y-axis) is 
plotted against the log of the average share price per decile (x- 
axis). The log of the average dollar spread (right-side y-axis) is 
also plotted against the average share price. The graph clearly shows 
that the percentage spread declines as stock prices get larger. 
Moreover, the relationship appears to be a log-linear function. The 
somewhat obvious exception is the percentage spread for the lowest 
price decile. As demonstrated in figure 2.1, the relative spread for 
the lowest price decile departs from the strict linearity of the other 
deciles. This departure may be related to previously reported 
findings of abnormal returns accruing to low price stocks, the stocks 
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Figure 2.1 Bid-Ask Spread versus Average Share Price by Decile. 
Results are graphed for test sample one. 
of small firms, and firms with low market values of equity. Figure 
2.1 also shows that the proportional increases in dollar spreads are 
also log-linear in terms of increases in price per share. 
Demsetz (1968) observed that; 
...A security’s price must also affect the spread quoted for 
quick exchange. Spread per share will tend to increase in 
proportion to an increase in the price per share so as to 
equalize the cost of transacting per dollar exchanged. 
Otherwise, those who submit limit orders will find it 
profitable to narrow spreads on those securities for which 
dollar spread per dollar exchanged is larger, (p. 45) 
Demsetz also suggested that the lack of strict proportionality in 
brokerage commissions could result in the attenuation of the ’’strict 
proportionality” (p. 45) in specialist imposed transaction costs. 
Furthermore, the bid-ask spread for any individual security is 
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sensitive to the volume of trading activity in that security and this 
sensitivity affects realized returns in a manner distinctly different 
from brokerage fees. 
In as much as securities tend to trade noncontinuously, 
institutional arrangements are required in order to provide liquidity 
or immediacy services for traders demanding immediate execution of 
their orders. Demsetz (1968) described the bid-ask spread as "...the 
markup that is paid for predictable immediacy of exchange in organized 
markets." (p. 36) The specialist function on the floor of the NYSE 
provides liquidity services by imposing a dual price structure. The 
specialist stands ready to buy (sell) at the quoted bid (ask) price 
from (to) those traders desiring immediate execution of their sell 
(buy) orders. If markets are efficient, the bid-ask spread should 
straddle the true price. In effect, the trader who demands an 
immediate execution pays a "penalty" equal to one-half of the spread. 
This penalty increases the cost basis on a buy and reduces the 
proceeds on a sale. A "round trip" incurs the full amount of the 
spread. An important characteristic of the bid-ask spread is that it 
varies according to the several aspects of the market for each 
security. Hence stocks trading at the same price but with different 
daily volumes or price volatilities are subject to different spreads. 
The cost of [equity] capital for a firm reflects the rate of 
return required by investors who buy and hold the firm's [equity] 
securities. The total rate of return experienced by investors is 
affected by the level of transaction costs. Demsetz (1968) suggested 
that a portion of the difference in "...borrowing costs between large 
and small firms can be attributed to differences in the cost of trans- 
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acting rather than to imperfections in the capital market” (p. 34). 
The importance of Demsetz' study resides in its suggestion of a 
relationship between transaction costs and the cost of capital. 
The buying and selling of a firm’s securities does not by itself 
change the cost of the firm's capital. This change is brought about 
by changes in the rates of returns investors desire to achieve. The 
dynamics of this suggestion are fairly simple. Investors will attempt 
to pass on to other investors any costs incurred which reduce 
achievable rates of return. The effective result is an increase in 
the gross required rate of return achieved by adjusting the price at 
which they wish to sell or buy. This grossing up of the investors 
required rate of return results in an effective increase in the cost 
of capital for the firm. The amount by which investors gross up the 
required rate of return is directly a function of the magnitude of the 
transaction costs incurred at the brokerage level and on the floor of 
the stock exchange. Since brokerage fees are essentially fixed by 
competitive forces, bid-ask spreads imposed by the market maker/ 
specialist function are important determinants of the price adjust¬ 
ments made by investors. This suggests that the return experienced by 
an investor/trader must consider the effects of transaction costs. 
Thus any model of the return generating process, given the 
imperfections of ’’real world” markets, would have to reflect the 
effects of transaction costs (i.e., bid-ask spread) on measured 
returns. Also, these transaction costs would be expected to influence 
the allocation of capital in a market where firms are competing for 
investment capital. Thus a rational argument can be made that 
investors will adjust their required rates of return based on expected 
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transaction costs. This is a typical situation in real estate where 
sellers will mark-up the asking price of their property by an amount 
equal to the expected brokerage fee. In the case of securities, the 
portion of transaction costs represented by bid-ask spreads would be 
expected to influence the return required by investors. Similarly, 
the return experienced by an investor would be influenced by the 
magnitude of the bid-ask spread. We might also argue that the 
existence of the limit order book may result from investors adjusting 
their buy/sell prices to compensate for the effects of transaction 
costs on realized or expected returns. The magnitude of those effects 
is a function of several market related variables. 
More recently. Roll (1984), Glosten and Harris (1985), Harris 
(1986b), and Choi, Salandro, and Shastri (1988) have attempted to 
measure the magnitude of the bid-ask spread actually paid (the 
effective spread) by uninformed traders. The important commonality in 
their research has been the attempt to measure the magnitude of the 
effective spread by utilizing closing prices. Moreover, their 
research is motivated by a recognition of the important effects that 
bid-ask spreads have on investor behavior. Constantinedes (1986) 
suggests that these proportional transactions costs (i.e., bid-ask 
spreads) create ”no transactions regions.” Specifically, investors 
will make no adjustments to their portfolios when asset prices lie 
within the no transaction region. Roll (1984) suggested the use of 
the serial covariance properties of observed prices to estimate 
effective bid-ask spreads in order to avoid the costly process of 
collecting actual bid-ask spread data in machine readable form. An 
important objective for any empirical study utilizing actual bid-ask 
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spread data would be to examine the accuracy of bid-ask spread 
magnitudes measured utilizing transaction prices. 
2.2 Determinants of the Bid-Ask Spread 
Demsetz (1968), Tinic (1972) and others have investigated the 
determinants of the bid-ask spread. Demsetz (1968) observed an 
inverse relationship between the cost of transacting and trading 
activity. As the number of trades (volume) increased, the bid-ask 
spread tended to become smaller. Demsetz also observed that as stock 
prices increase, the relative cost of transacting also tends to become 
smaller; the percentage spread declines as price increases. The 
effective result is an increase in the cost of [equity] capital (and 
by implication the required rate of return) for small firms (those 
with low price stocks or small market values of equity) or firms with 
narrow trading volumes. Implicit in Demsetz' observations is a 
relationship between bid-ask spreads, stock price, trading volume, and 
observed returns. Tinic (1971) suggested that Demsetz’ (1968) study 
examined too few variables. Tinic included as determinants of the 
bid-ask spread certain aspects of the specialists' portfolio inventory 
position, market structural characteristics, and the economics of the 
specialist's function. The Tinic model included eight variables (six 
statistically significant) explaining 84 percent of the variation in 
bid-ask spreads. Branch and Freed (1977) constructed an equally 
effective model of bid-ask spread determinants using volume, 
competition, volatility, and stock price. 
An important issue in this study relates to the more complete 
specification of the returns generating process. Demsetz (1968) 
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established a clear relationship between bid-ask spreads and the cost 
of capital and by implication the required rates of return. The 
important determinants of the bid-ask spread have been identified as 
price, volume, volatility, and the degree of competition. Clearly, 
models purporting to represent the returns generating process would be 
misspecified if they did not consider either the bid-ask spread or its 
determinants. Beaver (1981) has suggested that much of the existing 
empirical research has been conducted in the absence of a formal model 
of the returns generating process. The addition of a spread variable 
to the return generating process would capture an important element 
missing in the CAPM. Alternatively, the return generating process 
could be respecified to include the effects of nonsynchronous trading 
at the microstructure level by measuring returns across the bid-ask 
spread. 
2.3 Specification of the Return Generating Process 
Many researchers have observed weak relationships between beta 
(as a relative measure of risk) and return [ie., Sharpe (1965), 
Lintner (1965)]. Schwert (1983) has suggested that the statistical 
evidence supporting a positive relationship between (beta) risk and 
average returns is surprisingly weak. The basic model used to test 
this relationship is described by equation (2.1). 
R-^ = a-£ + B-^Rm + e-[ (2.1) 
Where: B-^ = beta, a measure of systematic (market) risk 
RjL = the average return for security i 
ai» ei = a constant and random error term, respectively 
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The inability of the (linear) capital asset pricing model (CAPM) 
to reflect actual market experience more efficiently may be tied to 
the manner in which returns and risk have often been measured. Thus 
the recurrent observation of a misspecified model or incorrectly 
measured risk attributes may be the result of reliance on returns 
measured close-to-close. This reliance may be due in large measure to 
the availability of closing price data in computer readable form. 
The effects of the bid-ask spread on the cost of capital and by 
implication, required rates of return have been established in studies 
by Demsetz (1968), Smidt (1971), and Tinic (1972). These studies 
indirectly suggest an alternative method for measuring returns. 
Assuming for the moment that the cost of capital is affected by the 
cost of transacting, any model of the returns generating process would 
be misspecified if it did not include a cost of trading variable. 
Stoll and Whaley (1983) suggest that "...transaction costs are a 
missing factor in the single period, two-parameter CAPM.” (p. 58). 
Accordingly, the costs of transferring existing equity should also 
affect the required rates of return. Thus, we argue that by measuring 
returns across the bid-ask spread we may capture an important aspect 
of transaction costs. The obvious question is how should those 
returns be measured? Most trading activity on the floor of the NYSE 
is accomplished via the use of "market'’ orders. Moreover, such orders 
are the only type that assures a trade. Thus, any realistic testing 
of trading strategies or returns measurement should assume the use of 
market orders. Market orders, if not "crossed" with other market 
orders on the floor of the exchange, are taken to the relevant post to 
be executed at the quoted ask price for buy orders, and bid price for 
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sell orders. Computing returns would require the use of an asking 
price on the buy side and a bid price on the sell side. 
Some market orders are "crossed" with other market orders, 
usually at a price within the bid-ask spread. Such matching requires 
that orders arrive at the relevant "post" at very nearly the same 
time. Given a random occurrence of crossed trades within the bid-ask 
spread, the average price of these crossed trades should approximate 
the mean of the bid and ask price quotes. Returns measured using the 
mean of the bid and ask price quotes would approximate returns 
computed from "true" prices as defined by Blume and Stambaugh (1983) 
and Glosten and Milgrom (1985). The likelihood of crossed-trades 
occurring on the buy and sell transactions for any given trader is 
probably low except for securities with relatively large spreads or 
low volumes. Thus a case may be made for measuring returns using the 
means of the bid and ask price quotes. Most studies using closing 
price quotes to compute returns implicitly assume the equivalence of 
the mean closing price quotes and the mean of the bid and ask price 
quotes. 
Returns could also be measured assuming the use of "limit" 
orders. Limit orders specify a particular execution price, usually 
outside the current bid-ask price quotes or equal to either the 
specialist's bid-price for a limit-buy order or the ask-price for a 
limit-sell order. If these orders cannot be executed reasonably 
quickly, they are left with the specialist who enters them in the 
limit-order book. These orders will eventually be executed at the 
specified price (assuming that is possible). Thus a "best" case 
return would be measured by buying at the bid and selling at the ask. 
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This is the return typically earned by the specialist. A public 
trader is unlikely, however, to earn this return on a regular basis. 
Nearly three-quarters of all trades utilize market orders. 
Moreover, the specialist participates in two out of every three 
trades. Thus returns computed from ask-to-bid prices are much more 
likely to reflect what might actually be earned than returns based on 
close-to-close prices. Computing returns ask-to-bid (buying at the 
ask and selling at the bid) embodies a "worst case" assumption. Such 
an assumption is, however, probably the most realistic for most public 
(ie., non-exchange member) traders. Computing returns from close-to- 
close prices, in contrast, introduces a bias of potentially 
significant but thus far largely unknown dimensions. This study, 
however, examines the magnitude of this bias. 
2.4 Empirical Anomalies 
The current study bears on all security market studies that have 
used close-to-close returns. Much of the empirical research on market 
behavior has been motivated by tests of market efficiency which use 
the CAPM to establish risk adjusted returns as a benchmark. This 
study is, however, particularly motivated by the recent interest in 
the size, low-priced, and year-end effects as well as the weekend 
effect. The literature on market anomalies is fairly recent in 
origin. The seminal papers were written by Banz (1981) and Reinganum 
(1981) on size effects and by French (1981) and Gibbons and Hess 
(1982) on weekend effects. These researchers were generally testing 
the explanatory power of the CAPM when they discovered the results 
reported in the following sections. The literature in this area is 
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substantial and growing. The following review is not intended to be 
exhaustive. The remainder of this chapter will review the most 
germane research reported in the academic literature. 
2.4.1 Size/Low Price Effects 
Banz (1981) and Reinganum (1981) are frequently cited as the 
motivators of subsequent research activity on size effects. Size 
effects address the incidence of excess risk adjusted rates of return 
accruing to the stocks of small firms over time. The rates of return 
experienced are in excess of those predicted by most asset pricing 
models. Also, size effects are most pronounced in studies utilizing 
daily returns data. Several potential explanations have been offered 
for these anomalies including the possible misspecification of the 
CAPM. Roll (1981) has suggested that nonsynchronous trading may 
explain the size effect anomalies associated with the stocks of small 
firms or firms with small market values of equity. Alternatively, 
Roll (1983) suggested that what appear to be excess (positive) returns 
for small capitalization stocks may have two potential causes: first, 
the mis-estimation of returns; second, the underestimation of risk, 
particularly under conditions of nonsynchronous trading. Lakonishok 
and Smidt (1984) found that stocks in the lowest market value of 
equity (MVE) decile only traded on average 75 percent of their sample 
days. This finding is typical of turn-of-the-year trading patterns. 
Branch and Echevarria (1986) have reported a significant bias in 
returns when those returns are measured using closing prices. Thus an 
indication of nonsynchronous trading, underestimation of risk, and 
overestimated returns may explain the apparent abnormal excess returns 
of small MVE. 
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Stoll and Whaley (1983) suggest that the small MVE effect can 
also be viewed as a low price effect (LPE). Using monthly holding 
period returns and per share price as the stratification variable they 
found results similar to Reinganum (1982). The same results have been 
reported in other research. Both methods utilize stock prices or 
market values computed from stock prices as the classification 
variable. Stoll and Whaley (1983) echo other researchers' concerns 
that the effect could be due to price or other statistical biases. 
Blume and Stambaugh (1983) have suggested that the "bid-ask 
effect" explains part of the size effect. That is, a portion of the 
effect is due to an estimation bias in computed returns for individual 
securities. The bid-ask effect imparts an upward bias in average 
returns computed from closing prices. Moreover, the bias' magnitude 
is largest in stocks with low MVE. The upward bias in computed 
returns results from the oscillation of closing (last) transaction 
prices between quoted bid and ask prices. Unfortunately, they do not 
offer an explanation for why the bid-ask effect imparts an upward bias 
in computed returns. Blume and Stambaugh also suggest that the bid- 
ask effect bias is strongest in rebalanced portfolios and is 
substantially less significant in buy and hold portfolios. This 
reduction in bias for buy and hold portfolios results from a 
"diversification effect" not present in rebalanced portfolios. This 
creates some confusion. Rebalancing means maintaining an equal dollar 
amount invested in each asset held in a portfolio by "rebalancing" at 
the end of each period. Accordingly, stocks which have gone up in 
price must have some portion sold so as to maintain a fixed dollar 
value invested; stocks which have gone down in price must have 
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additional shares purchased in order to maintain the same proportions 
(equal weights). This rebalancing behavior does not present a problem 
in a perfect market; i.e., no transactions costs. The effects of 
rebalancing can be accomplished (de facto) by simply computing the 
daily return of the portfolio as the cross-sectional daily average 
return of all securities in the portfolio and then utilizing these 
daily portfolio returns to compute the geometric holding period 
return. The result appears as a rebalancing to equal weights. The 
lack of a ’’diversification effect” is unlikely to result in a bias or 
bid-ask effect. A portfolio composed of randomly selected securities 
which are bought and held does not necessarily obtain better 
diversification effects than a series of randomly formed portfolios 
over the same time frame. 
Blume and Stambaugh (1983) characterize the magnitude of the 
estimation bias in terms of return differentials between buy-and-hold 
portfolios and rebalanced portfolios. They demonstrate that the bias 
in calculated returns is most noticeable in "rebalanced” portfolios. 
Blume and Stambaugh show that the size effect reported by Reinganum 
(1981) is reduced by one-half when buy-and-hold portfolio returns are 
calculated. This reduction in the magnitude of the size effect is 
attributed to the attenuation of the bid-ask effect via use of buy- 
and-hold portfolios. 
Roll (1983) has shown that the method used for computing mean 
portfolio returns in size effect studies lead to different results. 
The method used to compute mean returns is partly responsible for 
anomalous excess returns accruing to small firms or firms with small 
market values. These results stem from the autocovariance properties 
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of portfolio returns. Specifically, if positive serial dependence is 
present in portfolio returns, arithmetic average returns (AR) will be 
larger than returns for buy-and-hold (BH) or rebalanced (RB) 
portfolios. Thus any size effects will be larger if a simple AR 
return is used in contrast to BH or RB returns. Also, for short-term 
holding periods (ie., daily or weekly) use of arithmetic average 
returns or rebalancing strategies will overstate returns compared to 
buy-and-hold. 
The Mbid-ask effect", in the Blume and Stambaugh (1983) study, 
results in a mis-estimation of the "true" prices (and by implication 
true returns) when the average of observed prices is computed. They 
define the true price as the average of the closing bid and ask price 
quotes. This definition differs from the true price as defined by 
Glosten and Milgrom (1985). The latter define the "true" price as the 
price which would prevail under conditions of symmetric information. 
The two definitions evolve from complementary views of the market 
microstructure. The Blume and Stambaugh (1983) view implicitly 
recognizes the imperfection of real markets; stocks trade at values 
other than their theoretical intrinsic values. The mean of these 
observed transaction prices should, however, be equal to the intrinsic 
value. The intrinsic value is the result of an informationally 
efficient market and is termed the "true" value by Glosten and Milgrom 
(1985). An underlying drift in the daily mean of the closing bid and 
ask price spread over a period of time is a potential source of error 
or bias. This is readily observable in a bull or bear market. A 
tendency of last trade prices to occur on the ask-side (bull market) 
or the bid-side (bear market) could result in a difference between the 
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mean of observed closing prices and the mean of the closing bid and 
ask prices. 
Intuitively, if transactions occur symmetrically at the bid and 
ask levels and randomly within or outside the bid-ask spread, the mean 
of all transaction prices in any security should equal the true price. 
The bias resulting from oscillations of quoted closing prices which 
differentiate the mean of the closing price quotes from the mean of 
the closing bid and ask prices suggest some degree of measurement 
error or inefficiency. Moreover, the bias could be greater if the 
price series were experiencing a drift. The magnitude of the drift 
would be the difference between the mean closing price and the mean of 
the closing bid and ask price quotes divided by the number of 
observations. The presence of any drift in values, up or down, would 
be reflected in the distribution of transactions at the bid, ask, 
inside or outside the bid-ask spread at the close of trading. Thus an 
upward or downward bias might be found in computed average returns 
which are subject to an underlying drift moment. If the "bid-ask” 
effect bias is partly responsible for the size effect, then the bias 
should be relatively large for low price stocks and stocks with low 
trading volumes. This result is due to the magnitude of the relative 
spread which tends to be higher for those stocks. Blume and Stambaugh 
(1983), however, offer limited empirical evidence for their 
hypothesized bid-ask effect. Their sample consisted of one day's 
closing bid and ask price quotes for 332 stocks on the NYSE with bid 
prices less than $8.00. Thus their results may only be valid for a 
static cross-section of stocks and may not reflect the dynamic 
behavior of this bias over a longer period of time. Also, the Blume 
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and Stambaugh study does not examine any other effects due to volume 
differences, price volatility, or the magnitude of the bias as stock 
prices get larger. These additional variables would be useful in any 
study examining the determinants of the bias. 
2.4.2 January Effects 
The sample of December and January bid-ask spreads facilitates 
review of the January effect research. The January effect is the 
apparent tendency of stocks which experienced year-end lows in 
December or large declines in the preceding year to experience 
positive returns in January. Rozeff and Kinney (1976), Branch and 
Freed (1977), Dyl (1977), Keim (1983). More recently Branch and Chang 
(1985), and a host of others observe seasonal effects in stock 
returns. Keim (1983), studying the size effect, observed that 50% of 
the abnormal excess (positive) returns ascribed to the size effect 
occur in the month of January; 26% occurs in the first week in January 
and 11% the first day. As a consequence, the January effect and the 
size effect may exhibit some degree of inter-relationship. The two 
effects may be acting together. Brown, Kleidon and Marsh (1983), 
using monthly returns data report that the January effect is unstable, 
but still positive. Keim (1986) observes that the magnitude of the 
size effect differs across days of the week and months of the year. 
Accordingly, the magnitudes of the effects may be influenced by 
whether the year ends or starts on a Monday or a Friday. Keim (1986) 
also observes that the inclusion of dividends imparts a strong upward 
bias if a sufficient number of companies in the sample are paying 
dividends. Few companies in the lowest price decile of this study 
paid dividends either during the 42-day test sample one or the 43-day 
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confirmation sample. However, all returns will include dividend 
yields. 
2.4.3 Weekend Effects 
Cross (1973), French (1980), and Gibbons and Hess (1981) have 
reported the apparent tendency of stocks to experience negative 
returns on Mondays. This behavior is inconsistent with the weak form 
of the efficient market hypothesis. One potential explanation for the 
weekend effect may be the systematic occurrence of ex-dividend dates 
on Mondays. These studies did not control for the incidence of ex- 
dividend dates. Thus any study of a weekend effect would need to 
control for ex-dividend effects. The French (1980) study reporting a 
weekend effect used a data sample for Standard & Poor’s Industrials 
stocks that did not include dividends. Thus, the presence of a 
substantial negative return on Mondays would be expected in the 
absence of correcting the return computation algorithm for ex¬ 
dividend-day price adjustments. French observes that his results may 
’’...simply reflect a systematic pattern in ’ex-dividend' dates." More 
recently Philips-Patrick and Schneeweis (1987) find that ex-dividend 
price effects distort weekend effect findings and offer an essentially 
theoretical proof. 
2.5 Microstructure Price Behavior and Autocorrelation 
An important concern of security market researchers is the extent 
to which serial price correlations affect the results of empirical 
studies. The general theoretical assumption is that prices are 
randomly drawn from a known distribution. The theoretically expected 
results are independently distributed returns. An important and 
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unresolved question is how returns are related to where stocks close 
in relation to the bid-ask spread. Neiderhofer and Osborne (1966) 
reported the presence of serial dependencies in intraday price 
movements. The presence of autocorrelation in sequential price series 
is a statistically troublesome phenomenon. 
About twenty years ago Niederhofer and Osborne found a tendency 
for intraday transaction prices to move up and down (between the bid 
and ask price quotes) thereby producing an apparent degree of negative 
serial autocorrelation in successive price changes. An earlier study 
by Niederhofer (1965) reported the apparent clustering of limit order 
prices at whole dollar values. The important result is the negative 
autocovariance property of intraday sequential transaction price 
series. This property reflects the manner in which stock trades occur 
when markets are discontinuous. An important explanation for this 
behavior is the activity of the specialist. In markets characterized 
by discontinuous trading, the specialist alternatively buys and sells 
from his (her) own account or holds orders left by other brokers until 
a matching order arrives at the trading post. The result appears as a 
series of up and down movements of transaction prices. The 
assumptional structure of the asset pricing models holds that these 
oscillations are random. The first order negative covariance 
properties would indicate that successive prices are not randomly 
drawn as specified in the theory. 
2.6 Market Indexes and Stock Performance 
A substantial body of literature has addressed the problems of the 
capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and market efficiency. Roll (1977) 
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observed that the choice of index will influence any results obtained 
when the CAPM is used to measure market efficiency. Roll also 
suggested that the market portfolio should contain all assets. 
Statistical sampling techniques allow for the use of very small 
samples in order to ascertain the characteristics of the population. 
In like manner, an index may be constructed using a small set of 
securities which captures the character and trend of the stock market. 
The DJIA has been selected for this purpose. 
Closing prices (last trade of the day) are used to compute price 
changes of securities that are reported in the newspapers and 
elsewhere. These same closing prices are also used to compute the 
values of market indexes and the change in those values. The last 
trade of the day for a particular issue is, however, a rather 
imperfect index of the market for that stock at day's end. The last 
trade could have taken place any time during the day (including the 
opening). Moreover the bid and ask levels could have moved 
appreciably by the end of the day. Without a transaction, however, 
the reported close will not reflect this movement. Most of those who 
follow the market primarily focus on the closing or last trade prices 
to determine what is happening to the market index and individual 
security prices. Also, most measures of stock price volatility ( such 
as betas and nonmarket risk measures) utilize prices and price changes 
based on the close. 
CHAPTER 3 
HYPOTHESES 
3.1 Research Questions 
The basic questions discussed in this chapter are: 
Question la: 
Question lb: 
Question 2a: 
Question 2b: 
Question 2c: 
Question 3: 
How much measurement error is induced in the 
estimate of the true price when closing 
transaction prices are utilized rather than 
closing bid and ask price quotations ? 
What is the magnitude of measurement error in 
computed holding period returns when closing 
prices are used rather than expected closing 
prices estimated from closing bid and ask 
prices ? 
To what extent is the evidence of the size 
effect anomalies the result of misspecification 
of the return generating process ? 
To what extent is the evidence of weekend 
effects the results of misspecifications of 
the return generating process and other market 
regularities ? 
To what extent can we identify potential causes 
of the January effect and can size effects be 
separated from the January effect ? 
How efficient are market estimates of relative 
risk (beta) when alternative price structures 
are utilized to estimate beta ? 
This chapter begins with the development of the rationale 
underlying the construction of alternative price and return measurement 
models to be utilized in testing the persistence of the several 
anomalies reviewed in the literature. The assumptions regarding the 
nature of observed prices will also be tested to determine the extent 
of their viability as estimates of true prices. The specification for 
each of the three return generating process models is based on the 
assumed transaction price level. The models may indicate that some 
portion of the reported anomalies result from the misspecification of 
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the price and return measurement models used in almost all security 
market research. The key to much of the following discussion is the 
manner in which the asset pricing models have been constructed and how 
biases and measurement errors may have resulted in findings 
inconsistent with market efficiency. 
3.2 Observed Prices as True Prices 
Demsetz (1968), Blume and Stambaugh (1983), and Glosten and 
Milgrom (1985) have addressed the notion of the "true" price. The true 
price represents the intrinsic value of the underlying firm’s expected 
income streams on a per share basis. Demsetz characterized the true 
price as the price which would prevail in a perfect market. More 
recently, Blume and Stambaugh and Glosten and Milgrom have defined 
the true price as the simple average of the closing bid and ask price 
quotes in an efficient market. Most market studies assume that the 
closing price is an equivalent of the true price construct. If a 
significant and systematic difference exists between the observed price 
and the true price, then some or all of the reported anomalies may be 
the result of measurement errors induced by the use of closing prices. 
Blume and Stambaugh suggest that a difference between true and observed 
prices does exist and results from a "bid-ask effect." The magnitude 
of the error can be readily obtained as the difference between the 
closing price and the mean of the closing bid and ask price quotes. 
The following discussion draws heavily from Blume and Stambaugh 
(1983) and forms the development rationale for the test hypothesis. 
Let represent the true (expected closing) price and pt represent the 
observed (average closing) price. For purposes of this study, and in 
order to maintain consistency with prior studies, Pt is defined in 
equation (3.1) as the mean of the closing bid (PB) and ask (PA) price 
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quotes; 
Pt = < PB,t + PA,t > / 2 (3.1) 
Errors in estimating security returns arise when Pt and pt are not 
equal. Accordingly, the closing price is modeled by Blume and 
Stambaugh in equation (3.2) as; 
(3.2) 
Solving for 6^ t; 
(3.3) 
The term defines the [percentage] factor by which the observed 
closing price (p-j^) differs from the expected closing price (Pj_ t). 
Blume and Stambaugh assume that Pi,t is equal either to the closing bid 
or the closing ask price. Since many, perhaps most, stocks have bid- 
ask spreads sufficiently large to permit a close between the bid and 
the ask, we estimate the empirical value of 6j_ t as e-j. t. We will then 
compare Blume and Stambaughs E(6) to the empirically estimated E(e). 
Accordingly, we model e^ 
(3.4) ei,t “ [Pi,t / pi,tJ " 1 
We will test to see if E{e-j^t} is nonzero. Blume and Stambaugh (1983) 
assumed 6-^ ^ to be independently distributed across t and independent 
of Pj^t f°r all t. We do not make the same assumption about the 
covariance of (e^ e^ t+j). 
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Results reported by Blume and Stambaugh (1983) did not address the 
magnitude of this error. This omission may be due to the limited 
amount of data available to them. Their study was based on one day’s 
data for closing bid and ask price quotes. The current test examines 
42 days of data for 1134 companies in the test sample and 43 days of 
data for 1205 companies in the verification sample. A second problem 
with the Blume and Stambaugh suggestions is that they do not consider 
the effects of an underlying drift in the true price as market 
estimates of intrinsic values change over time. At question is the 
identity of the mean observed closing price and the mean of the closing 
bid and ask prices. The effects of any underlying drift in the true 
price will be reflected in slightly higher variance estimates for both 
price series. This underlying drift is not expected to have an adverse 
impact on the statistical tests. 
Hypothesis 1—True versus Observed Prices 
Hypothesis 1: The mean of the observed closing price is equal 
to the mean of the closing bid-ask price quotes. 
Specifically, the E{ej)t} = 0. 
This test has two parts. In the first part we will test the 
parameter estimates for all stocks in each of the research samples. In 
the second part we test the parameter estimates for each price- 
classified decile. The two sets of tests are necessary. An objective 
of this phase of the study is to ascertain the magnitude of the bias 
across different price ranges. Failure to reject the null hypothesis 
will imply that the two measures are the same. Failure to accept the 
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null hypothesis will have more important implications for empirical 
anomalies and market efficiency. 
3.3 Observed Returns as True Returns 
Blume and Stambaugh (1983) suggest that the "bid-ask effect" 
results in upwardly biased estimates of security returns. The bias 
results when closing prices, instead of "true" prices, are utilized to 
compute [daily] returns. Blume and Stambaugh estimate the 
"...potential magnitude of the bid-ask bias" (p390) using equation 
(3.5); 
o2(6) = E {(PA - PB) / (PA + PB)}2 (3.5) 
The Blume and Stambaugh suggestion that equation (3.5) defines the 
magnitude of the bid-ask bias requires amplification and correction. 
Equation (3.5) is really a point estimate of the [maximum] variance of 
the difference between the expected (true) closing price and the 
observed closing price. The numerator (pa-Pb) as e(lual to the bid-ask 
spread; the denominator (Pa+pb^ is etlual to two times the true price. 
Equation (3.4) may be re-written as; 
o2(6) = ( 0 / P )2 (3.6) 
where: 0 = one-half the bid-ask spread 
P = the true price computed as (PA+PB)/2 
In effect, o2(6) is a conditional estimate of s2(e); the variance of 
the error term described by equation (3.4). Moreover, equation (3.5) 
explicitly assumes that stocks will close at the bid (PB) or the ask 
(PA) price. This assumption is reasonable for stocks trading with a 
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spread of 1/8 point. This is the case for most stocks in the lowest 
price decile. Blume and Stambaugh estimate the average value of o2(6) 
as .051% (based on one day’s data for 332 NYSE-listed stocks). This 
study will test the generality of that result. We note that the 
magnitude of the bid-ask bias in returns estimated by equation (3.5) is 
conditioned on an assumption of a zero drift in the underlying price 
trends. We will show that the Blume and Stambaugh estimate of the bid- 
ask bias in returns is incorrect when security prices are subject to 
drift. 
Blume and Stambaugh (1983) also fail to test the significance of 
the difference between returns computed using closing prices and 
returns computed using the mean of the closing bid and ask quotes. 
Recall that in an efficient market, the bid and ask quotes should 
straddle the true price. Accordingly, we model two return series; a 
true series and an observed series. The difference between the two 
series represents the magnitude of the bias resulting from the bid-ask 
effect. The true return (R^ t) for anY security i for period t is 
modeled; (Dj. t = dividend) 
Ri,t = { ( pi,t + Di,t ) / pi,t-l 
and the observed return (rj^t) is modeled; 
ri,t “ < < Pi,t + Di,t > / Pi,t-1 
} - 1 (3.7) 
> - 1 (3.8) 
and the error process is modeled; 
*- i, t Ri, t ri, t - rn (3.9) 
If the bid-ask effect is not a factor in return measurements, we expect 
that E($i j-) = 0. Any significant differences between the two computed 
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return series implies a degree of return measurement inefficiency. 
This inefficiency may be the cause of a portion of the return 
estimation problems observed in tests of the asset pricing models. 
Also, this inefficiency may underlie the explanations for research 
results demonstrating anomalies in security returns. 
Hypothesis 2—True Returns versus Observed Returns 
Hypothesis 2: The mean of the observed returns for individual 
securities is equal to the mean of the estimated 
true return. Specifically, E($) = 0. 
Blume and Stambaugh (1983) suggest that E(r-j^t) > E(R^ t). This 
test will explore whether this assertion is true and more importantly 
if the difference is significant. The results of this test, as in the 
previous test, will have important implications for the assumptional 
structures of the asset pricing models. 
3.4 The Size Effect 
The size effects reported by Banz (1981), Reinganum (1981), and 
Keim (1983) may be statistical artifacts of the method used to 
calculate returns. Blume and Stambaugh (1983) and Roll (1983) have 
suggested that size effect findings are influenced by the methods used 
to measure mean portfolio returns. Blume and Stambaugh ascribe the 
magnitude of the findings to "bid-ask effects" which are more 
pronounced in rebalanced portfolios. Roll suggests that the method 
used to compute mean returns contributes to size effect findings. Both 
agree that the affects are minimized, but still present, in buy/hold 
portfolios. Size effects may also be the result of a misspecification 
of the return generating process. An important difference between this 
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study and prior studies is that the current study utilizes stock price 
as the stratification variable instead of the market value of equity. 
Stoll and Whaley (1983) have suggested that the size effect and the low 
price effect are substantially the same. Accordingly, we examine the 
character of the size effect by utilizing the prices rather than market 
value of equity. Clearly low price and low market capitalization are 
not identical; one is no more than an imperfect proxy of the other. 
Accordingly, We expect some loss of generality as a result of this 
modification. 
In an efficient market, the observed closing price is assumed to 
be an identity with the expected closing (true) price. We have 
suggested earlier in this chapter the possibility that the two may be 
different. Even if the two are not significantly different, a problem 
remains stemming from the implicit assumption that the observed closing 
price is in all instances obtainable by a public trader. The problem 
is tied to the measurement of returns. If the expected closing price 
is identical to the price obtainable by a public trader, then the 
return generating process would be modeled as; 
Ri,t = t <Pi,t + Dt) / Pi,t-1 3 " 1 (3.10) 
Note that equation (3.10) assumes a substantive identity between the 
true and observed prices ( Pj^t * Pi,t This assumption is not 
equivalent to implying that Pi}t a £ood representation of an 
obtainable price for a public trader using a market order. Earlier, we 
reviewed the problems and costs incurred when markets do not 
continuously trade. The result is an additional cost for immediacy 
services (the bid-ask spread). This cost is equal to one half of the 
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bid-ask spread for a buy or sell order; we defined 0 to equal one half 
of the spread. Assuming that the most prevalent order used for trading 
securities is the market order, the return process should be modeled; 
*i,t = t <Pi#t“*> + Di,t> / <Pi,t-l+0) 1 - 1 0.11) 
Note that by the normal operation of the market, a market order trader 
buys at the ask and sells at the bid. Accordingly, bid^ t = t - 0 
and aski>t = Pi,t-1 + <*• 
ri,t = [(bidi,t + Di^t^ / as^i,t-l 1 “3 (3.12) 
The returns computed using equation (3.12) are to be compared to 
returns computed using equation (3.10). Two sets of returns will be 
computed; December and January for each price stratified decile . Keim 
(1983) reports a significant difference between January returns and 
returns for other months of the year between firms in the smallest and 
largest market value of equity deciles. Similarly, we will compare 
average December and January returns in testing the persistence of low 
price effects. The low price effect will also be tested using returns 
generated bid-to-ask (simulating a limit order execution). 
Hypothesis 3—Effects of Alternative Specifications of the 
Return Generating Process on Findings of Low Price Effects. 
Hypothesis 3: The low price effect is a statistical artifact 
of the return generating model used to compute 
returns. 
Tests of the low price effect under alternative specifications of 
the return generating process underscore the importance of the biases 
found in returns generated from closing price quotes. The fundamental 
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question is; are the assumptions made about the return generating 
process adequately specified when they rely on closing prices? We have 
earlier described the manner in which returns are most likely to be 
earned; ie., ask-to-bid with a market order, and less probably bid-to- 
ask with a limit-order. The most important return process model must 
be the ask-to-bid model. The results of this study should help 
increase our understanding of the extent to which biases in estimated 
returns underlie the causes of observed empirical regularities. 
One additional set of comparisons will be made. Roll (1983) 
demonstrates that the method used to compute mean portfolio returns in 
size effect studies determines to a significant degree the magnitude of 
the size effect. Accordingly, this study will compute and compare 
returns utilizing the three methodologies outlined by Roll; Arithmetic 
returns (AR), Buy and Hold returns (BH) and Rebalanced returns 'RB). 
The three mean portfolio return measurements are modeled in equations 
(3.13), (3.14), and (3.15). 
RAR = l/HT-I li Zt Ri>t]* (3.13) 
rBH - 1/S-Ii-l H Ri,t 1 (3.14) 
RrB = *t I 1/N-Ij Ri,t ) (3.15) 
Where: S = the number of securities in the portfolio 
t = the total number of periodic returns in the sample 
i = a product of T-periodic returns 
Equations (3.13) and (3.14) specify two alternative methods for 
computing mean equally-weighted portfolio returns. Equation r 3.13) is 
a simple periodic (i.e., daily) average return computed across N 
securities for t periods. This periodic average is then raised to the 
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Tth power to compute the total portfolio return for t periods. 
Equation (3.14) demonstrates the actual investment results achieved 
when equal dollar amounts are invested in N securities and held for t 
periods. Equation (3.15) is the return an investor would earn if equal 
dollar amounts were invested in N securities and maintained by 
rebalancing at the end of each period, t = 1,...,T. Research use of 
equation (3.15) implicitly ignores the transactions costs which would 
be incurred as a result of periodic rebalancing of the amounts invested 
in each security held. 
Twelve different estimates of portfolio returns are possible. 
Discrete returns may be computed with equations (3.7), (3.8), (3.12), 
and a variation of (3.12) reflecting the use of a limit order and 
portfolio returns computed with equations (3.13), (3.14), and (3.15); 4 
x 3 = 12. Roll shows that (AR) returns are greater than (BH) in the 
presence of positive serial correlations in portfolio returns. Roll 
also shows that (RB) returns are also larger than (BH) returns. These 
results obtain from the behavior of the error process in computed 
returns. 
3.5 The Weekend Effect 
The weekend effect has been documented in studies by Cross (1973), 
French (1980), and Gibbons and Hess (1981). In each study returns 
generated from closing prices have been utilized. These studies have 
generally lacked adequate controls for potential biases in Friday- 
Monday returns caused by any tendency for large numbers of stocks to go 
ex-dividend on Mondays compared to other days of the week. Also, these 
studies have not examined the effects across different levels of price 
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and under alternative specifications of a return generating process. 
The use of closing prices to estimate returns are known to involve 
significant estimation biases. These biases may underlie findings of 
weekend effects in stock returns. 
This study will reexamine the weekend effect utilizing two 
separate methodologies. First, Friday-to-Monday and Monday-to-Tuesday 
returns will be estimated using equations (3.10) and (3.12). 
Differences between Friday-Monday and Monday-Tuesday returns will be 
tested for significance. Second, the effects will be examined for each 
price stratified decile. Dichotomization of the sample permits more 
discrete information to be established on the nature of the effect. 
Weekend effects may also be the result of a misspecification of the 
return generating process. Alternatively, the weekend effect may not 
be uniform across different stock price ranges. Finally, the weekend 
effect may be the result of mis-estimations of true prices and returns 
by observed prices and returns. 
Hypothesis 4—Causes and Explanations of the Weekend Effect 
Hypothesis 4a: The weekend effect is a statistical artifact of 
the return generating process used to compute 
returns. 
Hypothesis 4b: The weekend effect is uniform across all 
securities regardless of price range or dividend 
payment artifacts. 
Examination of these two hypotheses will permit a more structured 
and complete study of the weekend effect in stock returns. Earlier 
studies reporting weekend effects have generally failed to examine all 
the available information fully and have as a result been unable to 
explain adequately the probable causes of the anomaly. 
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3.6 The January Effect 
Several studies have noted the apparent tendency of stocks 
experiencing depressed prices in December to experience substantial 
gains in January. These findings may have been confounded by size 
effects or other possible anomalies. Substantial disagreement 
permeates the various papers on the subject. The current study is 
principally engaged in examining the biases induced in returns when 
those returns are measured using closing prices rather than bid and ask 
price structures. The nature of the data samples, however, permits a 
partial examination of this effect. Accordingly, the first (lowest) 
and tenth (highest) price deciles are subdivided into quintiles. 
Stocks are assigned into each quintile on the basis of December 
returns. Stocks with the poorest December performance are assigned to 
quintile one, those with the best December performance to quintile 
five. These quintiles are then utilized to contrast December and 
January returns. Some research has reported that stocks experiencing 
large declines in December experience large gains in January. Other 
research has shown that stocks with large positive returns in December 
experience additional gains in the new year. Also, price and volume 
data may be examined to test the strength of the January effect. No 
testable hypotheses are offered due to the limitation imposed by the 
time period of the data samples. This particular area, however, offers 
a fertile ground for additional research with an expanded data set. 
3.7 Alternative Price Specification Effects on Indexes 
A final area of interest in this study is the construction of a 
market index using prices other than the closing price reported in the 
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financial press and on the data tapes. Of particular interest are the 
magnitudes of any differences noted between alternative index 
construction methods and measures of risk (beta). The use of closing 
prices may result in a more volatile index and/or more volatile 
estimates of risk when the market model, equation (3.16), is utilized. 
The interest in this particular area stems from the frequent 
identification of a misspecified asset pricing model or problems 
arising from mis-estimation of returns and variances. This particular 
part of the study may not lend itself to meaningful statistical testing 
due to the limited time-frame of the sample and the problems attendant 
to getting good estimates of beta. The results to be described in this 
study should be treated accordingly. Also, no part of this inquiry is 
meant to imply an interest in forecasting returns. Our principal 
objective is to determine whether more efficient estimates of beta may 
be attained by utilizing alternative price structures. 
The current study will examine the effect of using the mean of the 
closing bid and ask price quotes to generate returns and estimates of 
beta (using the market model). A recurrent observation in the 
literature on size effects is that these effects are to some degree the 
result of misestimations of risk and/or over-estimations of return. 
Elimination of potential sources of estimation error should improve the 
efficiency of beta estimates. Returns will be generated using 
equations (3.7) and (3.8). Betas will be estimated using the market 
model as defined by equation (3.16); 
Rit ~ ai + &i_Rmt + eit (3.16) 
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Betas estimated by using returns computed with equation (3.7) will be 
compared to betas estimated with returns computed with equation (3.8). 
We would expect that the latter would be more efficient than the 
former. 
Hypothesis 5—Efficiency of Beta Estimates 
Hypothesis 5: Estimates of betas are sensitive to errors 
induced by misestimations of true prices 
in computing returns. 
An additional set of betas may be estimated using the returns 
estimated from equation (3.12) for all securities in the sample. This 
study recognizes that these estimates as well as the estimates using 
equations (3.7) and (3.8) are deficient in that they only cover a very 
limited time sample. These estimates are made for purposes of 
determining if increases in risk estimation and pricing efficiency are 
possible when alternative price constructs are used in estimating 
returns. As stated in the beginning of this chapter, a substantial 
portion of the deficiencies of the asset pricing models, the CAPM in 
particular, may be the result of numerous small sources of errors in 
estimating security returns. The reduction of these sources of error 
may be achieved via corrections in the specifications of the price and 
return generating models. 
CHAPTER 4 
METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
This chapter begins with an outline of the research design. 
Special emphasis is placed on discussing the significance of the test 
procedures for the research hypotheses. A description of the samples 
follows. A discussion of measurement procedures and statistical 
analysis completes the work of the chapter. 
4.1 Research Design 
The hypotheses to be tested in this study call for two basic 
research designs. Hypotheses 1, 2, 3, and 4 require the computation of 
means and variances. Hypothesis 5 requires the regression of 
individual security returns against a proxy for the market portfolio 
using alternative price and return generating process specifications. 
The form of the tests are rather simple. The implications of those 
tests are another matter. 
4.1.1 Hypothesis 1 and 2 
These hypotheses address important questions raised in security 
market research regarding the equivalence of observed prices and 
returns and the estimates of true prices and returns constructed from 
closing bid and ask price quotations. In an efficient market the bid 
and ask price quotes should straddle the true price. Any significant 
deviation of closing prices from the mean of the closing bid and ask 
prices becomes important in light of the operation and sensitivity of 
the asset pricing models. The problems in the use of the asset pricing 
models to test market efficiency are well documented. At issue in this 
section of the study is the magnitude of the errors in the price 
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assumptions and whether those errors are systematic. Accordingly, we 
test to see if errors are significantly different from zero, or if two 
sample means are the same or significantly different. The test of 
hypothesis 1 will indicate whether the mean of an observed series of 
closing prices is equal to the mean of the closing bid and ask quotes. 
The Milgrom, et al, price theory holds that the expected closing price 
should be approximately equal to the true price. The expected closing 
price is assumed to be the average of observed closing prices over some 
unspecified time period for any randomly selected security. Any 
significant differences could result in potential errors in measuring 
returns. The validation of that finding is made by testing the returns 
generated from the observed price series against returns computed 
utilizing the closing bid and ask prices. The test of hypothesis 2 is 
designed to indicate whether the observed returns are equal to the true 
returns. Both tests are used to determine the extent of measurement 
errors in the variables used to test market efficiency and the asset 
pricing models. The problem of measurement errors is non-trivial even 
in samples as large as those typically used in security market 
research. 
4.1.2 Hypotheses 3 and 4 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 address specific anomalies reported in the 
literature. Hypothesis 3 examines the persistence of the size effect 
when alternative specifications of the return generating process are 
utilized. The market value of equity is generally used to study the 
small firm or size effect. A study by Stoll and Whaley (1983) 
confirmed findings by Banz (1981) and Reinganum (1981) reporting the 
inverse relationship between market value of equity and risk-adjusted 
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returns. Stoll and Whaley also demonstrate that price per share 
exhibits the same characteristic. Accordingly, price per share is 
utilized to examine the dynamics of the size effect. Separate return 
series are generated for December and January. Results reported by 
other researchers {i.e., Keim (1983)} indicate that the returns of 
these two months are significantly different. Accordingly, we test the 
data sample using the same return generating model specification in 
order to verify that the anomaly is present. The same data set is then 
tested with returns measured in different ways to determine whether or 
not the anomalies persist and if they do exist, whether the effects are 
attenuated or magnified. 
The size effect anomaly will be tested in a manner similar to 
Reinganum (1981). The sample will be divided into deciles using price 
as the classification variable. Testing of the sample will be made to 
ascertain the strength of the difference between December and January 
returns using close-to-close prices. One important difference between 
this and prior studies is the size of the data sample. Prior studies 
have typically used 15 to 20 or more years of data. The current study 
has two months of data in the test sample and an additional two months 
in the verification sample. The enormity of effort required to collect 
just one month of closing bid-ask quotes in computer-usable form 
restricted our sample size. The implications of any results found 
using this data sample are accordingly limited. This study will be 
able to examine returns in the month of January relative to December 
returns. Keim (1983) has reported that a substantial portion of the 
size effect (excess returns for small capitalization stocks) occurs in 
January and the bulk of it in the first week in January. The current 
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data sample allows these findings to be confirmed. The size effect may 
then be tested using the alternative return measures from chapter III. 
The size effect will be tested primarily for the differences between 
the average daily returns when different methods are utilized to 
compute portfolio average returns. Specifically, Roll (1983) suggested 
that the manner in which returns are measured explain part of the 
effect. Roll discusses three methods for measuring portfolio returns; 
averaged returns (AR), buy-hold returns (BH) and rebalanced returns 
(RB). Given the observed presence of negative autocovariance in 
individual security returns and positive covariance in portfolio 
returns, testing for the size effect will utilize the BH method as the 
primary test vehicle. Roll (1983) and others have reported this method 
yields the smallest, but still significant, size effect. The price 
deciles become the buy-hold portfolios. December returns will be 
compared to January returns using the three return calculation methods 
discussed in chapter III. Student-t tests will be used to test if the 
differences are statistically significant. 
Hypothesis 4 addresses the weekend effect anomaly in much the same 
manner as hypothesis 3. The weekend effect is important as it forms a 
major violation of the random walk hypothesis. Systematic negative 
returns accruing on Mondays in contrast to other days of the week are 
potentially troublesome, particularly for studies using monthly or 
weekly data. The prevalence of Monday observations in the data set 
would tend to bias downward the estimated returns. Also, variance 
estimates might be upwardly biased unless corrective measures are 
taken. The results could appear as excess risk adjusted returns. The 
test procedures for the weekend effect require three separate phases. 
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First, the returns are tested for dividend effects. A systematic 
pattern of ex-dividend dates falling on Mondays could result in the 
observed negative returns . A second possibility is that the effect is 
not universal. It may be stronger in some price categories and not in 
others. In the second phase, we gauge the strength of the anomaly 
across price stratified data. The effect may be significant in some 
deciles and not in others. As a consequence, a few securities may be 
able to influence overall results. Alternatively, the effect may be 
the artifact of the means used to measure returns. In phase three we 
test the returns generating model specification hypothesis. The 
weekend effect may be an artifact of the method used to measure 
returns. An important thread throughout the current study is the 
importance of this specification. The strength of previously reported 
anomalies will be substantially attenuated when the return generating 
process is respecified. 
The weekend effect will be tested by examining the difference 
between the average of returns generated Friday-to-Monday (or Thursday- 
to-Monday for the holiday weekends) and average Monday-to-Tuesday 
returns using equations (3.7),(3.8), and (3.12) in chapter III to 
compute each daily return. Statistical tests of the difference between 
the two sets of average returns will confirm the presence of a weekend 
effect in the sample data. The data sample will then be subdivided 
into dividend and non-dividend paying stocks to test further the nature 
of the anomaly. If the weekend effects anomaly is sensitive to the 
presence of ex-dividend day effects, then weekend returns should not 
differ significantly from weekday returns when dividend paying stocks 
are excluded. The weekend anomaly may also be an artifact of the 
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manner in which returns are measured; in addition to or exclusive of 
ex-dividend day effects. One additional examination of the data is 
possible. If ex-dividend day frequency distributions are non-random, 
then we should observe a non-random pattern in daily price effects. 
The tests in this section are strongly related to the first set of 
tests described in section 4.1.1. The common objective of the first 
four hypotheses is to gauge the behavior of anomalies and errors when 
alternative specifications of price structures are imposed and when 
alternative specifications of the return generating process are 
utilized. A third anomaly, the January effect, is also examined 
The January effect refers to the apparent tendency of stock prices 
depressed in December to experience substantial gains in January. 
These effects may be compounded by low price effects. Stocks which 
have reached lows are very likely to fall in the lower price deciles. 
Any stock experiencing a low in December may experience a substantially 
positive move in December. Moreover, the magnitude of the January 
"recovery" may be a function of the price level. An appropriate test 
would be to subdivide securities within each decile on the basis of 
December performance. Stocks in the first and tenth price deciles are 
rank-ordered on the basis of December returns into quintiles. January 
returns are compared to December returns by quintile to examine the 
extent of the January effect and to determine if the January effect is 
sensitive to price level. Also, stocks which have not reached year end 
lows in December are equally likely to experience substantial gains in 
January. Since the two effects may be difficult to separate, this 
study will examine the distribution of December returns against January 
returns. Accordingly, two sets of returns (December vs January) for 
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the lowest and highest price deciles will be examined using mean 
quintile return differentials. The differentials will be tested to see 
if they are significantly different from zero. The resulting analysis 
should permit some generalizations to be made about the January effect. 
4.1.3 Hypothesis 5 
Hypothesis 5 brings the process of this study to an interim 
conclusion. The results to be presented in the following chapter will 
raise several questions about the methodologies used in constructing 
the asset pricing models and in the relevancy of the assumptional 
structures which support them. In Hypothesis 5 we test to see if more 
efficient estimates of relative (beta) risk are possible when 
measurement errors in the variables are minimized. Accordingly, we 
estimate beta utilizing the simple market model and two different price 
series. The first price series is the usual closing price series. 
This series is used to compute returns for individual securities and 
the proxy for the market portfolio. All securities in the sample are 
used to construct the market index. The second price series is 
constructed by calculating the means of the closing bid and ask quotes. 
In effect, the second price series enables us to estimate the true 
return. We assume that such a return is capable of being estimated 
using empirical data. The assumption is non-trivial. If the notion of 
an efficient market is to be verified empirically, then this series 
should yield improved estimates of beta. If this series does not 
improve the efficiency of the model, then other constructs might be 
required in order to improve or respecify the current asset pricing 
models. 
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4.2 The Research Sample 
The research data sample is divided into two sub-samples. The 
first test sample (TS1) includes market data for 1134 stocks traded on 
the NYSE over the period from December 1, 1981 through January 29, 1982 
(42 days). The second test sample (TS2) covers the period December 1, 
1982 through January 31,1983 (43 days), and contains market data for 
1205 stocks. TS1 includes daily open, high, low, closing, bid, and ask 
price quotes, and trading volume; TS2 consists of bid, ask, and 
closing price data. Open, high, low, close, and volume data were 
extracted from the daily range tape prepared by Fitch for the NYSE. 
Closing bid and ask price quotes for each day in the data sample were 
provided by Fitch’s ’’Stock Quotations on the New York Stock Exchange". 
TS1 information on ex-dividend dates and dividend amounts were manually 
inputted from Standard and Poor's Dividend Record (1982). TS2 
information on ex-dividend dates and distributions were extracted fiom 
the CRSP daily master tape (1987). The resulting data samples 
represent a substantial increase in the amount of bid and ask price 
data from that used in prior studies. The data samples contain no 
preferred stocks, or warrants. Also, the return computation 
algorithms have been modified to allow for the ex-day effects of stock 
dividends or stock splits during the two-month time frame covered by 
the samples. A check has been made on the extent of missing 
observations. For TS1, out of 47,292 transaction line items, 348 were 
missing data on the range tape (.74%). A smaller percentage of issues 
are missing data in TS2. Issues missing three or more successive days 
of closing, bid, or ask price data were excluded from the samples. 
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Finally, the data samples have been checked for the presence of 
foreign securities trading via American Depository Receipts (ADRs). 
These securities were deleted from the sample to remove any currency 
translation effects which might affect parameter estimates. The 
resulting data samples has been exhaustively checked to assure a 
reasonably high degree of accuracy. This included spot checking of 
closing prices and ex-dividend dates reported in the Wall Street 
Journal for randomly selected days and stocks. The resulting data 
sample should permit accurate estimation of "true" returns and 
variances in a manner consistent with that suggested by Blume and 
Stambaugh (1983), Glosten and Milgrom (1985), and the extensive 
literature on the EMH. 
4.3 Measurement of Variables 
The methods used to measure portfolio returns in testing low price 
effects follow Roll (1983). Accordingly, mean portfolio returns are 
measured AR, BH, and RB. The January effect is tested using geometric 
returns computed for each security, then averaged cross-sectionally by 
quintile for the months of December and January. January returns 
assume that stocks were purchased on December 31st. This is in accord 
with the general convention adopted in this investigation; re¬ 
balancing to equal weights are assumed to occur on December 31st and 
are motivated by tax-related reasons. This differs from the usual 
practice of cross-sectional averaging of daily returns for the period 
under observation. The latter practice yields substantial distortions 
in the magnitude of reported anomalies. The general method in this 
investigation is to calculate geometric returns for individual 
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securities and measure variances as the difference between the mean 
geometric return and the discrete period returns. This practice yields 
more appropriate estimates of the contribution of individual securities 
to portfolio variance. Elsewhere, individual daily returns are 
computed, summed, and averaged cross-sectionally by decile and for the 
overall sample. We expect no loss of generality from using this 
method. 
As noted in the introduction and literature review, almost all 
prior studies on bid-ask spreads and their determinants were based on 
small samples of bid-ask data. Some samples were cross-sectionally 
large but none were time series large. No sample reported in the 
literature was deemed large enough to permit a reasonable subdivision 
into quartiles, quintiles, or deciles. The current study provides a 
total of 85 days of closing bid and ask price data for over two 
thousand securities. The data sample covers two pronounced market 
movements. The resulting contrast will enable us to make better 
descriptions of market behavior in the case of spreads, returns, and 
measurement errors. 
4.4 The Degree of Bias in Computed Returns 
We suggested earlier that biases are introduced when returns are 
measured using closing prices. A more realistic measurement of returns 
would assume the use of "market” orders (the only type that assures a 
trade). Most market orders to sell are executed at the bid while most 
market orders to buy are executed at the ask. Accordingly, returns 
should be measured from yesterday’s ask for a buy to today's bid for a 
sell. Buying at the bid (in effect competing with the specialist) and 
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selling at the ask is also possible. Returns based on such trades 
would assume the use of attractively placed "limit” orders for both the 
buy and the sell. This discussion suggests three alternative return 
measurement methods: Close-to-close, ask-to-bid, and bid-to-ask. This 
investigation will study returns measured ask-to-bid (Rab) and bid-to- 
ask (Rba) in addition to close-to-close (Rcc) returns. The magnitude 
of return measurement biases for the data samples will be reported in 
chapter V in summary form. Mean daily returns variances are also 
examined to determine relative volatilities. 
Average daily returns will be computed utilizing closing prices 
and compared to average daily returns computed from the mean of the 
closing bid and ask price quotes for each data sample. Additionally, 
each sample will be stratified by price and average returns computed 
for each decile. Three sets of returns will be computed: AR, BH, and 
RB following Roll (1983). The December 1, 1981 closing price will be 
utilized as the stratification variable. Any biases due the "bid-ask" 
effect will be demonstrated by a significant difference between returns 
measured close-to-close (CC) and returns measured with the daily means 
of the closing bid and ask price quotes (MAB). Thus, six sets of 
returns are computed and corresponding sets, three for each sub-sample, 
tested for the statistical significance of the differences (CC-MAB) for 
each of the Roll (1983) portfolio return measurement models. 
4.5 Testing Empirical Anomalies 
The limited time horizon of the data samples utilized in this 
study requires that the samples be tested for the presence of 
previously reported anomalies. The presence of these anomalies when 
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returns are measured in the traditional way (close-to-close) will serve 
to underscore the validity of any different results obtained when the 
alternative return generating specifications are used. Accordingly, 
the data samples will be divided into deciles using closing prices on 
December 1st as the stratification variable. Statistical testing of 
the data samples should reveal the presence of significant weekend and 
low price effects previously reported by French (1980) and Stoll and 
Whaley (1983), respectively. 
The price-stratified samples will be utilized to measure mean 
December and January returns for buy-hold portfolios. Student-t tests 
for the difference between January and December mean daily returns 
should indicate if January returns are significantly less negative or 
more positive compared to December for the low price decile. Also, 
these results may be influenced by the presence of a January effect. 
Statistical tests for the significance of the difference between 
two means will be conducted to verify the presence of the weekend 
effect in the data sample. The t-statistic for all stocks in each 
sample is expected to indicate a significant weekend effect. The 
results of these tests may be affected by the time period covered by 
the data samples. The weekend effect examined during a period at the 
turn-of-the-year may be different from the weekend effect examined at 
other times of the year. The first day of January has been reported by 
Keim (1983) and others to contain the largest proportion of the size 
affect. Both data samples in this study commence the new year on a 
Monday. Therefore, testing will be conducted with the new years’ 
returns included and excluded from the samples. 
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Friday-Monday returns have been reported to be significantly 
(more) negative than Monday-Tuesday returns. The same test will be 
repeated for each of the price-stratified deciles. These tests should 
provide additional insights into the nature of the weekend returns 
anomaly. Also, the price stratified deciles will be dichotomized on 
the basis of stocks declaring dividends during the sample time frame 
and those which did not declare dividends. The strong presence of a 
weekend effect when prices are corrected for dividends indicates the 
effect is not an artifact of a systematic trend for large numbers of 
stocks to go ex-dividend on Mondays. This result will be strengthened 
if non-ex-dividend stocks also experience negative weekend returns in 
contrast to (positive) weekday returns. 
The tests will be repeated using returns measured ask-to-bid and 
bid-to-ask to test for persistence of the effect. If the effects are 
still present we can tentatively conclude that the empirical anomalies 
are not statistical artifacts resulting from the manner in which 
returns are measured. Alternatively, if the effects are not present 
when returns are measured using alternative specifications of the 
return generating process, we may tentatively conclude that the 
empirical anomalies are artifacts of the manner in which returns have 
been traditionally measured. 
CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS I 
5.1 Sample Summary Statistics 
A meaningful evaluation of the empirical results to be reported in 
chapter VI requires an understanding of the biases induced in returns 
when those returns are computed solely with closing prices. The key to 
that knowledge is an understanding of the behavior of prices, bid-ask 
spreads, trading volumes, and trading activity at the microstructure 
level. The chapter begins with an examination of the distributions and 
changes in the magnitude of the relevant variables. The test sample 
statistics are reported first. The same information is then reported 
for the verification sample. Differences are noted along with 
potential explanations. The expected result is an increase in our 
understanding of market microstructure behavior and new insight on the 
nature of empirical anomalies in the research literature. 
The hypotheses to be examined in this study are first tested using 
test sample one (TS1). These results are then compared to a second 
sample, test sample two (TS2). The data are analyzed under two general 
schemes; collectively, and stratified by price (closing price on 
December 1, 1981 or December 1, 1982). Securities are assigned to ten 
equal-weighted portfolios and daily cross-sectional average returns 
calculated for each price-stratified portfolio. These portfolios were 
maintained for all subsequent calculations, in effect creating buy-and- 
hold portfolios. 
Figure 5.1.A displays the trend of the daily cross-sectional 
average price for TS1. (Chart Note: F = Friday, T = Thursday) 
68 
Bid -e- X Spread 
Figure 5.1.A. Closing Bid, Asked, and Last Trade Prices. Daily cross- 
sectional averages for 1134 NYSE issues in test sample one for period 
December 1, 1981 through January 29, 1982. 
Figure 5.I.B. Closing Bid, Asked, and Last Trade Prices. Daily cross- 
sectional averages for 1205 NYSE issues in test sample one for period 
December 1, 1982 through January 31, 1982. 
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Prices in TS1 declined slowly throughout December (1981). The rate of 
decline accelerated the first seven trading days in January (1982). 
Figure 5.1.B (p. 68) displays the average price trends in TS2. The 
broad market finished approximately where it started for the month of 
December; the January market finished noticeably higher. 
Table 5.1.A (p. 70) presents summary data for each decile in TS1. 
January prices were typically lower in all deciles compared to December 
reflecting the general bear trend of the market during this time frame. 
Relative (percentage) spreads were larger in January for all deciles: 
The increase in January relative spreads reflects lower prices and a 
general decline in share volume. The behavior of the average relative 
spread for TS1 is plotted in figure 5.1.A. These results are in 
conformance with the behavior of spreads reported by Demsetz, et al. 
Column (4) contains the average daily value of the absolute (dollar) 
spread for all stocks in each decile; absolute spreads increase as 
stock prices get larger. Demsetz (1968) suggested that the absolute 
spread increases with share price in order to maintain constant 
proportionality between the cost of transacting and total transaction 
dollar value. Column (5) contains the average relative spread: 
Relative spreads are largest for the lowest-priced stocks and exhibit a 
monotone decline by decile as prices get larger. These results accord 
with those reported by Demsetz (1968), Tinic (1971), and others 
researching microstructure behavior. Moreover, the results indicate 
that the general characteristics of test sample one are similar to 
those reported by other researchers using different (and smaller) 
samples of bid-ask price data and different time frames. Accordingly, 
we conclude that TS1 is typical of securities traded on the NYSE. 
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Table 5.1.A: Average Daily Closing Prices & Spreads 
Test Sample One Summary Data by Deciles 
Dec 
(1) 
Close 
DEC! 
(2) 
Bid 
EMBER 
(3) 
Ask 
19 8 1 
(4) 
$Sprd 
(5) 
%Sprd 
(6) 
N 
1 4.978 4.910 5.082 0.172 4.002 105 
2 9.940 9.857 10.061 0.204 2.081 113 
3 13.226 13.123 13.357 0.234 1.781 112 
4 16.076 15.969 16.216 0.247 1.546 106 
5 18.934 18.818 19.077 0.260 1.372 121 
6 22.672 22.546 22.825 0.278 1.235 114 
7 26.069 25.936 26.225 0.288 1.111 100 
8 30.198 30.061 30.356 0.295 0.982 121 
9 36.686 36.540 36.844 0.303 0.831 114 
10 53.405 53.248 53.572 0.323 0.615 128 
JAN U A R Y 19 8 2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dec Close Bid Ask $Sprd %Sprd N 
1 4.898 4.815 4.990 0.175 4.159 105 
2 9.741 9.643 9.852 0.210 2.204 113 
3 12.857 12.744 12.984 0.241 1.891 112 
4 15.656 15.542 15.789 0.247 1.596 106 
5 18.311 18.186 18.449 0.263 1.440 121 
6 21.486 21.354 21.634 0.281 1.317 114 
7 24.803 24.666 24.957 0.290 1.178 100 
8 28.807 28.671 28.957 0.286 1.004 121 
9 34.024 33.879 34.177 0.297 0.882 114 
10 50.441 50.287 50.601 0.314 0.639 128 
Note: %Sprd = (ask-bid)/((ask+bid)/2) * 100 
Table 5.1.B (p. 71) displays the summary data for each decile in 
TS2. In TS2, prices are typically higher in January compared to 
December. Percentage spreads are typically smaller in January; a 
result of slightly higher prices. December and January absolute 
spreads are insignificantly different. General comparisons of TS1 and 
TS2 reveal a consistent orderliness in the behavior of spreads in 
response to changes in price levels. Percentage spreads tend to get 
larger as prices get smaller and vice-versa. This behavior is shown in 
figures 5.1.A and 5.1.B 
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Table 5.1.B: Average Daily Closing Prices & Spreads 
Test Sample Two Summary Data by Decile 
Dec 
(1) 
Close 
DEC1 
(2) 
Bid 
5MBER 
(3) 
Ask 
19 8 2 
(4) 
$Sprd 
(5) 
%Sprd 
(6) 
N 
1 5.685 5.608 5.789 0.181 3.729 109 
2 10.640 10.547 10.763 0.216 2.058 no 
3 15.029 14.915 15.159 0.243 1.639 145 
4 17.960 17.845 18.105 0.260 1.455 100 
5 20.885 20.767 21.034 0.267 1.288 130 
6 24.716 24.594 24.878 0.283 1.151 132 
7 28.616 28.500 28.797 0.297 1.042 118 
8 33.832 33.693 33.998 0.306 0.909 118 
9 42.070 41.916 42.236 0.320 0.768 124 
10 62.917 62.738 63.105 0.368 0.598 119 
JAN U A R Y 19 8 3 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dec Close Bid Ask $Sprd %Sprd N 
1 6.364 6.271 6.455 0.184 3.475 109 
2 11.501 11.395 11.609 0.214 1.909 110 
3 15.927 15.813 16.054 0.242 1.539 145 
4 19.051 18.923 19.183 0.261 1.385 100 
5 21.970 21.840 22.109 0.269 1.242 130 
6 25.378 25.259 25.538 0.280 1.114 132 
7 29.676 29.550 29.841 0.291 0.991 118 
8 34.830 34.703 35.011 0.309 0.904 118 
9 42.589 42.437 42.751 0.314 0.750 124 
10 62.831 62.649 63.022 0.374 0.610 119 
Note: %Sprd = (Ask-Bid)/((ask+bid)/2) * 100 
In general, prices (average decile) in TS2 are uniformly greater than 
prices in TS1. The equally weighted average prices in TS1 and TS2 are 
$23,226 and $26,786, respectively. Also, TS1 dollar spreads are 
greater and percentage spreads smaller compared to TS1. 
5.2 Bid-Ask Spread Behavior 
Earlier we have suggested that increases in absolute spreads and 
decreases in relative spreads are log-linear functions of price. We 
observe in figure 2.1 (chapter 2), however, that the relative spread in 
the lowest price decile does not appear to be a strictly linear 
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function of price (Figure 2.1 is plotted using sample averages from 
table 5.1.A). This observation is tested using linear regression and a 
logarithmic transformation of the data in table 5.1.A. We note that 
regressions on decile data are very low power compared with regression 
analysis on the actual spreads for all stocks in the data samples. The 
following analysis is performed to estimate the degree to which actual 
bid-ask spreads deviate from those predicted by a linear regression 
model. 
Two regressions are estimated and the error processes examined. 
The first regression included price and relative spread data for 
deciles 2 through 10. The regression parameter estimates were used to 
estimate the relative spread for the first decile given the average 
price for stocks in that decile. The relative spread estimate for 
decile 1 is 2.896 standard errors from the regression line; the fitted 
regression line under-estimates the actual spread. The second 
regression included price and relative spread for all ten deciles. The 
result is a decrease in the forecast error for the first decile (1.152 
standard errors from the regression line) and an increase in forecast 
error for the second decile (-2.080 standard errors); spreads are 
under-estimated for the lowest price decile and substantially over¬ 
estimated for the second price decile. We concluded that relative 
spreads for the lowest price decile tend to exceed the proportionality 
implied by Demsetz (1968) by a significant amount. Moreover, including 
the lowest price decile in the regression increases the standard error 
of the forecast. This result may be due in part to the 1/8 point 
minimum spread used on the NYSE for all stocks trading in excess of one 
dollar per share. Smaller spreads might permit more nearly 
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proportional bid-ask spreads when very low price levels are considered. 
The larger than expected relative spread for the lowest price stocks 
may be a significant factor in size effect or in low price effect 
studies. 
Stocks in the tenth decile are characterized by the largest 
absolute ($) spreads (3/8 of a point on average). Stocks in the lowest 
price decile typically have low absolute spreads; slightly greater than 
1/8 point on average. A related observation is that low prices 
increase the probability of specialist participation in market-order 
trading activity due to the size of the spread. 
Trading volumes are not reported in detail for either of the two 
sub-samples in this study. They are available for TS1 but not for TS2. 
NYSE volumes were, however, substantially higher during the time period 
covered by TS2. Accordingly, we make the assumption that trading 
volumes were higher in all price deciles. The general support for this 
assumption is the difference in average bid-ask spreads between the two 
samples. TS2 spreads were typically lower than TS1 spreads. This 
difference is due in part to slightly higher prices and higher trading 
volumes. 
5.3 Computing Returns Under Alternative Assumptions 
Average daily returns are computed using three alternative 
methods: askt_^-to-bidt, bidt_j-to-askt, and closet_i-to-closet. 
Returns measured ask-to-bid assume the use of market orders for one 
round lot; buy at the ask and sell at the bid. Since market orders 
require immediate execution, they are almost certain to be executed 
without difficulty. Returns measured bid-to-ask assume the use of 
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limit orders; buy at the bid and sell at the ask. This bid-ask return 
represents a "best case" assumption for a trader. The execution of a 
limit order placed to buy at the bid or sell at the ask is relatively 
uncertain. Not only must a trader emerge to take the other side, but 
such trading interest must be sufficiently large to absorb any orders 
that had been previously placed at the limit price. Clearly, a trading 
strategy which assumes the use of market orders (the worst case 
assumption) is much more realistic than one which assumes trades at 
either the close or at favorably placed limit orders, particularly for 
infrequently traded stocks. For stocks with high trading volumes, 
measuring returns bid (buy) to ask (sell) is more likely but still 
unrealistic. For comparative purposes returns are also measured using 
closing prices. The three sets of calculated returns exhibit 
considerable differences. Table 5.2.A (TS1) and Table 5.2.B (TS2) show 
the (unweighted) average daily cross-sectional returns and the average 
difference between alternative return measures for all stocks in each 
sample. Columns (1), (2), and (3) in both tables indicate the mean 
daily return for all stocks in each sample. Returns are measured 
closet_i-to-closet (CC), askt-_j-to-bidt: (AB), and bidt_j-to-askt 
(BA), and are computed using equation (5.1) 
rt = KPt + dt^ / Pt-ll ~ 1 (5.1) 
where: rt = holding period return 
Pt = closing price quote (ask, bid, or close) 
pt_l = closing price quote (ask, bid, or close) 
dt = dividend paid to owners of record day t 
where t = last cum dividend trade date 
The unweighted average daily (CC) return for all stocks in TS1 for the 
42-day period was -.0896% , a value insignificantly different from 
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zero. The average (AB) and (BA) returns were -1.633% and 1.484%, 
respectively. (AB) and (BA) returns are significantly different from 
zero at the .01 level. The corresponding values for TS2 (43 days) are 
.160% (CC), -1.228% (AB), and 1.585% (BA); (CC) returns are insigni¬ 
ficantly different from zero, (AB) and (BA) are both significant at the 
.01 level. Also, returns measured (AB) and (BA) are significantly 
different from returns measured (CC) at the .01 level. 
We test the significance of the differences between the two sets 
of sample summary data averages contained in tables 5.2.A (p.76) and 
5.2.B (p. 77) to determine if the two samples from the same population. 
Testing the differences between corresponding TS1 and TS2 mean daily 
returns yielded the following; (CC) and (BA) returns are 
insignificantly different at the .05 level (t = 1.363 and 0.555 
respectively). (AB) returns are significantly different at the .01 
level (t = 2.276). 
Column (4) demonstrates the daily average magnitude of the return 
measurement bias between returns measured close-to-close and returns 
based on market order executions for buying and selling (CC-AB). The 
average magnitude of the difference is 1.544% for TS1 (Table 5.2.A) and 
1.388% for TS2 (Table 5.2.B). These results indicate that a bias is 
induced in returns when closing prices are utilized instead of bid and 
ask prices. As previously noted, the latter represent prices more 
likely to be obtained by public traders using market orders. 
Column (5) demonstrates the average of the return measurement bias 
when limit order executions are assumed. The average magnitudes of the 
bias are -1.574% for TS1 and -1.425% for TS2. Column (6) shows the 
magnitude of the difference (BA-AB) between market order returns and 
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Table 5.2.A: Average Daily Returns and Differentials 
Test Sample One: 1134 NYSE Issues 
Day 
(1) 
CC 
(2) 
AB 
(3) 
BA 
(4) 
CC-AB 
(5) 
CC-BA 
(6) 
BA-AB 
2 -0.662 -2.117 0.931 1.455 -1.594 3.049 
3 0.207 -1.358 1.681 1.565 -1.474 3.039 
4 0.624 -0.860 2.163 1.483 -1.539 3.022 
5 -0.746 -2.206 0.828 1.459 -1.574 3.033 
6 -0.618 -2.156 0.876 1.538 -1.495 3.033 
7 0.159 -1.315 1.708 1.474 -1.549 3.023 
8 0.197 -1.293 1.698 1.490 -1.501 2.991 
9 -0.297 -1.784 1.236 1.487 -1.533 3.020 
10 -1.384 -2.851 0.214 1.467 -1.598 3.065 
11 0.293 -1.281 1.837 1.574 -1.544 3.118 
12 -0.247 -1.722 1.335 1.474 -1.582 3.057 
13 0.185 -1.336 1.696 1.521 -1.512 3.032 
14 0.677 -0.829 2.208 1.506 -1.531 3.037 
15 -0.412 -1.847 1.164 1.434 -1.576 3.010 
16 -0.263 -1.781 1.246 1.518 -1.509 3.027 
17 -0.201 -1.718 1.325 1.517 -1.526 3.043 
18 0.378 -1.195 1.879 1.573 -1.501 3.075 
19 -0.396 -1.816 1.205 1.420 -1.601 3.021 
20 -0.386 -1.890 1.118 1.503 -1.504 3.008 
21 0.351 -1.183 1.879 1.533 -1.528 3.061 
22 0.739 -0.859 2.293 1.598 -1.554 3.152 
23 0.598 -1.022 2.104 1.620 -1.506 3.126 
24 -1.328 -2.837 0.229 1.508 -1.557 3.065 
25 -0.685 -2.259 0.875 1.574 -1.561 3.134 
26 -0.065 -1.605 1.521 1.540 -1.586 3.126 
27 0.457 -1.097 2.053 1.555 -1.596 3.151 
28 -2.083 -3.555 -0.440 1.473 -1.643 3.115 
29 -0.706 -2.266 0.891 1.560 -1.597 3.157 
30 -0.989 -2.566 0.606 1.577 -1.596 3.173 
31 0.165 -1.471 1.744 1.636 -1.579 3.215 
32 0.597 -1.005 2.259 1.602 -1.662 3.264 
33 0.289 -1.378 1.907 1.668 -1.618 3.285 
34 -0.530 -2.080 1.176 1.551 -1.705 3.256 
35 -0.281 -1.871 1.327 1.590 -1.608 3.198 
36 0.107 -1.483 1.724 1.590 -1.617 3.207 
37 -0.288 -1.874 1.369 1.585 -1.657 3.242 
38 -0.869 -2.435 0.800 1.567 -1.669 3.235 
39 -0.071 -1.706 1.514 1.635 -1.585 3.220 
40 0.310 -1.262 1.962 1.572 -1.652 3.224 
41 2.300 0.561 3.858 1.739 -1.559 3.298 
42 1.206 -0.366 2.860 1.571 -1.654 3.226 
Mean -0.896 -1.633 1.484 1.544 -1.574 3.188 
Notes for Tables 5.2A and 5.2B 
1. CC = Returns measured close-to-close 
2. AB = Returns measured Ask-to-Bid (market order) 
3. BA = Returns measured Bid-to-Ask (limit order) 
4. CC-AB , CC-BA, BA-AB = Return Differentials 
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Table 5.2.B: Average Daily Returns and Differentials 
Test Sample Two: 1204 NYSE Issues 
Day 
(1) 
CC 
(2) 
AB 
(3) 
BA 
(4) 
CC-AB 
(5) 
CC-BA 
(6) 
BA-AB 
2 -0.091 -1.519 1.314 1.428 -1.405 2.833 
3 -0.055 -1.420 1.358 1.365 -1.413 2.777 
4 1.091 -0.328 2.468 1.419 -1.377 2.796 
5 0.691 -0.674 2.170 1.365 -1.480 2.844 
6 0.090 -1.336 1.520 1.426 -1.430 2.856 
7 -0.854 -2.255 0.577 1.401 -1.431 2.832 
8 -0.637 -1.944 0.909 1.307 -1.546 2.853 
9 -0.030 -1.512 1.335 1.482 -1.365 2.847 
10 -1.038 -2.403 0.461 1.365 -1.499 2.863 
11 -1.634 -3.032 -0.139 1.398 -1.494 2.893 
12 -0.271 -1.723 1.170 1.452 -1.441 2.893 
13 1.177 -0.292 2.661 1.469 -1.484 2.952 
14 -0.477 -1.932 0.990 1.455 -1.467 2.922 
15 0.781 -0.693 2.264 1.474 -1.482 2.957 
16 0.559 -0.797 2.149 1.357 -1.589 2.946 
17 0.632 -0.867 2.079 1.499 -1.447 2.946 
18 0.966 -0.471 2.454 1.437 -1.487 2.924 
19 -0.406 -1.712 1.175 1.306 -1.582 2.888 
20 0.202 -1.303 1.579 1.505 -1.377 2.881 
21 -0.190 -1.585 1.234 1.396 -1.424 2.820 
22 0.649 -0.757 2.125 1.405 -1.476 2.881 
23 -0.824 -2.352 0.539 1.528 -1.363 2.891 
24 1.240 -0.216 2.664 1.456 -1.424 2.880 
25 0.829 -0.517 2.293 1.347 -1.464 2.811 
26 2.546 1.101 3.947 1.445 -1.401 2.846 
27 0.328 -0.967 1.783 1.295 -1.455 2.750 
28 1.284 -0.049 2.680 1.333 -1.396 2.729 
29 -0.237 -1.552 1.128 1.315 -1.365 2.680 
30 0.765 -0.565 2.147 1.330 -1.382 2.712 
31 -0.423 -1.752 0.922 1.329 -1.345 2.674 
32 0.709 -0.654 2.040 1.363 -1.331 2.694 
33 0.454 -0.794 1.865 1.248 -1.411 2.659 
34 -0.221 -1.567 1.096 1.345 -1.318 2.663 
35 -0.696 -2.016 0.671 1.320 -1.367 2.687 
36 0.229 -1.077 1.602 1.306 -1.373 2.679 
37 -1.208 -2.527 0.131 1.319 -1.338 2.657 
38 -2.903 -4.174 -1.437 1.271 -1.466 2.737 
39 1.097 -0.408 2.466 1.505 -1.370 2.875 
40 0.320 -1.059 1.739 1.378 -1.420 2.798 
41 1.383 -0.033 2.762 1.416 -1.379 2.795 
42 0.313 -0.957 1.800 1.269 -1.487 2.756 
43 0.571 -0.886 1.876 1.457 -1.305 2.762 
Mean 0.160 -1.228 1.585 1.388 -1.425 2.813 
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(optimally placed) limit order returns. This return differential 
corresponds to the difference between executing limit orders under 
favorable conditions ( buy at bidt_j , sell at askt ) and executing 
market orders under normal conditions (buy at askt_j , sell at bidt ). 
The average magnitude of the difference between the two trade-oriented 
returns is 3.118% for TS1 and 2.813% for TS2. 
The magnitude of the bias stemming from the utilization of close- 
to-close returns is non-trivial. Indeed many reported anomalies are in 
the same 1% to 2% range of the return measurement bias. The overstate¬ 
ment of close-to-close returns relative to those that are realizable, 
coupled with nonlinearities in the relationships, may well have 
resulted in the many findings of abnormal returns. In section 5.3 we 
examine in greater detail the nature of the bias operating on different 
price stratifications. Of particular interest is the behavior of the 
percentage spread around the turn-of-the-year and the distribution of 
closing prices relative to the closing bid and ask price quotes. 
5.4 Average Daily Returns for Price-Stratified Deciles 
Average daily returns for each of the price-stratified deciles are 
measured utilizing the three trading price assumptions discussed in 
section 5.3. Table 5.3 (p. 80) displays information for each assumed 
type of trade's returns by decile by month; Panel A contains the 
results for TS1, Panel B for TS2. For decile 1, returns measured ask- 
to-bid (AB) are substantially lower than those measured close-to-close 
(CC). This result is due to measuring returns across the bid-ask 
spread assuming market order executions. The situation is reversed 
when returns are 
Table 5.3: Stratified Mean Daily Returns 
For Strategies: Ask-Bid, Bid-Ask, Close-Close 
Dec 
Panel A 
December 
CC AB 
: Test 
1981 
BA 
Sample One 
January 
C-C A-B 
1982 
B-A 
1 -0.225 -4.119 3.858 -0.040 -4.107 4.229 
2 -0.074 -2.129 2.028 -0.039 -2.218 2.184 
3 -0.084 -1.838 1.714 -0.060 -1.938 1.835 
4 -0.087 -1.609 1.474 -0.023 -1.619 1.575 
5 -0.101 -1.462 1.281 -0.094 -1.525 1.349 
6 -0.063 -1.284 1.182 -0.188 -1.496 1.129 
7 -0.078 -1.182 1.037 -0.235 -1.402 0.945 
8 -0.091 -1.068 0.895 -0.154 -1.150 0.854 
9 -0.162 -0.984 0.673 -0.232 -1.114 0.648 
10 -0.109 -0.722 0.507 -0.155 -0.792 0.484 
Dec 
Panel B 
December 
CC AB 
: Test 
1982 
BA 
Sample Two 
January 
C-C A-B 
1983 
B-A 
1 0.019 -3.617 3.849 0.589 -2.871 4.136 
2 0.051 -1.978 2.130 0.373 -1.542 2.300 
3 0.092 -1.532 1.745 0.226 -1.310 1.784 
4 0.072 -1.373 1.545 0.268 -1.113 1.664 
5 0.065 -1.211 1.368 0.215 -1.025 1.461 
6 -0.014 -1.155 1.144 0.160 -0.953 1.284 
7 0.020 -1.019 1.067 0.175 -0.812 1.178 
8 -0.009 -0.909 0.908 0.160 -0.746 1.072 
9 -0.006 -0.772 0.766 0.087 -0.660 0.840 
10 -0.057 -0.656 0.541 0.108 -0.500 0.718 
measured bid-to-ask (BA) assuming limit order executions. This last 
method of computation yields positive returns for all deciles in both 
months, with returns in January being higher for the first five 
deciles. Returns measured CC were typically negative in TS1; typically 
positive in TS2♦ In neither sample were CC returns significantly 
different from zero. Returns measured ask-to-bid (AB) were 
typically negative in both samples for all deciles; returns measured 
(BA) were typically positive. The smaller magnitudes of TS2 (AB) and 
(BA) returns are due to smaller bid-ask spreads resulting from 
generally higher prices 
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Returns measured bid-to-ask (BA) and ask-to-bid (AB) were each 
subtracted from returns measured close-to-close (CC) and the results 
presented in table 5.4. Results for bid-to-ask returns minus ask-to- 
bid returns (BA-AB) are also displayed. The data indicate a 
substantial difference in return streams when measured either ask-to- 
bid or bid-to-ask relative to close-to-close; differences are 
approximately 4% per day for the lowest price decile. The values 
reported in table 5.4 indicate the average magnitude of the bias 
induced in measured returns computed using bid-ask quotes rather than 
closing price quotes. The mean differences between alternative 
Table 5.4: Mean Daily Return Differentials 
Close-AskBid, Close-BidAsk, BidAsk-AskBid 
Panel A : Test Sample One 
December 1981 January 1982 
Dec CC-AB CC-BA BA-AB CC-AB CC-BA BA-AB 
1 3.894 -4.083 7.977 4.067 -4.269 8.336 
2 2.055 -2.102 4.157 2.179 -2.223 4.402 
3 1.754 -1.799 3.552 1.878 -1.895 3.774 
4 1.522 -1.561 3.083 1.596 -1.598 3.193 
5 1.362 -1.382 2.744 1.431 -1.443 2.874 
6 1.221 -1.244 2.465 1.307 -1.318 2.625 
7 1.104 -1.115 2.219 1.167 -1.180 2.346 
8 0.976 -0.986 1.963 0.996 -1.008 2.004 
9 0.822 -0.835 1.657 0.882 -0.879 1.762 
10 0.613 -0.616 1.228 0.637 -0.639 1.276 
Panel B : Test Sample Two 
December 1982 January 1983 
Dec CC-AB CC-BA BA-AB CC-AB CC-BA BA-AB 
1 3.636 -3.830 7.467 3.461 -3.547 7.008 
2 2.029 -2.079 4.108 1.915 -1.926 3.841 
3 1.624 -1.653 3.276 1.536 -1.558 3.094 
4 1.445 -1.473 2.918 1.381 -1.395 2.776 
5 1.276 -1.303 2.579 1.241 -1.245 2.486 
6 1.141 -1.158 2.299 1.113 -1.124 2.238 
7 1.039 -1.047 2.086 0.987 -1.003 1.991 
8 0.900 -0.917 1.817 0.906 -0.912 1.818 
9 0.766 -0.772 1.538 0.747 -0.753 1.500 
10 0.598 -0.598 1.197 0.607 -0.611 1.218 
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measurement schemes were statistically significant at any usual level. 
Differences between alternative measures of return are largest for the 
lowest price decile and decline monotonically as stock price increases. 
These results are consistent with those reported earlier in this 
chapter. The difference between returns measured bid-to-ask and ask- 
to-bid averages approximately 8 % for the lowest price decile and 1.25% 
for the highest price decile. The differences are larger in January 
1982 than in December 1981 for TS1 and are statistically significant at 
the .01 level for all deciles. January 1983 (BA-AB) values are smaller 
than December 1982 values for TS2; a result of smaller bid-ask spreads. 
The results presented here indicate that close-to-close returns are 
significantly overstated relative to what might actually be realized by 
an investor using market orders to execute trades. The degree of bias 
is strongly correlated with price level and bid-ask spread magnitudes. 
Also, the magnitude of the bias declines as per share prices get 
higher: The bias is greatest in the lowest price decile. Finally, we 
observe that many of the reported anomalies rely disproportionately on 
the performance of low price stocks. 
5.5. Weekly and Monthly Holding Period Characteristics 
The same portfolios described in the previous sections are used to 
compute mean weekly and monthly holding period return differentials for 
the three alternative computation methods. Weekly returns are measured 
from the last trading day of the preceding week, period (t—1), and the 
last trading day of the current week, period (t). Table 5.5 (p. 82) 
displays the results for this series of return differentials. 
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Table 5.5: Mean Weekly Return Differentials 
Close-AskBid, Close-BidAsk, BidAsk-AskBid 
Panel A: Test Sample One 
December 1981 January 1982 
Dec CC-AB CC-BA BA-AB CC-AB CC-BA BA-AB 
1 3.834 -4.032 7.866 4.157 -4.341 8.498 
2 2.077 -2.113 4.190 2.137 -2.146 4.284 
3 1.709 -1.764 3.473 1.943 -1.881 3.824 
4 1.517 -1.617 3.134 1.662 -1.566 3.228 
5 1.378 -1.422 2.801 1.474 -1.449 2.923 
6 1.200 -1.242 2.441 1.305 -1.283 2.588 
7 1.117 -1.126 2.243 1.173 -1.180 2.353 
8 0.986 -0.976 1.961 0.989 -1.005 1.994 
9 0.809 -0.849 1.659 0.890 -0.843 1.733 
10 0.618 -0.634 1.252 0.634 -0.629 1.263 
Panel B: Test Sample Two 
December 1982 January 1983 
Dec CC-AB CC-BA BA-AB CC-AB CC-BA BA-AB 
1 3.636 -3.897 7.534 3.671 -3.614 7.285 
2 1.997 -2.095 4.092 2.006 -1.930 3.935 
3 1.633 -1.745 3.378 1.564 -1.566 3.130 
4 1.465 -1.453 2.917 1.361 -1.373 2.734 
5 1.262 -1.325 2.587 1.241 -1.227 2.468 
6 1.141 -1.160 2.301 1.132 -1.127 2.259 
7 1.046 -1.043 2.089 0.981 -0.985 1.966 
8 0.922 -0.957 1.878 0.856 -0.859 1.715 
9 0.760 -0.766 1.527 0.729 -0.753 1.482 
10 0.597 -0.579 1.176 0.596 -0.615 1.211 
Similar to the results reported in section 5.3, weekly holding 
period returns measured ask-to-bid are lower than returns measured 
close-to-close. Returns measured bid-to-ask are substantially higher. 
All differences are statistically significant at the .01 level. The 
smaller magnitudes of all values reported in TS1 compared to those in 
TS2 reflect the smaller bid-ask percentage spreads in TS2. The smaller 
magnitude of the percentage spread is the result of higher prices in 
TS2. 
Similar results are obtained for monthly holding period return 
differentials. Table 5.6 displays the pattern of monthly holding 
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period return differentials as measured using the three different 
assumed trading patterns. 
Table 5.6: Mean Monthly Return Differentials 
Close-AskBid, Close-BidAsk, BidAsk-AskBid 
Panel A: Test Sample One 
December 1981 January 1982 
Dec CC-AB CC-BA BA-AB CC-AB CC-BA BA-AB 
1 3.899 -3.952 7.851 4.063 -4.158 8.221 
2 2.034 -2.067 4.101 2.169 -2.043 4.211 
3 1.687 -1.939 3.626 2.051 -1.682 3.733 
4 1.441 -1.736 3.177 1.825 -1.356 3.181 
5 1.306 -1.344 2.650 1.459 -1.298 2.757 
6 1.159 -1.316 2.475 1.314 -1.164 2.478 
7 1.119 -1.082 2.201 1.117 -1.101 2.218 
8 0.955 -0.953 1.908 0.967 -0.996 1.963 
9 0.777 -0.881 1.658 0.940 -0.732 1.672 
10 0.603 -0.589 1.192 0.620 -0.583 1.204 
Panel B : Test Sample Two 
December 1982 January ‘ 1983 
Dec CC-AB CC-BA BA-AB CC-AB CC-BA BA-AB 
1 3.695 -4.266 7.961 4.848 -3.239 8.087 
2 2.498 -2.668 5.166 2.611 -1.933 4.544 
3 1.991 -2.100 4.091 1.841 -1.772 3.613 
4 1.459 -1.661 3.120 1.680 -1.516 3.196 
5 1.395 -1.635 3.030 1.511 -1.250 2.762 
6 1.265 -1.430 2.694 1.200 -1.148 2.348 
7 1.228 -1.158 2.386 1.000 -1.130 2.130 
8 0.882 -1.073 1.955 0.980 -0.910 1.889 
9 0.816 -0.830 1.646 0.771 -0.765 1.537 
10 0.650 -0.573 1.222 0.621 -0.613 1.235 
Comparisons of tables 5.4 5 5 * J J > and 5.6 reveal similar monotone 
declines in return differentials as prices increase. Also, weekly and 
monthly holding period return differentials are typically smaller in 
December than January for most deciles. Returns measured bid-to-ask 
are substantially higher in January for the first four deciles. These 
findings are similar to the daily holding period results shown in table 
5.4. Caution is warranted in intrepeting these results. Other samples 
may yield slightly different magnitudes. 
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The results reported in sections 5.3 and 5.4 indicate that returns 
measured ask-to-bid (AB), reflecting market order executions, and bid- 
to-ask (AB), reflecting limit order executions, are more sensitive to 
price levels than returns measured close-to-close (CC) when compared on 
a year to year basis. The source of this sensitivity is the behavior 
of the price-sensitive bid-ask spread. We tentatively conclude that 
measuring returns close-to-close introduces a bias in computed returns. 
Moreover, the bias is substantial for lower priced securities. The 
implication of these results is that the return generating process is 
misspecified if it does not consider the combined effects of bid-ask 
spreads and price levels. Also, returns measured utilizing closing 
prices do not adequately reflect the return most likely to be achieved 
by a trader after market microstructure behavior is appropriately 
factored into the process. 
5.6. Turn-of-the-Year Closing Price Characteristics 
The daily activity of closing prices relative to the closing bid 
and ask prices for TS1 are shown in figure 5.2.A (p. 85). The very 
small number of stocks with closes outside the bid-ask range are not 
shown. The chart reveals a fairly stable number of stocks closing at 
prices between the closing bid and ask quotes (the top line). The 
number of stocks closing at the bid or the ask is not as stable and 
also demonstrates evidence of a ’’weekend" effect in stock prices; a 
disproportionate number of Monday closes on the bid side is evidenced. 
Two exceptions to the "weekend" effect appear in figure 5.2.A. The 
first occurs January 4, the first trading day of the new year, which 
occurred on a Monday (the "M" following the second "T" from the left). 
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Figure 5.2.A. Daily last trade price distributions relative to closing 
bid and ask price quotations for TS1. TS1 year ended on Thursday 
(second "T" from left). M = Monday, F = Friday. 
The frequency of ask side closes on January 4 are slightly greater than 
closes on the bid side. This finding supports Roll’s (1983a) 
conjecture that part of the turn-of-the-year effect is caused by a 
shift in closing prices from the bid to the ask side. The second 
exception occurs on the third Monday in January (January 18). The 
traces of closes on the bid or ask quotes cross on both of these 
Mondays and re-cross the following Tuesday. The traces cross again on 
January 28 reflecting a "bullish” move by the market the last two 
trading days in January. 
A possible explanation for the January effect is also evident in 
figure 5.2.A. The traces of closes on the bid and ask sides are on 
average much closer in January than December; the number of closes on 
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the ask side increase as the number of bid-side closes decrease. The 
strong downward trend of the market in early January shown earlier in 
figure 5.1.A is not reflected in the distribution of closing price 
quotes shown in figure 5.2.A. We would expect that a downward movement 
of the market would be accompanied by an increase in the number of bid- 
side closes. Instead, we observe a decrease in the number of bid-side 
closes. Thus, a portion of the January effect may be partly explained 
by a change in the relative distributions of closing price quotes at 
the bid and ask. 
Similar results for TS2 are displayed in figure 5.2.B. The most 
significant difference is the narrowing of the distribution of closes 
Figure 5.2.B. Daily last trade price distributions relative to closing 
bid and ask price quotations for TS2. TS2 year ended on Friday (first 
"F" following the "T"). M = Monday, T = Thursday. 
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on the bid-side and closes on the ask-side, especially after the first 
trading day in January. This reflects the bullish tendency of the 
market in TS2. 
Figure 5.3.A is formed by displaying the daily values in figure 
5.2.A as the average of the daily values for each week. The TS1 
general trend is for bid-side closes to increase steadily throughout 
the month of December followed by a significant decline in the average 
number of bid-side closes during the first week in January. The 
December trend is also accompanied by declines in the number of closes 
on the ask-side as well as a small decline in the number of closes 
Figure 5.3.A. Weekly average last transaction price distributions for 
TS1. Dl, D2,,,J4 denote the various weeks in December and January. 
between the closing bid and ask quotes. The turn-of-the-year effect is 
(at least for 1981-82) fairly generalized cross-sectionally for the 
88 
companies in the sample. More significant effects will be demonstrated 
when discrete price decile data are shown. The results for TS2 shown 
in figure 5.3.B are similar to those of TS1 in figure 5.3.A. TS2 shows 
a more significant change in the number of ask-side close during the 
first week in January. The general bullish tendency of the market in 
TS2 is accompanied by a narrow spread between bid and ask side closes. 
Figure 5.3.B. Weekly average last transaction price distributions for 
TS2. Dl, D2,,,J4 denote the various weeks in December and January. 
Lakonishok and Smidt (1983) constructed a "critical ratio" to 
illustrate the relationship of closing prices to the quoted high and 
low prices for the day. In a similar fashion we construct a Momentum 
Index (MI). The MI captures the average position of the last trade of 
the day relative to the closing bid and ask price quotes for all stocks 
in each sample. The variable is constructed to range from 0 to 1. A 
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value of 0 indicates a close at the bid; a value of 1, a close at the 
ask. The MI is computed using equation (5.2): 
MI = ( C - B ) / (A-B) (5.2) 
where: MI = Momentum Index 
C = Closing price (last trade of day) 
A = Closing ask quote 
B = Closing bid quote 
Figures 5.4.A and 5.4.B (p. 90) show the mean value of this variable 
for each trading day for all stocks in TS1 and TS2, respectively. The 
MI exhibits a substantial amount of volatility for both samples. 
General trends emerge when averages are taken. Figures 5.5.A and 5.5.B 
(p. 91) display the daily values in figures 5.4.A and 5.4.B as weekly 
averages for TS1 and TS2, respectively. Throughout December the 
general trend of closing price-relatives is down indicating the effects 
of selling pressures on stock prices; potentially caused by year-end 
tax-selling or portfolio realignments. The downward trend stops at the 
second to last day in December and rises the first week in January. 
The trend lines in figures 5.5.A and 5.5.B clearly reflect closing 
prices momentum to the bid side during December and to the ask side in 
January. The trend reversal in the last trading week in December 
reflects the influence of the last trading day; the number of issues 
closing at the bid declines as the number of closes below and equal to 
the ask increases. Figures 5.5.A and 5.5.B also display the Mi's for 
the first and tenth deciles. TSl's MI for decile 1 exhibits a clear 
swing toward ask-side closes the first week in January and declining 
thereafter. TS2 decile 1 MI exhibits a more pronounced swing to ask- 
side closes and captures the general bullish trend in the market. 
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Figure 5.4.A. Average cross-sectional daily momentum index values for 
TS1. F = Friday, M = Monday, T = Thursday. 
Figure 5.4.B. Average cross-sectional daily momentum index values for 
TS2. F = Friday, M = Monday, T = Thursday. 
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Figure 5.5.A. Weekly average cross-sectional momentum index values for 
TS1. F = Friday, M = Monday, T = Thursday. 
Figure 5.5.B. Weekly average cross-sectional momentum index values for 
TS2. F = Friday, M = Monday, T = Thursday. 
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5.7 Turn-of-the-Year Characteristics by Decile 
Changes in relative bid-ask spreads may suggest a potential 
explanation for size effects or turn-of-the-year effects. Table 5.7, 
Panel A (p. 94), shows the average cross-sectional percentage spread 
per decile for each of the last three trading days in December and the 
first three days in January for TS1. Decile 1 (lowest price stocks) 
exhibits a steady rise in the percentage spread as the year draws to a 
close. Day 1 of the new year finds a substantial (and statistically 
significant at the .05 level) drop (12.8%) in the size of the spread, 
but rebounding quickly the second day and more or less stable as the 
week progresses. While several other deciles exhibit similar behavior 
between day -1 and day +1, none exhibit the magnitude of the first 
decile. None of the other nine deciles revealed any statistically 
significant changes in spread values during this time frame. Also, 
none of the other price deciles exhibit the monotone increase in 
percentage spread the last full week of trading for the ’’old” year. 
Results for TS2 (Table 5.7, Panel B) reveal a slightly different 
trend in the lowest price decile. A 9.336% decline in the magnitude of 
the spread occurs on the second day in January. An examination of TS1 
reveals an "up” day on the first trading day in January, 1982. This 
would indicate a decrease in the size of the average spread but by a 
substantially smaller percentage than actually occurred. TS2 
experienced a "down" day on the first trading day in January 1983 and 
was "up" the next day. The 9.336% verification sample change in the 
(+2) spread for the lowest price decile is significant at the .10 
level 
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Table 5.7: Mean Daily Percentage Spread by Decile 
Trading Date Relative to Year End 
Panel A: Test Sample One (81-82) 
Dec -3 -2 -1 1 2 3 
1 3.921 4.122 4.278 3.753 4.369 4.190 
2 2.147 2.098 2.120 2.160 2.178 2.174 
3 1.726 1.776 1.838 1.823 1.895 1.924 
4 1.448 1.510 1.651 1.484 1.582 1.526 
5 1.401 1.281 1.380 1.415 1.401 1.358 
6 1.226 1.295 1.258 1.247 1.283 1.281 
7 1.125 1.087 1.134 1.087 1.200 1.102 
8 0.976 1.048 1.010 0.936 0.936 0.936 
9 0.838 0.843 0.908 0.847 0.809 0.860 
10 0.622 0.603 0.629 0.617 0.589 0.625 
Panel B: Test Sample Two (82-83) 
Dec -3 -2 -1 1 2 3 
1 3.760 3.620 3.701 3.738 3.389 3.506 
2 2.004 1.929 2.089 2.112 2.019 1.885 
3 1.649 1.605 1.781 1.639 1.569 1.609 
4 1.381 1.397 1.385 1.586 1.379 1.398 
5 1.211 1.300 1.253 1.337 1.262 1.281 
6 1.173 1.159 1.178 1.203 1.122 1.152 
7 1.058 1.047 1.084 0.942 1.024 1.054 
8 0.847 0.894 0.946 0.932 0.915 0.960 
9 0.742 0.740 0.733 0.757 0.790 0.767 
10 0.601 0.574 0.582 0.605 0.599 0.588 
Note: -1 = last trade date in December 
1 = first trade date in January 
Roll (1983) suggested that a portion of the size effect results 
from the tendency of stocks to close at the ask side of the spread 
after the first of the year. One method for testing this suggestion is 
to utilize the Momentum Index. The Momentum Index is used to capture 
the combined effects of closing prices relative to the closing bid and 
ask price quotes. Table 5.8 (p. 94) displays momentum index (MI) 
values for the last three days in December and the first three days in 
January. The data indicates that, at least for this time period, low 
priced stocks were more likely to close at the ask after the first of 
the year. Test sample (Panel A) mean values for the momentum index are 
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.401 and .500 for December and January, respectively, for the first 
four price deciles. The difference between these two means is statis¬ 
tically significant at the .01 level. The values for TS2 (Panel B) 
Table 5.8: Mean Daily Momentum Index by Decile 
Trading Date Relative to Year End 
Panel A: Test Sample One (81-82) 
Dec -3 -2 -1 1 2 3 
1 0.283 0.360 0.444 0.491 0.508 0.508 
2 0.409 0.397 0.440 0.494 0.499 0.471 
3 0.421 0.467 0.437 0.506 0.526 0.524 
4 0.370 0.420 0.365 0.520 0.472 0.486 
5 0.406 0.427 0.463 0.485 0.418 0.471 
6 0.469 0.425 0.439 0.468 0.457 0.488 
7 0.460 0.384 0.488 0.451 0.480 0.451 
8 0.430 0.426 0.507 0.503 0.434 0.405 
9 0.470 0.431 0.464 0.533 0.527 0.477 
10 0.460 0.473 0.537 0.546 0.453 0.503 
Panel B: Test Sample Two ' (82-83) 
Dec -3 -2 -1 1 2 3 
1 0.432 0.411 0.428 0.509 0.552 0.584 
2 0.458 0.418 0.415 0.438 0.603 0.570 
3 0.453 0.451 0.449 0.515 0.568 0.493 
4 0.465 0.462 0.513 0.500 0.552 0.492 
5 0.459 0.521 0.387 0.425 0.537 0.512 
6 0.465 0.439 0.429 0.487 0.612 0.510 
7 0.499 0.438 0.516 0.455 0.612 0.579 
8 0.557 0.480 0.426 0.494 0.614 0.517 
9 0.513 0.452 0.512 0.441 0.556 0.467 
10 0.546 0.408 0.583 0.480 0.551 0.457 
Note: -1 = last trade date in December 
1 = first trade date in January 
are .446 and .531 for December and January, respectively. The 
difference between these last two means is also significant at the .01 
level. 
Results reported in Table 5.7 and Table 5.8 reveal a consistent 
pattern of behavior for stock prices in the lower price deciles at the 
turn of the year, at least for the samples under observation. The 
higher price deciles exhibit little or no significant difference 
95 
between the two time frames for either of the two sub-samples. The 
shift in closing prices from the bid to ask side for the lower price 
deciles would suggest that the higher returns reported in January, 
particularly for the lowest priced stocks, may not be the result of a 
fundamental change in intrinsic values. The higher returns result at 
least in part from a demand-induced shift from selling (at the bid) to 
buying (at the ask) before and after the turn of the year, 
respectively. 
5.8. Preliminary Conclusions 
This chapter examined the nature of the bias induced in returns 
measured using closing (last trade) prices compared to the use of 
closing bid and ask price quotes. We find a consistent over-estimation 
of returns (compared to those realized in actual trades) when closing 
prices are used. The bias is approximately the same for different 
length holding periods. The order of magnitude of the bias for each 
price decile examined tended to be approximately equal to the 
percentage spread for that decile. Low priced stocks tend to have the 
largest relative spreads and the greatest bias in close-to-close 
returns. Thus, the evidence suggesting the existence of a low price 
effect may be partially explained by nonlinear relative spread effects. 
The nonlinearity is the result of the 1/8 minimum spread imposed by the 
NYSE. The adoption of decimal spreads might result in a significant 
attenuation of the spreads on low price stocks. Quite possibly the 
size effect and the low price effect would also appear to be less 
strong. Finally, the magnitudes of the biases in computed returns 
examined in this chapter are also sensitive to the magnitude of the 
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price level. The biases may also be sensitive to the use of daily 
returns in place of weekly, monthly, or even yearly holding periods 
when larger data samples are examined. 
The magnitude of the bid-ask spread has been of interest in 
research by Roll (1984) and Glosten and Harris (1985). Both 
researchers have attempted to estimate the "effective" bid-ask spread 
by utilizing closing or intra-day transaction prices. Their estimates 
of the effective spread, defined as the spread paid by uninformed 
traders, have been substantially less that the actual bid-ask spreads 
measured in the current research. Moreover, the magnitude of the 
spread is fairly constant over a daily, weekly, or monthly assumed 
holding periods. Also, the bid-ask spread is positive for all deciles 
in the the sub-samples tested. We conclude tentatively that the 
attempt to measure "effective" bid-ask spreads using closing or 
transaction prices will result in substantially mis-estimated bid-ask 
spread effects and potential errors in the implications drawn from 
those estimates 
CHAPTER 6 
RESULTS II 
6.1 Observed Prices as True Prices 
The first question to be addressed in this chapter concerns the 
identity of observed closing prices and ’’true" prices. On average, 
these prices should be identical or (at least) statistically equal. 
Blume and Stambaugh (1983), Glosten and Milgrom (1985), and others 
define "true" prices as the mean of the closing bid and ask price 
quotes. The true price is also termed the "expected closing price." 
We shall use the latter term for the balance of this analysis. In an 
efficient market, the average observed closing price should be equal to 
the expected closing price. Earlier we noted the Blume and Stambaugh 
(1983) suggestion that a "bid-ask effect" results in an upward bias in 
returns computed from closing prices. Although unspecified by Blume 
and Stambaugh, we suspect that the observed closing price should be 
slightly smaller than the expected closing price. Consider the 
following: Suppose the expected closing price on day (t—1) is $2.00 
and the (average) observed closing price is $1.99 and the change in 
price on day (t) is (+) $0,125. The "expected return" is 6.25% and the 
"observed return" is 6.28%. The difference is a 0.03% upward bias in 
the computed return when observed closing prices are used to compute 
returns. Thus, a smaller denominator in the return computation 
algorithm results in larger return magnitudes for a given change in 
price. This section investigates the average ($) magnitude of the 
difference between observed closing prices and expected closing prices; 
E{e-L> = E{pi - Pi), where p-j^ is the observed price. 
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Test sample one (TS1) and test sample two (TS2) are stratified by 
price into deciles and means computed for the difference between 
observed and expected closing prices for each decile. The results are 
tabulated in Table 6.1. The average difference between observed 
closing prices (Ob) and expected closing prices (Ex) for each decile 
are displayed in the columns labeled "Ob-Ex." Column (1), Panel A, 
presents TS1 results; Column (4), Panel B, TS2 results. We test 
whether differences between observed closing prices and expected 
closing prices are significantly different from zero: The null 
hypothesis is (Ob-Ex) = 0. 
Table 6.1: Observed versus Expected Closing Prices 
Dec 
(1) 
Ob-Ex 
Panel A: 
(2) 
t-test 
TS1 
(3) 
MI N 
Panel B: 
(4) (5) 
Ob-Ex t-test 
TS2 
(6) 
MI N 
1 -0.01184 -11.486 0.425 105 -0.00472 -4.577 0.475 109 
2 -0.01268 -11.917 0.435 113 -0.00634 -5.568 0.474 110 
3 -0.01014 -8.991 0.458 112 -0.00491 -4.421 0.479 145 
4 -0.01316 -10.519 0.448 106 -0.00582 -4.436 0.483 100 
5 -0.01020 -8.383 0.463 121 -0.00777 -6.542 0.473 130 
6 -0.01066 -8.514 0.461 114 -0.00584 -4.684 0.480 132 
7 -0.01005 -7.618 0.459 100 -0.00595 -4.300 0.481 118 
8 -0.00896 -7.256 0.468 121 -0.00475 -2.910 0.485 118 
9 -0.00559 -4.443 0.480 114 -0.00220 -1.645 0.495 124 
10 -0.00369 -2.731 0.494 128 -0.00119 -0.632 0.503 119 
The results in column (1), Panel A. indicate that observed closing 
prices are slightly smaller than expected closing prices and the 
differences are significant; Column (2) contains the t-values. Also, 
the average difference is approximately one cent and exhibits a 
monotone decline in magnitude as prices get larger. Columns (4) and 
(5) display the results for TS2. The mean differences reported in 
column (4) are smaller than those in column (1) and are significant for 
all but the ninth and tenth deciles. 
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The results reported in Table 6.1 are consistent and readily 
explainable by examining the momentum index (MI) for decile 1 in each 
sample (columns (3) and (6)). The TS1 MI value for decile 1 is .425 
and the magnitude of the difference is -.0118. This value indicates 
that low price stocks in TS1 tended to close nearer the bid side. The 
corresponding values for TS2 are .475 and -.0047, respectively. TS2 
low price stocks also tended to close nearer the bid side but to a 
lesser degree. The magnitude of the bias decreases as the MI value 
approaches .500. Although these results may very well be period 
specific, the consistency of the relationship in both panels between 
the MI and the magnitude of (Ob-Ex) suggests that the magnitude of any 
bias induced in average observed prices is a function of investor 
expectations (i.e., bullish or bearish) and institutional (NYSE) 
constraints on spreads. Accordingly, if stocks are in equilibrium and 
spreads are not restricted to a minimum increment of 1/8 point, no bias 
should be observed in closing prices. This does not seem to be the 
situation when we examine market microstructure behavior. 
6.2 Observed Returns vs True Returns 
The next question in this investigation addresses return 
measurement errors induced by the use of closing prices as equivalents 
for expected closing prices (true prices). Blume and Stambaugh (1983) 
suggest that the Mbid-ask effect” results in significant estimation 
errors in returns computed from observed closing prices in contrast to 
returns computed from expected closing (true) prices. In their study 
they estimate the value of the average daily estimation bias as .051%. 
In section 6.1 we reported that a statistically significant difference 
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exists between observed closing prices and expected closing prices. 
This section will test if the average magnitude of those differences is 
sufficient to produce a significant difference between observed returns 
and expected returns. Returns are computed for all stocks in each 
decile utilizing the three methods outlined by Roll (1983) and 
specified in equations (3.9), (3.10), and (3.11). Results are reported 
in Table 6.2 for TS1 (Panel A) and TS2 (Panel B). 
Table 6.2: Observed minus Expected Returns (%) 
Panel A: TS1 
Arithmetic Buy/Hold Rebalanced 
Dec Ob-Ex t Ob-Ex t Ob-Ex t N 
1 0.0209 0.5729 -0.0077 -1.1452 0.0206 0.5833 105 
2 0.0051 0.3328 -0.0003 -0.1188 0.0050 0.2825 113 
3 0.0050 0.4213 0.0018 0.9573 0.0049 0.5008 112 
4 0.0047 0.4284 0.0021 0.9913 0.0047 0.3421 106 
5 0.0037 0.3997 0.0016 1.2525 0.0036 0.4212 121 
6 0.0009 0.1187 -0.0005 -0.4204 0.0009 0.1236 114 
7 0.0022 0.2993 0.0011 1.0395 0.0022 0.2562 100 
8 0.0005 0.0885 -0.0003 -0.3650 0.0005 0.0704 121 
9 0.0021 0.4307 0.0016 2.2475 0.0021 0.4866 114 
10 0.0011 0.3066 0.0008 1.4300 0.0011 0.2071 128 
All 0.0044 1.0217 0.0000 0.0633 0.0044 0.7069 1134 
Panel B: TS2 
Arithmetic Buy/Hold Rebalanced 
Dec Ob-Ex t Ob-Ex t Ob-Ex t N 
1 0.0284 0.8564 0.0033 0.6048 0.0338 0.8254 109 
2 0.0090 0.6349 0.0044 1.8451 0.0097 0.5701 110 
3 0.0031 0.3168 0.0002 0.0985 0.0038 0.3556 145 
4 0.0023 0.2347 0.0003 0.1907 0.0027 0.2055 100 
5 0.0021 0.2785 0.0005 0.5053 0.0030 0.3540 130 
6 0.0006 0.0914 -0.0007 -0.6414 0.0004 0.0361 132 
7 0.0001 0.0129 -0.0010 -0.8599 -0.0003 -0.0449 118 
8 ■ -0.0007 ■ -0.1026 -0.0020 -1.9234 -0.0012 -0.1417 118 
9 0.0009 0.1916 0.0003 0.4483 0.0003 0.0567 124 
10 0.0017 0.4168 0.0013 2.3035 0.0016 0.2858 119 
All 0.0045 1.1387 0.0006 0.9298 0.0051 0.8046 1205 
Two important results are presented in Table 6. 2. First , the 
magnitude of the differences in returns computed from observed closing 
prices are generally positive and less than the bias estimated by Blume 
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and Stambaugh (1983). When arithmetic mean portfolio return 
differentials for decile 1 are computed, the magnitudes of the biases 
are .0209% and .0284% for TS1 and TS2, respectively. Second, the error 
magnitudes, while positive, are insignificantly different from zero. 
The results are quite similar when rebalanced portfolio return 
differentials are computed. The utilization of the buy/hold portfolio 
return algorithm results in an substantial attenuation of the bias, but 
the results are still insignificantly different from zero; -0.0077% and 
0.0033% for TS1 and TS2, respectively. 
The important implication of these results is that the "bid-ask 
effect" does not materially affect the reliability of daily returns 
generated utilizing observed closing prices instead of the mean of the 
closing bid and ask prices. The magnitudes of the biases will, 
however, impart larger errors when arithmetic and rebalancing return 
computation methods are used to examine size effects or low price 
effects. These errors could be substantial when longer holding period 
returns are computed utilizing daily closing price data. 
The results reported in this section indicate that the error 
magnitude induced in computed returns by the bid-ask effect is 
substantially smaller than that reported by Blume and Stambaugh. Two 
reasons are offered for the difference in results achieved in this 
study. First, the Blume and Stambaugh study used a single day’s 
closing bid and ask price data for 332 stocks. This single day's 
sample did not permit a sequence of expected closing prices to be 
estimated using the mean of the closing bid and ask price quotes. This 
series of expected prices would be important in computing true returns 
and for comparing those returns to returns computed using the observed 
closing price series. Second, the algorithm used by Blume and 
Stambaugh may be incorrectly specified in so far as estimating the 
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average value of the bias is concerned. Their specification assumes 
that stocks will close at the bid or the ask with equal probabilities. 
Results reported earlier in Chapter 5 indicate that this is not 
necessarily the case. Moreover, the magnitude of the bias will depend 
upon the market's direction. A more precise method for measuring the 
magnitude of the bias would be to take the differences in holding 
period returns using expected closing prices and observed closing 
prices. That is the procedure followed in this section. The limited 
size of their sample may have produced the abbreviated procedure for 
estimating the average bias induced in the lowest price decile and the 
resulting misestimation of the bias. The results of the Blume and 
Stambaugh study are even less effective due to their very small sample. 
The larger samples used in the current investigation permitted better 
estimates of expected closing prices and expected (true) returns, and 
their comparison to observed closing prices and returns computed from 
those observed closing prices. 
6.3 Size Effects 
Size effect anomalies have received a substantial amount of 
attention in the recent literature. The methodologies most often 
employed require the estimation of historical betas (utilizing 60 
months of returns), with and without the several beta correction 
procedures, (ie., Dimson betas) as measures of relative risk. These 
beta estimates are then utilized in one of the many forms of the 
pricing equation of the CAPM; typically the risk-adjusted return format 
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incorporating a proxy for the risk free rate. Some researchers compute 
actual and forecast returns which are then differenced and the 
residuals examined within the framework of a statistical test. The 
test determines whether the residuals are significantly positive. 
Other researchers examine the intercept term using the risk-adjusted 
form of the CAPM pricing equation. If the average intercept is 
significantly positive for firms with small market values of equity or 
low prices, then size effects are said to exist. 
All of the methodologies described above rely on beta as a 
relative measure of risk. As reviewed earlier, academic researchers 
disagree as to the validity of the small firm effect. The most 
frequently cited problems are the weak links between beta risk and 
return, and the problems related to nonsynchronous trading which result 
in under-estimation of risk when the CAPM is used to test market 
efficiency. Others note that the theory does not specify what 
determines the risk-free rate. Similar tests were performed in this 
study. [Market model] Betas, average returns and variances were 
estimated for all stocks in test sample one (41 days of returns). A 
correlation matrix was constructed and the following results noted: 
The correlations between betas and returns are weak; r2's are typically 
less than .13. The correlations between average return and variances 
(r2 > .95) are strong as are those between return variance and beta. 
Some researchers have suggested that the inclusion of the variance term 
in the market model improves the explanatory power of the model. This 
study does not suggest that the betas estimated using the relatively 
short time period are valid estimators of beta. The procedure is 
conducted to establish the generality of the relationships which exist 
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between beta, return, and return variance when different price 
constructs are used. An alternative method is utilized in this study 
to test for the size effect which is not hampered by the beta 
estimation problems but relies instead on the strong relationship 
between return and variance (risk). In this section we examine the low 
price effect. Stoll and Whaley (1983), and others, have suggested that 
this method of analysis yields substantially the same results as the 
market value of equity (MVE) used in size effect studies. Moreover, 
the method employed in this section captures the same ordering of 
results typically reported in size effect studies which utilize MVE. 
Size effect tests typically rely on returns computed from closing 
prices. Results reported earlier in this study have examined the 
extent to which these returns might be biased due to expected closing 
price measurement errors. The results reported in sections 6.1 and 6.2 
indicate that while the differences between observed closing prices and 
expected closing prices are statistically significant, returns computed 
from the two price series are statistically identical. 
The low price effect is tested by computing mean daily holding 
period returns and testing the difference between December and January 
portfolio returns. Mean daily holding period returns are estimated for 
each decile [portfolio] using equations (3.13), (3.14), and (3.15) 
corresponding to the three methods outlined in Roll (1983) for 
computing portfolio returns; arithmetic (AR), buy-hold (BH), and 
rebalanced (RB), respectively. Returns are measured close-to-close, 
ask-to-bid, and bid-to-ask. The last two simulate the use of market- 
and limit-orders to execute stock trades. Mean daily holding period 
returns for December (R^) and January (Rj) are differenced and the 
105 
residuals (Rj-Rd) tested for significance. The null hypothesis is 
E(Rj-Rd) =0. If low price effects are part of the explanation for the 
January effect, then the difference between January and December 
returns should be significantly different from zero and positive for 
low price stocks. Accordingly, the critical value for the t-test is 
1.658 for a single-tail test and the .05 level of significance. TS1 
results are reported in Table 6.3.A; TS2 results in Table 6.3.B. 
Discussion of the results is oriented by the method used to define 
trade execution prices and the methodology used to compute mean daily 
portfolio returns. Returns are measured using each of the Roll 
methodologies for each set of assumed transaction prices. The first 
section (6.3.1) focuses on TS1 results. Mean daily holding period 
returns based on the AR algorithm are analyzed first. AR returns are 
estimated using closing prices (CC), ask-to-bid prices (AB), and bid- 
to-ask prices (BA). This is followed by a discussion on mean portfolio 
returns utilizing the BH algorithm. A discussion of the RB algorithm 
results completes the analysis. A second section (6.3.2) analyzes TS2 
results in the same manner. 
6.3.1 Test Sample One (TS1) Results 
A generalized review of the results presented in Table 6.3.A (p. 
106) indicates that lower price stocks experienced generally positive 
or less negative returns in January. The most typical case was less 
negative returns in January compared to December. Higher price stocks 
experienced greater losses in January compared to December. With 
certain exceptions, most residuals (January returns minus December 
returns) were statistically equal to zero. 
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When portfolio returns are measured AR, the lowest price decile 
yields significantly positive residuals for close-to-close returns (t = 
1.773). Returns measured ask-to-bid have a much smaller and 
insignificant (t= 0.179) January residual. Bid-to-ask returns have the 
largest and most significant January residual (t = 3.095). Stocks in 
the highest price decile experienced insignificantly negative January 
residuals for all three of the assumed price structures. Summary 
statistics for all stocks in TS1 show a slightly negative but 
insignificant January residual for close-to-close returns, signifi¬ 
cantly negative ask-to-bid returns, and significantly positive bid-to- 
ask returns. These results indicate a statistically significant low 
price effect. The price effect is smallest for returns measured ask- 
to-bid, reflecting the use of market orders. 
The BH methodology results reveal substantially the same outcomes 
as the AR method: Significant but smaller positive January residuals 
for the lowest price decile. Residuals for the highest price decile 
are substantially lower than decile 1. The smaller magnitudes of the 
mean daily residuals in all deciles supports the Roll (1983) and Blume 
and Stambaugh (1983) suggestions that BH-based return measurements 
yield the smallest size-related effects. Similar to AR returns, 
returns measured ask-to-bid experience the smallest low price effects 
while those measured bid-to-ask experienced positive returns in both 
months. January bid-to-ask returns, however, were lower for higher 
priced deciles compared to December returns. The magnitudes of the 
lower January bid-to-ask returns were not significantly different. 
Bid-ask spreads were larger in January reflecting lower prices, and 
107 
Table 6.3.A: Low Price Effects Jan-Dec Return Differentials 
Retns Dec 
Test 
ROLL AR 
Ri-Rd t 
Sample 
ROLL 
Ri-Rd 
One 
, BH 
t 
ROLL 
Ri-Rd 
, RB 
t N 
CC 0.204 1.773 0.185 2.353 0.202 1.562 105 
AB 1 0.020 0.179 0.012 0.046 0.018 0.152 105 
BA 0.385 3.095 0.371 1.354 0.383 3.118 105 
CC / 0.038 0.523 0.035 0.662 0.037 0.395 113 
AB 2 -0.085 -1.192 -0.089 -0.917 -0.086 -0.982 113 
BA 0.162 2.166 0.156 1.972 0.160 1.732 113 
CC 0.028 0.397 0.024 0.437 0.026 0.263 112 
AB 3 -0.098 -1.452 -0.100 -1.177 -0.099 -1.064 112 
BA 0.125 1.793 0.121 1.677 0.123 1.253 112 
CC 0.073 1.149 0.064 1.250 0.070 0.741 106 
AB 4 -0.002 -0.030 -0.010 -0.131 -0.004 -0.044 106 
BA 0.110 1.746 0.101 1.535 0.107 1.176 106 
CC 0.015 0.254 0.007 0.129 0.012 0.134 121 
AB 5 -0.054 -0.957 -0.063 -0.952 -0.057 -0.640 121 
BA 0.076 1.301 0.067 1.089 0.074 0.813 121 
CC -0.118 -1.940 -0.126 -2.654 -0.122 -1.104 114 
AB 6 -0.205 -3.415 -0.212 -3.102 -0.209 -1.954 114 
BA -0.044 -0.718 -0.053 -0.906 -0.049 -0.438 114 
CC -0.147 -2.327 -0.157 -3.245 -0.151 -1.422 100 
AB 7 -0.210 -3.397 -0.219 -3.390 -0.214 -2.060 100 
BA -0.083 -1.311 -0.092 -1.568 -0.086 -0.816 100 
CC -0.055 -1.030 -0.063 -1.326 -0.058 -0.599 121 
AB 8 -0.075 -1.411 -0.082 -1.359 -0.078 -0.818 121 
BA -0.034 -0.630 -0.041 -0.812 -0.037 -0.374 121 
CC -0.061 -1.060 -0.070 -1.510 -0.066 -0.542 114 
AB 9 -0.121 -2.140 -0.130 -2.222 -0.126 -1.065 114 
BA -0.016 -0.279 -0.025 -0.490 -0.021 -0.174 114 
CC -0.038 -0.827 -0.046 -1.121 -0.042 -0.410 128 
AB 10 -0.062 -1.350 -0.070 -1.285 -0.066 -0.656 128 
BA -0.015 -0.324 -0.023 -0.476 -0.019 -0.185 128 
Summary Statistics 
All CC -0.007 -0.345 -0.016 -0.948 -0.010 -0.323 1134 
All AB S -0.089 -3.983 -0.096 -1.952 -0.091 -3.040 1134 
All BA 0.064 2.709 0.056 1.093 0.061 1.958 1134 
lower volumes. These observations indicate that the specialist is 
still able to earn positive returns even in a down market. 
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The RB method reveals residuals quite similar in magnitude and 
significance to AR method results. These results are consistent with 
Roll's (1983) suggestions; AR > BH and RB > BH. Also. RB ask-to-bid 
residuals are uniformly smaller and less significant than close or bid- 
to-ask returns. The TS1 results demonstrate that the magnitude of low 
price effects (and most likely size effects) are sensitive to the 
return measurement algorithms. Moreover, the magnitudes of the 
residuals as well as returns are particularly sensitive to the assumed 
transaction price structures. 
6.3.2 Test Sample Two (TS2) Results 
The results reported for TS1 are influenced by a bearish move by 
the market in general. The results reported in Table 6.3.B for TS2 are 
influenced by a bull market move. Accordingly, the test results 
reported herein reflect the significant effects of that market trend. 
In general. January returns were more positive than December returns 
for all deciles and is reflected by the positive values for all 
residuals. January residuals were largest for the lowest price decile. 
Moreover, the largest magnitude of the residual occurs for returns 
measured ask-to-bid. Two reasons account for this result. First, 
higher prices typically result in smaller bid-ask spreads. Second, the 
substantial positive move by lower price stocks attenuated the effect 
of the spread on measured returns. This was uniformly the case for all 
price deciles except the tenth (largest price) decile. 
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Table 6.3.B: Low Price Effects Jan-Dec Return Differentials 
Test Sample Two 
ROLL AR ROLL BH ROLL RB 
Retns Dec Rj-Rd t Rj-Rd t Rj-Rd t N 
CC 0.590 4.777 0.574 6.726 0.581 3.475 109 
AB 1 0.746 6.038 0.739 2.968 0.738 4.757 109 
BA 0.289 2.159 0.281 1.046 0.282 1.721 109 
CC 0.324 3.562 0.324 4.538 0.318 2.245 no 
AB 2 0.424 4.386 0.438 4.254 0.419 3.124 110 
BA 0.158 1.592 0.171 2.006 0.152 1.085 no 
CC 0.145 2.276 0.143 2.824 0.142 1.392 145 
AB 3 0.233 3.505 0.232 3.215 0.230 2.331 145 
BA 0.049 0.722 0.048 0.717 0.046 0.455 145 
CC 0.219 2.913 0.214 3.479 0.215 1.719 100 
AB 4 0.277 3.578 0.278 3.236 0.274 2.276 100 
BA 0.135 1.710 0.137 1.955 0.131 1.065 100 
CC 0.140 2.119 0.138 2.601 0.137 1.239 130 
AB 5 0.187 2.843 0.186 2.676 0.184 1.714 130 
BA 0.093 1.389 0.092 1.458 0.089 0.802 130 
CC 0.136 2.036 0.130 2.302 0.133 1.187 132 
AB 6 0.168 2.162 0.160 2.319 0.165 1.467 132 
BA 0.103 1.305 0.095 1.591 0.101 0.884 132 
CC 0.141 2.105 0.131 2.357 0.137 1.146 118 
AB 7 0.182 1.781 0.185 2.725 0.178 1.432 118 
BA 0.089 0.859 0.092 1.549 0.084 0.660 118 
CC 0.180 2.626 0.177 3.300 0.178 1.385 118 
AB 8 0.194 2.271 0.172 2.210 0.191 1.442 118 
BA 0.198 2.204 0.171 2.925 0.195 1.473 118 
CC 0.035 0.539 0.023 0.438 0.034 0.267 124 
AB 9 0.054 0.833 0.043 0.683 0.053 0.426 124 
BA 0.015 0.227 0.003 0.062 0.013 0.107 124 
CC 0.097 1.262 0.068 0.847 0.096 0.675 119 
AB 10 0.087 1.138 0.060 0.641 0.087 0.615 119 
BA 0.108 1.392 0.080 0.953 0.107 0.750 119 
Summary Statistics 
All CC 0.193 7.970 0.185 9.153 0.190 4.979 1205 
All AB 0.247 9.073 0.241 5.584 0.243 6.550 1205 
All BA 0.119 4.174 0.112 2.316 0.116 3.041 1205 
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Returns measured BH were typically negative and less so in January 
compared to December. This reflects the narrowing of bid-ask spreads 
as stock prices get larger. The difference in magnitudes of the BH 
residuals compared to AR and RB residuals are quite small; typically 
less than three basis points. This should not be interpreted to mean 
that the same level of return was experienced by all three return 
measurement methods. It reflects the uniformity of effects as bid-ask 
spreads begin to narrow. The important implication of this finding is 
the effect that the bid-ask spread has on realized returns. 
The results discussed in the last two sections suggest that the 
low price effect may be sensitive to the methodology and time sample 
used to measure returns. In bear markets, the low price effect may be 
the result of the specification of the return generating process. 
Specifically, when returns are generated using close-to-close prices, 
significant low price effects are present in the lowest price decile. 
When returns are generated in a manner consistent with market order 
executions, size effects are reduced to insignificance. In bull 
markets, the opposite appears to be true. When returns are generated 
using ask-to-bid prices (market-order executions), low price effects 
are significant. Returns measured bid-to-ask, however, are less 
significant. This would suggest that the specialist/market maker earns 
less at the margin during up markets due to a narrowing of the bid-ask 
spread. The issue is more complicated. The spread may reflect more 
limit order activity on the bid side. Also, we cannot overlook the 
possibility of specialist inventory profits in up markets offsetting 
any losses in income due to a narrowing of the bid-ask spread. 
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The general implications of the preceding analysis suggests that 
the low price effect is sensitive to time, market characteristics, and 
the method used to examine return differentials. The strength of the 
effect is largely a function of the methodology used to measure returns 
and the nature of the samples used to test the effect. This 
observation has been made by other research results indicating an 
instability of the effect. We cannot dismiss the notion that some 
degree of market inefficiency is at work in the low price effect 
anomaly and most probably in the size effect. The origin of the 
inefficiency, however, is not the market per se. The low price effect 
is most likely related to the behavior of the spread and in particular 
the minimum spread imposed by the NYSE for stocks trading in excess of 
one dollar. When stocks rise sufficiently in price, particularly low 
price stocks, the mean bid-ask spread predicted by the model implied in 
section 6.1 may result in an attenuation of the low price effect. A 
simple elimination of the 1/8 point spread increments might achieve the 
same result; ie., use of decimal spreads. 
6.4 Weekend Effects 
Weekend effects are tested in a manner similar to the testing of 
low price effects. Monday-to-Tuesday (MT) returns are subtracted from 
Friday-to-Monday (FM) returns and the residuals tested for 
significance. The null hypothesis is E{MT-FM} = 0. Due to the 
relatively small sample, the two holiday weekend returns (Christmas and 
New Years) are included. This procedure may bias the results. The 
bias, if present, should act equally on all return computation methods. 
Accordingly, the results should be useful in understanding the nature 
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of the weekend effect. Also, one might expect weekend returns to be 
substantially larger than weekday returns. This expectation would be 
conditioned on the belief that returns occur in calender time. 
Accordingly, weekend returns (3 days) should be three times as large as 
weekday returns. The objective of the French (1980) study was to 
determine the answer to that question. French's results suggested that 
returns occur in trading time rather than calender time. 
A potentially important influence on weekend effects is the 
incidence of ex-dividend dates. Table 6.4 presents the distribution of 
ex-dividend dates for TS1. 495 stocks went ex-dividend during the 
sample period; 188 stocks (38%) went ex-dividend on Monday as opposed 
to 37 stocks (7%) going ex-dividend on Friday. We would expect, in the 
absence of any other effects, that average closing prices on Fridays 
would be higher than average closing prices on Mondays. This 
expectation is based on the generally observed tendency of ex-dividend 
day share prices to recover less that the total amount of the dividend 
lose of trading on the ex-date. 
Table 6.4: Frequency Summary for Ex- -Dividend Days 
By Days of the Week for Test Sample One 
Week Mon Tues Wed Thurs Fri Total 
Decl JL ✓N 16 6 5 15 42 
Dec 2 30 24 40 7 9 110 
Dec3 28 15 8 7 6 64 
Dec4 9 6 3 37 H 55 
Dec5 27 8 2 2 H 39 
Janl 28 8 3 1 1 41 
Jan2 33 7 1 3 1 45 
Jan3 16 8 3 1 3 31 
Jan4 17 33 11 5 2 68 
Total 188 125 77 68 37 495 
% 38 25 16 14 7 100 
Note: Decl = first week in December, etc. 
H = Holiday, NYSE closed 
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The data for TS2 indicate 579 stocks going ex-dividend during the 
sample time period. The distribution of ex-dates for TS2 are: 245 
(42%), 133 (23%), 67 (12%), 86 (15%), and 48 (8%) for Monday through 
Friday, respectively. Thus the two samples have approximately the same 
distribution of ex-dates. The distributions shown in Table 6.4 would 
support a marked potential for negative Friday-to-Monday returns for 
stocks that go ex-dividend on Monday. 
The possibility of substantial ex-dividend date effects suggests 
that the data sample be dichotomized on that basis. Accordingly, 
results are reported for non-dividend paying stocks, stocks going ex- 
dividend and combined results for each decile in the sample. Also, 
returns are measured close-to-close, ask-to-bid, and bid-to-ask. Table 
6.5.A (p. 113) presents the results for TS1, Table 6.5.B (p. 114) for 
TS2. D = (%) difference in returns, t = test statistic, and N = the 
number of issues. 
The last three rows in Table 6.5.A contain the summary statistics 
for all stocks in TS1. The weekend effect is present in eight of the 
nine categories. When returns are measured close-to-close, TS1 results 
indicate significantly negative residuals in six of the ten deciles. 
When returns are measured ask-to-bid, five deciles have significantly 
negative residuals and only three deciles have significantly negative 
residuals when returns are measured bid-to-ask. Effects are most 
significant in the third, sixth, and eighth deciles. In all deciles, 
the evidence of a weekend effect is weakest in non-dividend paying 
stocks; 7 out of 30 possibilities. The evidence is strongest in stocks 
going ex-dividend; 15 out of 30. Also, the weekend effects are weakest 
in the lowest and highest price deciles. 
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Table 6.5.A: Weekend Effect under Alternative Assumptions 
Return Differentials and Dividend Effects 
Test Sample One 
Dec 
Close- 
No 1 
-to- 
Div 
Close 
Comb No 
Ask-to 
Div 
-Bid 
Comb No 
Bid-to 
Div 
-Ask 
Comb 
D -0 .39 0 .06 -0.33 -0, ,28 -0 .08 -0.25 -0 .25 0.02 -0.21 
t 1 — 1.8 0 .18 1.71 -0. ,87 -0 .15 0.87 -0 .68 0.05 0.65 
N 91 14 105 91 14 105 91 14 105 
D -0 .17 -l 3.3 -0.22 -0. ,16 -0 .19 
f
-
H
 
. 
o
 1 -0 . 16 -0.14 -0.15 
t 2 -1 .18 -1 .89 2.02 -0, ,89 -1 .03 1.3 -0 .98 -0.75 1.24 
N 70 43 113 70 43 113 70 i 43 13 
D -0 .46 -0 .34 -0.4 -0, ,44 -0 .36 -0.4 -0 .45 -0.37 -0.41 
t 3 — 2.7 -2 .27 3.54 -2, .37 -2 .02 3.11 -2 .44 -2.63 3.55 
N 56 56 112 56 56 112 56 56 112 
D -0 .09 -I 0.4 -0.23 -0, ,22 -0 .36 -0.29 -0 .03 -0.31 -0.16 
t 4 -0 .69 -3 .28 2.52 -1, .49 -2 .89 2.91 -0 .18 -2.23 1.48 
N 57 49 106 57 49 106 57 49 106 
D -0 .05 -0 .02 -0.04 -0, .06 -0 .09 -0.07 -0 .06 0.06 0 
t 5 —1 0.4 -0 .15 0.39 -0, .44 -0 .61 0.75 -i 0.5 0.42 0 
N 60 61 121 60 61 121 60 61 121 
D -0 .23 -0 .34 -0.28 -0, .23 -i 0.4 -0.31 -0 .25 -0.3 -0.27 
t 6 -1 .83 -2 .49 3.04 -1, .62 -2 .74 3.02 -1 .91 -2.16 2.88 
N 62 52 114 62 52 114 62 52 114 
D 0 -0 .06 -0.03 -0, .05 -0 .13 -0.09 0 .09 -0.12 -0.01 
t 7 0 .03 -0 .38 0.25 -0 .35 -0 .94 0.91 0 .58 -0.69 0.12 
N 51 49 100 51 49 100 51 49 100 
D -0 . 16 -0 .28 -0.21 -0 .22 -0 .31 -0.26 -0 .15 -0.27 -0.2 
t 8 -1 .44 -2 . 16 2.54 -1 .94 -2 .44 3.09 -1 .31 -1.91 2.29 
N 67 54 121 67 54 121 67 54 121 
D 0 .02 -0 .25 -0.1 -0 .11 -0 .28 -0.19 0 .02 -0.22 -0.09 
t 9 0 .19 -1 .93 1.22 -0 .95 -2 .16 2.19 0 .17 -1.58 0.98 
N 61 53 114 61 53 114 61 53 114 
D 0 .09 0 .04 0.07 -0 .02 -0 .01 -0.01 0 .11 0.07 0.09 
t 10 0.9 0 .41 0.94 -0 .18 -0 .08 0.19 1 .04 0.8 1.25 
N 76 52 128 76 52 128 76 52 128 
Summary Statistics 
-0.15 -0.2-0.17 -0.18-0.23 -0.2 -0.11-0.17-0.14 
-3.16 -4.55 5.18 -2.14 -3.92 3.67 -1.27 -2.74 2.36 
651 483 1134 651 483 1134 651 483 1134 
D 
t 
N 
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Table 6.5.B: Weekend Effect under Alternative Assumptions 
Return Differentials and Dividend Effects 
Test Sample Two 
Close-to-Close Ask-to-Bid Bid-to-Ask 
Dec No Div Comb No Div Comb No Div Comb 
D 1 -0.14 -1 -0.21 -0.14 -0.28 -0.2 -0.55 -0.16 -0.31 
t -0.68 -1.81 1.09 -0.73 -1.97 1.69 -1.54 -0.88 1.75 
N 100 9 109 100 9 109 100 9 109 
D 2 -0.12 -1.04 -0.2 -0.17 -0.29 -0.22 -0.3 -0.36 -0.33 
t -0.4 -1.9 0.69 -0.97 -2.04 1.97 -2.33 -3.32 3.93 
N 70 40 110 70 40 110 70 40 110 
D 3 -0.19 -0.89 -0.25 -0.37 -0.29 -0.33 -0.57 -0.26 -0.41 
t -0.58 -1.55 0.8 -2.81 -2.12 3.51 -3.39 -1.53 3.42 
N 78 67 145 78 67 145 78 67 145 
D 4 -0.12 -0.08 -0.11 -0.37 -0.3 -0.34 -0.54 -0.52 -0.53 
t -0.67 -0.4 0.78 -2.63 -2.2 3.44 -3.01 -3.02 4.28 
N 54 46 100 54 46 100 54 46 100 
D 5 -0.15 0.12 -0.05 -0.38 -0.25 -0.32 -0.2 -0.28 -0.24 
t -0.78 0.51 0.36 -2.64 -1.82 3.19 -1.8 -2.43 3.02 
N 69 61 130 69 61 130 69 61 130 
D 6 -0.05 0.05 -0.01 -0.1 -0.33 -0.23 -0.2 -0.32 -0.26 
t -0.26 0.21 0.1 -0.71 -2.91 2.53 -1.81 -2.69 3.22 
N 60 72 132 60 72 132 60 72 132 
D 7 -0.21 -0.34 -0.27 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.16 -0.28 -0.23 
t -1.65 -2.46 2.88 -1.67 -1.99 2.58 -1.52 -2.46 2.85 
N 46 72 118 46 72 118 46 72 118 
D 8 -0.27 -0.37 -0.31 -0.26 -0.19 -0.22 -0.19 -0.09 -0.14 
t -1.84 -2.73 3.14 -1.48 -1.07 1.76 -1.54 -0.83 1.73 
N 59 59 118 59 59 118 59 59 118 
D 9 -0.25 -0.36 -0.3 -0.21 -0.18 -0.19 -0.25 -0.44 -0.35 
t -1.71 -2.54 2.94 -1.55 -1.69 2.29 -1.72 -1.7 2.36 
N 60 64 124 60 64 124 60 64 124 
D 10 -0.04 -0.27 -0.15 -0.58 -0.2 -0.35 -0.22 -0.12 -0.17 
t -0.21 -2.13 1.33 -1.65 -1.08 1.96 -1.66 -1.16 2.03 
N 62 57 119 62 57 119 
Summary Statistics 
62 57 119 
D -0.18 -0.27 -0.22 -0.18 -0.24 -0.21 -0.2 -0.27 -0.23 
t -3.63 -6.28 -6.55 -2.23 -4.61 -4.1 -2.22 -5.2 -4.21 
N 658 547 1205 658 547 1205 658 547 1205 
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These results support two possible conclusions. First, the weekend 
effect is very sensitive to the incidence of ex-dividend date price 
adjustments. Second, the weekend effect is not equally distributed 
among different price levels. This might suggest an interaction 
between the price level and the magnitude of the dividend. However, 
due to the size of the samples, any findings of weekend effects should 
be interpreted with caution. 
The last three rows in Table 6.5.B contain the results for all 
stocks TS2. The weekend effect is present in all nine categories. 
When returns are measured close-to-close, only three of the ten deciles 
have statistically significant negative residuals. When returns 
measured ask-to-bid or bid-to-ask, all ten deciles have statistically 
significant negative residuals In all deciles, the evidence of a 
weekend effect is weakest in non-dividend paying stocks; 11 out of 30 
possibilities. The evidence is strongest in stocks going ex-dividend; 
20 out of 30. Similar to the TS1 results, effects are weakest in the 
lowest and highest price deciles. The TS2 results are substantially 
similar to the TS1 results and support the same level of conclusions 
suggested in the previous paragraph. 
6.5 The January Effect 
The January effect is the tendency of stocks reaching year end 
lows in December to experience significant gains after the first of the 
year. A problem in examining the January effect is that it may be 
associated with or indeed part of the size effect, low price effect, or 
may be confounded by one or both of these effects. Some research has 
suggested that stocks with absolute gains in December or earlier may 
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continue to experience gains after the new year. Alternatively, not 
every stock reaching year-end lows in December will experience any 
significant gains in January. We are interested in examining the 
January effect under alternative assumptions about the form of the 
return generating process. Accordingly, we examine turn-of-the-year 
behavior with returns measured close-to-close, ask-to-bid, and bid-to- 
ask. The primary focus of our investigation is the behavior of the 
first (lowest) and tenth (highest) price deciles. 
The data samples are examined for a January effect by testing the 
difference between mean daily January and December close-to-close 
returns. The TS1 lowest price decile t-test is 2.54; the highest price 
decile is -.799. The test results indicate a January effect in the 
lowest price decile. January returns for the highest price decile were 
more negative than December returns but the difference is insignifi¬ 
cantly different from zero. When returns are measured ask-to-bid or 
bid-to-ask, test results are quite similar: January returns are more 
positive for the lowest price decile, and more negative for the highest 
price decile. Unlike close-to-close returns, none of the latter 
results are statistically significant. Tests of TS2 indicate 
substantially greater January returns compared to December returns for 
the three alternative return generating processes. The results were 
expected: the market evidenced a substantial bull move during January 
1983. The t-test values for the TS2 lowest and highest price deciles 
were 6.42 and 3.11, respectively. An additional test of the difference 
between January returns for the lowest and highest price deciles 
indicates a significantly more positive return for the lowest price 
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decile. The t-test values are 1.97 and 6.63 for TS1 and TS2, 
respectively. 
We next divide each the lowest and highest price deciles into 
quintiles and examine the January effect in greater detail. In effect, 
five portfolios each (total of ten) are formed with the stocks in the 
lowest and highest price deciles. Stocks are assigned to these 
portfolios on the basis of December returns; stocks with the lowest 
positive or most negative returns are assigned to portfolio 1, those 
with the highest positive or least negative returns are assigned to 
portfolio 5. The five portfolios within each decile contain the same 
number of stocks within plus or minus one. Table 6.6 contains the t- 
test results of these comparisons for TS1 and TS2. 
Table 6.6: January-December Return Differentials 
Panel A: TS1 t-Test Results 
Lowest Price Decile Highest Price Decile 
Pf CC AB BA CC AB BA 
1 6.199 1.558 0.254 2.892 2.208 3.084 
2 3.268 1.036 0.508 0.074 -0.227 0.280 
3 3.018 0.853 1.234 0.575 0.629 0.442 
4 1.036 -0.053 0.273 -3.642 -2.017 -3.784 
5 -4.898 -0.959 -0.854 -2.365 -1.310 -1.758 
All 2.541 0.922 0.448 -0.799 -0.469 -0.908 
Panel B: TS2 t-Test Results 
Lowest Price Decile Highest Price Decile 
Pf CC AB BA CC AB BA 
1 11.01 2.758 1.193 7.731 6.168 7.273 
2 7.610 2.817 1.716 4.100 2.000 2.697 
3 3.475 2.002 0.649 1.581 1.403 1.259 
4 2.356 1.995 -0.444 -0.197 -0.119 -0.150 
5 -2.293 0.302 -0.633 -3.504 -2.844 -3.025 
All 6.424 3.733 0.778 3.109 2.521 4.453 
In general, stocks in the first quintile, those experiencing the 
worst returns in December, show the largest positive differentials 
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between January and December returns; those experiencing the best 
December returns (fifth quintile) experience the largest negative 
differentials in January. The magnitudes of the return differentials 
decline in near monotone order from the first to the fifth quintiles. 
(Critical value for the t-test = 2.080.) 
Results describing return differences for the lowest price decile 
were presented in section 6.3. The results described therein clearly 
show more positive returns accruing to low-priced stocks in comparison 
to the high-priced stocks. Table 6.6 provides an additional dimension 
to the investigation. A further categorization based on December 
returns for stocks in the lowest and highest price deciles reveals an 
additional regularity. Stocks in the lowest return quintiles 
experience strong January effects regardless of price decile. Stocks 
in the highest return quintiles experience statistically significant 
lower January returns. Differentials for the lowest price decile are 
significant for returns measured close-to-close and ask-to-bid and 
insignificant for returns measured bid-to-ask . The results are 
generally significant for the lowest and highest return quintiles of 
the highest price decile regardless of the assumptions made about the 
return generating process. 
Tax considerations have been suggested as an explanation for part 
of the turn-of-the-year or January effect. Accordingly. December would 
seem the best time (from a tax standpoint) to recognize losses and 
January to realize gains. The regularity of the return behavior of the 
first and fifth quintiles suggests the possibility of a rotation in the 
flow of investment during January from those stocks with the best 
December performances to those with the worst; with part or all of the 
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rotation occurring in January. Two additional observations are made. 
First, test sample one average daily trading volumes for the lowest 
price decile were uniformly lower in January compared to December. The 
average daily trading volume decline in the fifth quintile (37%) was 
slightly greater than the first quintile (34%). Second, average daily 
trading volumes for the highest price decile were uniformly larger in 
January compared to December; 34% greater in the fifth quintile and 28% 
for the first quintile. The results are contained in Table 6.7, 
Table 6.7: January versus December Trading Volumes 
Test Sample One 
Low Price Decile High Price Decile 
Pf Jan Vol Dec Vol t-test Jan Vol Dec Vol t-test 
1 16757 25543 -0.907 61679 48035 1.093 
2 17413 19454 -0.315 90093 71005 0.697 
3 10559 12343 -0.449 51086 41496 0.858 
4 9866 15856 -1.384 80744 49297 1.174 
5 13666 21733 -1.669 84278 62525 0.596 
All 13652 18985 -1.881 73391 54383 1.699 
Statistical t-tests of the differences in trading volumes reveals 
insignificant differences when January volumes and December volumes are 
compared. These observations would suggest that, at least for TS1 
(bear market), January gains in low price stocks occur on lower 
volumes; losses in the highest priced stocks occur on larger volume. 
The differences between January and December trading volumes are 
significant at the .10 level; t-test results are -1.881 and 1.699 for 
the lowest and highest price deciles, respectively. The lower January 
trading volumes for the lowest price stocks might suggest a partial 
explanation for the January effect, at least for the lowest priced 
stocks. Lower volumes suggest a decrease in liquidity. A decrease in 
liquidity is also accompanied by an increase in the bid-ask spread. 
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Both are indicative of increased levels of risk. If the relationship 
between risk and return holds, then postive January returns for low 
price stocks would be a partial result of the increase in the apparent 
riskiness of these low priced securities. These results are, of 
course, very speculative due to the very small sample of stocks. It 
does, however, reveal a potentiallly important relationship between the 
interaction of volumes, bid-ask spreads and observed returns. A more 
detailed analysis with larger data samples might be useful in 
increasing our understanding of this particular anomaly. 
These results suggest that the magnitude of the January effect (or 
turn-of-the-year effect) is sensitive to the underlying trend of the 
market; the effect is stronger in a bull market. The results also 
indicate that the effect is non-uniform across a price-stratified 
sample. When a price decile is further stratified on the basis of 
December performance, stocks in the worst December returns quintile 
substantially outperform those in the best December performance 
regardless of the underlying trend in the market. Finally, the results 
suggest that the January effect is most significant when returns are 
measured close-to-close and least significant when returns are measured 
bid-to-ask (limit orders) for the lowest price decile: The results for 
the highest price decile are significant regardless of the assumptions 
made about the form of the return generating process. 
6.6 Microstructure Price Behavior and Autocorrelation 
We now investigate the relation between today's closing price 
relative to the closing bid and ask price quotes and the next day's 
price change. We are interested in determining the extent of 
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regularities in price changes when stocks close at the bid, ask, 
inside, or outside the closing bid-ask spread. To facilitate our 
investigation, we have stratified the sample into deciles using the 
daily closing price as the stratification variable. This procedure 
minimizes the effects of different price/spread levels present in the 
overall sample. The very low number of securities closing outside the 
closing bid-ask price spread precludes separate estimates for means and 
variances of next day price changes. Accordingly, three categories are 
reported: closes<=bid; bid< close <ask; and close >= ask. In each 
category, the scale of the (t+1) change is always relative to the 
magnitude of the day(t) bid-ask spread. Thus, changes in the (t+1) 
closing spread, bid, ask are given as percentages using equations 
(6.1),(6.2), and (6.3), respectively. 
%Dspr = (Askt+| - Bidt+i) - (Askt - Bidt) (6.1) 
(Askt - Bidt) 
%Dask = (Askt+i - Askt) / (Askt - Bidt) (6.2) 
%Dbid = (Bidt+i - Bidt) / (Askt - Bidt) (6.3) 
An important result of using time t's spread as a scale is 
demonstrated in the subsequent tables. The percentage change in the 
(t+1) spread (%CHG S) is equal to the algebraic difference between 
changes in the ask (%CHG A) and bid (%CHG B) quotes; equation (6.2) 
minus equation (6.3) equals equation (6.1). The price-stratified 
samples suggest that the magnitudes of the next day changes are 
sensitive to price levels and the size of the bid-ask spread. Two sets 
of price-stratified results are reported; (1) test sample one (TS1) and 
(2) test sample two (TS2). Next Day returns (%RET) are also reported 
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along with the total number of observations (N). Analysis of the TS1 
results is followed by an analysis of the TS2 results. 
When the last trade price is equal to or less than the closing bid 
price, next day returns (measured close-to-close) are positive for all 
deciles, and statistically significant for the first eight deciles. 
The (t+1) closing spreads are larger and exhibit a near monotone 
increase in the percentage change from the lowest to the highest price 
decile. All next day spread change magnitudes are statistically 
significant and positive. The change in spread is primarily the result 
of a drop in the bid-side quote. These results are exhibited in Table 
6.8.A.I. (t-statistics in parentheses.) 
Table 6.8.A.1: TS1 Next Day Changes 
Close =< Bid 
Dec %CHG S %CHG A %CHG B %RET N 
1 21.090 1.702 -19.389 1.111 1900 
(19.0) (0.72) (8.08) (14.2) 1900 
2 26.142 6.007 -20.135 0.546 1722 
(19.5) (1.73) (5.76) (10.0) 1722 
3 33.555 11.526 -22.029 0.480 1469 
(20.9) (2.65) (5.17) (8.76) 1469 
4 29.712 11.867 -17.845 0.472 1359 
(17.7) (2.49) (3.79) (9.08) 1359 
5 32.229 1.676 -30.552 0.333 1466 
(20.5) (0.34) (6.23) (6.89) 1466 
6 37.589 1.862 -35.727 0.269 1219 
(19.0) (0.26) (4.99) (4.84) 1219 
7 37.158 1.147 -36.011 0.270 1065 
(18.8) (0.14) (4.50) (4.67) 1065 
8 39.496 -6.685 -46.181 0.136 1240 
(19.6) (0.75) (5.25) (2.68) 1240 
9 43.557 -24.408 -67.965 0.054 1063 
(19.5) (1.97) (5.47) (0.88) 1063 
10 43.503 -8.481 -51.984 0.089 1205 
(17.4) (0.63) (3.91) (1.94) 1205 
The larger percentage changes in the upper deciles is due to the 
larger absolute spread for stocks trading at higher prices; typically 
3/8 of a point. The largest percentage change in the bid-ask spread 
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results from a change in the bid. Changes on the ask-side are 
insignificantly different from zero in most deciles. These results 
reflect the expected changes in the bid-ask spread/prices for markets 
influenced by specialist activity and/or the limit order book. If the 
last trade of the day results in the execution (from the limit-order 
book) of a limit order (to buy), we would expect an increase in the 
spread on average. Recall that the "market" is defined as the highest 
unexercised offer to buy (bid) and the lowest unexercised offer to sell 
(ask) as reflected in the specialist's limit-order book. The average 
magnitude of the change would depend on the depth of the orders 
awaiting execution from the specialist' limit order book. An earlier 
study by Neiderhofer and Osborne (1966) reported clustering of limit 
orders at whole numbers followed by halves, quarters, and odd eighths. 
The nonuniform clustering produced nonrandom effects in stock price 
motion. The results reported in this study may well reflect the 
effects of nonrandom distributions on the nonrandom outcomes of last 
trade prices relative to the closing spread/price. 
When stocks close inside the bid-ask spread, next day returns are 
typically and significantly negative for all deciles. The (t+1) 
closing spreads are smaller and exhibit a near monotone decrease in 
percentage change from the lowest to the highest price decile. These 
results are shown in Table 6.8.A.2 (p. 124) 
All spread changes are significantly different from zero. Changes 
in the ask quote are typically negative and significant in all ten 
deciles. Changes in the bid quotes are smaller in magnitude and are 
positive for the first four deciles and negative for the last six. The 
bid-quote changes in the first and last two deciles are significant. 
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Table 6.8.A.2: TS1 Next Day Changes 
Bid < Close < Ask 
Dec %CHG S %CHG A %CHG B %RET C N 
1 -23.537 -14.808 8.729 -0.339 1144 
(25.6) (7.51) (4.50) (3.23) 1144 
2 -18.258 -10.501 7.757 -0.138 1743 
(23.6) (4.68) (3.48) (2.18) 1743 
3 -15.756 -12.819 2.937 -0.156 2014 
(22.1) (5.60) (1.28) (2.91) 2014 
4 -13.653 -10.743 2.911 -0.106 1965 
(18.2) (4.16) (1.12) (2.17) 1965 
5 -13.356 -13.822 -0.466 -0.147 2332 
(19.1) (5.10) (0.17) (3.31) 2332 
6 -11.441 -14.121 -2.679 -0.134 2522 
(17.6) (4.85) (0.93) (3.18) 2522 
7 -10.468 -19.652 -9.184 -0.192 2250 
(14.2) (6.18) (2.87) (4.63) 2250 
8 -10.565 -16.346 -5.781 -0.125 2713 
(15.5) (4.97) (1.73) (3.41) 2713 
9 -10.266 -20.135 -9.869 -0.150 2679 
(15.7) (5.27) (2.57) (4.10) 2679 
10 -9.934 -25.333 -15.399 -0.143 2915 
(14.4) (5.56) (3.38) (4.67) 2915 
The observed decrease in the spread may reflect efforts by the 
specialist to limit competition from other traders or from public 
traders attempting to use attractively placed limit orders: the use of 
limit-orders avails the best strategy available to a public trader who 
desires to narrow the spread and obtain a better execution price. The 
significant change is a decline in the ask-side quote. This may 
reflect the general bearish behavior of the market during the period 
covered by TS1. 
When stocks close at a price equal to or greater than the closing 
ask price, next day returns are significantly negative for all deciles. 
The (t+1) closing spreads are significantly larger and exhibit a near 
monotone in the percentage change from the lowest to the highest price 
deciles. Table 6.8A.3 exhibits these results. The largest percentage 
change occurs on the ask side (the ask quote is higher) for the first 
five deciles and on the bid side (it is lower) for the last five 
deciles. All bid-side changes are negative and significant. 
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Table 6.8.A.3: TS1 Next Day Changes 
Close => Ask 
Dec %CHG S %CHG A %CHG B %RET C N 
1 22.297 15.133 -7.164 -1.591 1261 
16.151 4.483 -2.101 -14.661 1261 
2 36.044 19.116 -16.928 -0.705 1168 
16.851 3.821 -3.062 -9.902 1168 
3 35.604 22.266 -13.338 -0.543 1109 
18.556 3.963 -2.382 -7.346 1109 
4 38.680 14.171 -24.509 -0.574 1022 
18.433 2.246 -3.777 -9.563 1022 
5 39.288 22.222 -17.066 -0.456 1163 
19.186 3.504 -2.669 -7.799 1163 
6 41.879 9.578 -32.301 -0.506 933 
19.800 1.121 -3.761 -7.802 933 
7 42.761 4.366 -38.394 -0.522 785 
17.457 0.393 -3.426 -6.617 785 
8 40.617 15.345 -25.271 -0.347 1008 
19.279 1.435 -2.337 -5.785 1008 
9 39.122 -36.430 -75.551 -0.521 932 
18.075 -2.697 -5.536 -7.884 932 
10 40.831 11.331 -29.500 -0.276 1128 
18.999 0.763 -1.984 -5.338 1128 
We would expect that the ask-side quote would increase in the 
absence of other effects. These results may be ascribed to the general 
decline of the market during the period under observation. The average 
change in the spread is consistent with the operation of the 
specialist's limit order book and may also reflect the effects of 
price-clustering reported by Neiderhofer (1965). Also, the magnitudes 
and monotonicity of the changes are quite similar to those resulting 
from bid-side closes. 
The behavior observed in TS1 suggests that next day regularities 
decline in relative strength as prices (and spreads) get larger. The 
magnitudes of all next day returns are insufficient for trading profits 
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after transaction costs are considered. The regularity of this 
behavior is, however, anomalous to the random walk hypothesis. 
Results for TS2 are similar to those in TS1. They are exhibited 
in Tables 6.8.B.1, 6.8.B.2, and 6.8.B.3. When stocks close at or below 
the closing bid price, next day returns are positive and significant in 
all but the last two deciles. Spreads are significantly larger and the 
percentage change in the spread increases in a monotone fashion similar 
to the TS1 result. 
Table 6.8.B.1: TS2 Next Day Changes 
Close <= Bid 
Dec %CHG S %CHG A %CHG B %RET C N 
1 24.133 17.627 -6.507 1.515 1757 
(18.7) (4.39) (1.63) (15.2) 1757 
2 28.468 25.877 -2.591 0.838 1556 
(18.7) (4.42) (0.45) (10.6) 1556 
3 32.303 20.287 -12.016 0.615 1850 
(22.0) (4.09) (2.44) (11.5) 1850 
4 37.834 32.375 -5.473 0.601 1157 
(19.1) (4.36) (0.73) (8.92) 1157 
5 35.944 30.997 -4.947 0.556 1545 
(20.5) (4.46) (0.71) (9.60) 1545 
6 35.587 4.350 -31.237 0.321 1409 
(20.1) (0.49) (3.52) (5.13) 1409 
7 35.670 14.525 -21.187 0.348 1191 
(20.1) (1.32) (1.93) (5.25) 1191 
8 38.961 23.133 -15.832 0.368 1145 
(19.2) (1.96) (1.34) (5.69) 1145 
9 39.955 46.092 6.091 0.407 1071 
(19.8) (3.066 (0.41) (5.90) 1071 
10 45.312 59.929 14.621 0.326 1041 
(17.5) (2.56) (0.63) (4.80) 1041 
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Table 6.8.B.2: TS2 Next Day Changes 
Bid < Close < Ask 
Dec %CHG S %CHG A %CHG B %RET C N 
1 -23.147 -9.300 13.847 0.060 1332 
(27.6) (3.91) 5.779 (0.59) 1332 
2 -17.047 -1.113 15.932 0.115 1764 
(21.2) (3.39) 5.536 (1.61) 1764 
3 -14.818 4.928 19.740 0.201 2572 
(23.3) (1.79) 7.183 (3.91) 2572 
4 -13.731 4.622 18.354 0.202 1990 
(18.9) (1.41) 5.554 (3.66) 1990 
5 -12.840 3.175 16.012 0.124 2618 
(20.8) (0.97) 4.863 (2.53) 2618 
6 -10.387 4.136 14.515 0.119 2931 
(16.9) (1.22) 4.263 (2.75) 2931 
7 -10.804 9.707 20.497 0.162 2713 
(12.7) (2.43) 5.216 (3.67) 2713 
8 -8.250 5.515 13.746 0.105 2738 
(4.07) (1.20) 3.059 (2.32) 2738 
9 -8.149 0.765 8.882 0.049 3093 
(13.9) (0.16) 1.889 (1.29) 3093 
10 -7.762 5.743 13.375 0.058 2871 
(11.0) (0.86) 1.997 (1.50) 2871 
Table 6, .8.B.3: TS2 Next Day Changes 
Close => Ask 
Dec %CHG S %CHG A %CHG B %RET C N 
8 
25.974 44.534 18.557 -0.650 1489 
(17.8) (9.51) (3.99) (5.90) 1489 
33.371 44.954 11.583 -0.245 1300 
(18.7) (6.98) (1.77) (2.88) 1300 
34.148 36.181 2.023 -0.304 1668 
(20.2) (6.52) (0.36) (5.15) 1668 
36.040 45.473 9.433 -0.254 1053 
(17.9) (5.31) (1.11) (3.57) 1053 
38.159 46.904 8.741 -0.205 1297 
(19.8) (5.52) (1.03) (3.10) 1297 
37.312 49.136 11.575 -0.203 1204 
(19.1) (4.77) (1.13) (2.82) 1204 
36.839 37.078 0.238 -0.236 1052 
(18.4) (3.35) (0.02) (3.58) 1052 
40.878 42.386 1.477 -0.194 1073 
(19.2) (3.27) (0.11) (2.79) 1073 
37.059 22.124 -15.007 -0.247 1044 
(18.3) (1.48) (1.01) (3.77) 1044 
39.721 22.108 -17.782 -0.251 1086 
1(7.8) (1.01) (0.82) (3.94) 1086 
10 
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When stocks close on the ask side or above, next day returns are 
negative and significant for all deciles. When stocks close inside the 
bid-ask spread, next day spreads were significantly smaller. 
The principal differences between the TS1 and TS2 are related to 
which side of the spread changes the most. TS2 bid-side closes were 
typically accompanied by a significant increase in the next day ask 
quote for eight of the ten deciles. This was also the situation when 
stocks closed on the ask side. When stocks closed inside the bid-ask 
spread, next day returns were positive and significant in six of the 
ten deciles. These particular results are exactly opposite to the 
behavior observed in TS1. A plausible explanation for these 
differences is most likely related to the underlying trends in the 
stock market. The expected direction and relative magnitudes of next 
day changes are significantly influenced by the trend of the market. 
The results reported herein complement those reported earlier by 
Neiderhofer and Osborne (1966). Their study reported the regularity of 
intra-daily price-reversals for sequential transactions and nonrandom 
limit-order price clustering. The results reported here differ in two 
important aspects. First, earlier studies did not examine the 
relationship of serial price dependencies in relation to bid-ask 
spreads. Second, those studies focused on intra-daily trading 
patterns. The results reported in this study indicate a more 
significant regularity in the behavior of next day price changes given 
today’s closing price relative to the closing bid-ask spread. Caution 
is warranted in interpreting the implications of these results due to 
the relatively small time samples used in the study. However, the 
similarity of next day behavior of the variables in both samples 
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suggests that this behavior is more than just the artifact of a 
particular sample. 
The results reported herein, however, cast a shadow on recent 
efforts by Roll (1984), Harris (1985), and others, to measure the 
effective bid-ask spread. Central to their measurement scheme are two 
assumptions. First, that most trading takes place inside the bid-ask 
spread. Hence their assertion that the uninformed trader actual pays a 
smaller "effective" spread. Second, they assume that price 
fluctuations within the bid-ask spread are random. The effective 
result is that the effective spread may be measured as 2/-cov, the 
relationship hypothesized by Roll (1984) as defining the value of the 
effective spread. The results presented in Tables 6.8.A.1 through 
6.8.B.3 indicate significant nonrandom regularities in price behavior 
from day to day. Moreover, the results are nonuniform in magnitude 
across different price levels and market trends. Many trades do occur 
at the bid or the ask as well as inside the quoted spread. Also, there 
is evidence presented in the current research to indicate that even 
when trades occur inside the bid-ask spread, there is no regularity of 
expectation that they occur at the exact center of the spread. It is 
possible that the results presented in this research may cause a re- 
evaluation of theories and methods being developed to measure 
"effective" spreads paid by uninformed traders. 
In general, the results reported herein provide additional 
information on the nature of serial price dependencies at the 
microstructure level. The significant regularity of next day returns 
with respect to sign and magnitude would seem to suggest a potentially 
exploitable strategy. We will explore such possibilities when we 
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examine the effects of different price constructs on the computation of 
a popular market index. Also, these results may provide some insight 
into specialist behavior. 
6.7 The DJIA under Alternative Price Assumptions 
This study seeks to determine the sensitivity of market indexes to 
alternative specifications of closing prices. The Dow Jones Industrial 
Average (DJIA) has been selected for this investigation. The DJIA is 
computed using four different price specifications: Close, Bid, Ask, 
and the mean of the closing bid and ask price quotes (the "true” price 
construct). Tables 6.9.A (TS1) and 6.9.B (TS2) display the values of 
the DJIA index using closing prices (DJIA-C) and the mean of the 
closing bid and ask prices (DJIA-M). Equation (6.4) is used to 
calculate the daily value of the index: 
DJIA = I Pn / 1.314 for n = 1,2,,,30 (6.4) 
Where: Pn = closing price for each DJIA component stock 
1.314 = DJIA divisor 
The computed values of the index using closing prices and the mean 
of the closing bid and ask quotes are statistically identical. The 
same relationship is true for the index computed with closing bid or 
ask prices. As expected, the DJIA index constructed from closing ask 
prices is slightly higher, the DJIA index with closing bid prices 
slightly lower than the traditionally constructed index (DJIA-C). 
Pairwise correlations correlation coefficients are all in the .97 to 
.99 range. We conclude that the DJIA is insensitive to the closing 
price specification used in its construction. 
132 
TABLE 6.9.A: DJIA Alternative Price Assumptions 
Closing Distributions and Momentum Index 
Test Sample One 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Day DJIA-C DJIA-M C=B INS C=A MI 
1 890.22 890.22 23% 47% 30% 0.533 
2 882.61 883.28 50% 27% 23% 0.361 
3 883.85 883.70 27% 50% 23% 0.494 
4 892.69 892.79 33% 43% 23% 0.461 
5 886.99 886.80 40% 17% 43% 0.525 
6 881.75 881.28 17% 47% 37% 0.589 
7 888.22 888.22 30% 40% 30% 0.500 
8 892.03 892.17 33% 40% 27% 0.467 
9 886.51 886.84 43% 33% 23% 0.400 
10 871.48 872.15 60% 23% 17% 0.278 
11 875.95 875.33 27% 33% 40% 0.572 
12 868.72 869.20 37% 30% 30% 0.428 
13 870.53 870.62 43% 23% 33% 0.450 
14 875.00 875.62 37% 37% 17% 0.356 
15 873.10 873.72 53% 30% 17% 0.306 
16 871.96 871.77 30% 27% 43% 0.572 
17 869.67 869.58 30% 37% 33% 0.519 
18 873.48 873.48 23% 37% 37% 0.489 
19 870.34 870.53 40% 33% 27% 0.428 
20 868.25 868.39 37% 23% 40% 0.506 
21 873.10 873.72 47% 30% 23% 0.367 
22 875.00 874.90 20% 50% 30% 0.544 
23 882.52 882.42 33% 27% 40% 0.522 
24 865.30 866.01 50% 40% 10% 0.311 
25 861.02 861.44 43% 30% 27% 0.417 
26 861.78 861.73 30% 40% 30% 0.500 
27 866.53 865.92 37% 17% 43% 0.617 
28 850.46 850.74 37% 23% 37% 0.461 
29 847.70 843.03 33% 40% 27% 0.456 
30 838.95 838.80 27% 37% 37% 0.558 
31 842.28 842.47 47% 17% 37% 0.450 
32 847.60 847.27 33% 23% 43% 0.561 
33 855.12 854.12 20% 40% 40% 0.609 
34 847.41 847.41 40% 20% 40% 0.494 
35 845.89 845.84 30% 33% 37% 0.528 
36 848.27 848.89 50% 30% 20% 0.344 
37 845.03 845.51 40% 33% 27% 0.433 
38 842.75 842.51 27% 50% 23% 0.507 
39 841.51 841.13 30% 23% 47% 0.594 
40 842.66 843.32 53% 27% 20% 0.333 
41 864.25 862.87 13% 37% 47% 0.911 
42 871.10 870.34 3% 47% 47% 0.700 
Summary Statistics 
Mean 866.42 866.34 35% 33% 32% 0.487 
SDev 15.87 16.04 11% 9% 9% 0.114 
133 
Table 6.9.B: DJIA Alternative Price Assumptions 
Closing Distributions and Momentum Index 
Test Sample Two 
DAY 
(1) 
DJIA-C 
(2) 
DJIA-M 
(3) 
C=B 
(4) 
INS 
(5) 
C=A 
(6) 
MI 
1 1021.77 1022.35 33% 37% 30% 0.385 
2 1024.54 1024.59 37% 33% 30% 0.490 
3 1022.44 1022.39 40% 30% 30% 0.510 
4 1046.70 1046.27 23% 37% 40% 0.582 
5 1047.56 1047.60 27% 43% 30% 0.491 
6 1038.01 1038.29 30% 50% 20% 0.452 
7 1022.54 1022.11 27% 47% 27% 0.569 
8 1015.47 1015.76 43% 33% 23% 0.452 
9 1021.20 1021.06 33% 40% 27% 0.527 
10 1007.54 1008.02 47% 27% 27% 0.404 
11 992.65 991.50 33% 17% 50% 0.761 
12 987.20 987.11 27% 40% 33% 0.521 
13 1004.78 1005.54 43% 33% 23% 0.357 
14 999.90 999.52 13% 53% 33% 0.571 
15 1020.05 1019.72 27% 40% 33% 0.557 
16 1027.79 1027.69 23% 50% 27% 0.517 
17 1038.68 1038.91 40% 43% 17% 0.456 
18 1062.74 1061.88 20% 40% 40% 0.667 
19 1051.47 1051.95 40% 30% 30% 0.400 
20 1053.19 1053.05 27% 43% 30% 0.524 
21 1041.06 1041.68 43% 30% 27% 0.377 
22 1039.53 1039.87 37% 33% 30% 0.434 
23 1022.36 1021.77 27% 30% 43% 0.842 
24 1041.54 1040.87 10% 37% 53% 0.635 
25 1041.16 1040.63 27% 27% 47% 0.612 
26 1070.00 1070.04 37% 33% 30% 0.491 
27 1074.87 1074.87 27% 47% 27% 0.500 
28 1090.15 1089.62 27% 33% 40% 0.600 
29 1081.46 1080.84 23% 30% 47% 0.633 
30 1080.69 1080.98 37% 37% 27% 0.437 
31 1071.05 1071.29 47% 30% 23% 0.447 
32 1077.54 1077.30 30% 30% 40% 0.561 
33 1080.79 1080.88 43% 23% 33% 0.478 
34 1077.06 1077.68 47% 37% 17% 0.386 
35 1069.04 1068.71 33% 37% 30% 0.569 
36 1072.00 1072.34 43% 23% 33% 0.429 
37 1057.30 1057.44 23% 47% 30% 0.471 
38 1033.23 1033.66 33% 43% 23% 0.426 
39 1043.64 1043.83 33% 37% 30% 0.463 
40 1039.63 1040.11 30% 40% 30% 0.407 
41 1063.84 1062.41 13% 33% 53% 0.763 
42 1065.80 1064.89 20% 27% 53% 0.686 
43 1075.44 1075.34 27% 30% 43% 0.518 
Summary Statistics 
Mean 1044.54 1044.47 31% 36% 33% 0.520 
SDev 26.46 26.43 9% 8% 9% 0.109 
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Columns (3), (4), and (5) in Tables 6.9.A and 6.9.B capture the 
distribution percentages of the DJIA stocks’ closing prices in relation 
to the closing bid-ask price spreads. Not shown in Tables 6.9.A or 
6.9.B are the small number of stocks closing outside the closing bid- 
ask spread. The incidence of DJIA stocks closing outside the bid-ask 
range occurred less than 10 times per sample. This result is not 
surprising as the DJIA issues are very actively traded. Average daily 
(NYSE) trading volume during the TS1 period was in excess of 140,000 
shares. 
Earlier we described the regularity of next day price moves when 
today's closing prices relative to the closing bid and ask price quotes 
are known. We investigate if a meaningful relationship exists in where 
the DJIA stocks close in relation the closing bid and ask price quotes 
and next day moves in the DJIA. 
To capture the combined effects of the closing price distributions 
we utilize the Momentum Index (MI). Figures 6.1.A and 6.1.B plot the 
daily values of the momentum index (MI) as well as the trend of the 
DJIA over the TS1 and TS2 periods, respectively. Column (6) in tables 
6.8.A and 6.8.B list the daily values of the MI. In effect, the MI 
summarizes the closing distribution data in columns (3) through (5) in 
a more meaningful format. The mean value for the DJIA component stocks 
for TS1 is .487, reflecting the general downward trend of the market 
and the very slight dominance of bid-side closes. The TS1 mean MI 
value is insignificantly different from an expected value of .500 (t = 
-.625). The mean value for TS2 is .520 and the t-value = 1.005. 
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Figure 6.1.A. TS1 DJIA versus Momentum Index. Values plotted are for 
the period December 1, 1981 through January 29, 1982. 
Figure 6.I.B. TS2 DJIA versus Momentum Index. Values plotted are for 
the period December 1, 1982 through January 31, 1983. 
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We next test the correlations of time t's MI and time t+l's DJIA. 
If the closing distributions are useful in predicting next day returns, 
then we should observe a positive correlation between MIt and DJIA- 
Ct+i. The calculated correlation coefficients for MIt and DJIA-Ct+| 
for TS1 and TS2 are .0624 and .0965, respectively. Correlations for 
MIt and DJIA-Mt+1 were .0612 (TS1) and .0962 (TS2). The signs are 
positive as expected, but the MI appears to offer limited knowledge in 
forecasting the DJIA in either of the two specifications tested. We 
can explain less than 1% of the variation in the day (t+l)'s DJIA from 
the information contained in day (t)'s momentum index. A probable 
explanation for the weak correlations may be found in the effects of 
portfolio diversification. As more issues are added to a portfolio, 
the strong correlations for individual stocks described in the previous 
section are attenuated by the averaging out of bid- and ask-side 
closes. 
6.8 Security Risk Measures under Alternative Assumptions 
We are interested in determining if the use of alternative return 
measurement specifications reduce the degree of errors in estimated 
betas when using the market model (see equation 3.12). Herein betas 
are estimated using returns measured close-to-close (Beta-C) and 
returns measured using the mean of the closing bid and ask spread 
(Beta-M). The results are reported for price-stratified data similar 
to that used in prior sections. All returns are computed using 
equation (6.7): 
Ri - [ (Pt + Dt> / pt-l 1 - 1 (6.7) 
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Tables 6.10.A and 6.10.B present the results of estimating beta 
using the market model for each of the return generating model 
assumptions. In each case the ’’market” portfolio consists of all 1134 
issues in TS1 and 1205 issues in TS2. Two sets of cross-sectional 
averages of all stocks in each decile are examined: the average beta 
estimate for each price specification (Beta-C, Beta-M) and the average 
standard error of the estimate (SEE-C, SEE-M). The differences between 
the means for each set of paired estimates are tested statistically and 
the results are reported in columns (3) and (6). 
Table 6.10.A: Market Model Betas & Alternative Price Definitions 
Cross-sectional Means for TS1 (Dec81-Jan82) 
Dec 
(1) 
Beta-C 
(2) 
Beta-M 
(3) 
t-test 
(4) 
SEE-C 
(5) 
SEE-M 
(6) 
t-test 
1 1.053 0.991 0.518 0.034 0.029 3.148 
2 0.887 0.871 0.180 0.022 0.021 1.345 
3 0.950 0.937 0.152 0.020 0.019 1.500 
4 0.899 0.879 0.198 0.018 0.017 0.161 
5 0.936 0.933 0.028 0.017 0.017 0.896 
6 1.089 1.104 -0.158 0.018 0.017 0.534 
7 0.962 0.984 -0.214 0.017 0.016 0.695 
8 0.986 1.012 -0.313 0.016 0.016 0.380 
9 1.183 1.201 -0.212 0.016 0.016 0.500 
10 1.046 1.070 -0.362 0.013 0.013 0.339 
The results reported in Table 6.10.A, column (3), indicate that 
there are no significant differences, on average, in the magnitudes of 
the beta estimates using the two closing price specifications for any 
of the price stratified deciles. The general tendency is for lower 
price stocks to have slightly lower betas and higher price stocks to 
have slightly higher betas when returns are computed from expected 
closing prices. Column (6) indicates that statistically significant 
increases in estimation efficiencies are achieved for the lowest price 
stock decile. The efficiency gains decrease as prices get larger. 
138 
Similar results are reported in TS2 (Table 6.10.B). Mean 
estimated betas are slightly lower when returns computed from expected 
closing prices are utilized instead of observed closing prices. The 
differences in the two sets of beta estimates are insignificantly 
different from zero. Obvious increases in ex post prediction 
efficiency are evident in the lowest price decile and decreasing 
rapidly as prices get larger. 
Table 6.10.B: Market Model Betas & Alternative Price Definitions 
Cross-sectional Means for TS2 (Dec82-Jan83) 
Dec 
(1) 
Beta-C 
(2) 
Beta-M 
(3) 
t-test 
(4) 
SEE-C 
(5) 
SEE-M 
(6) 
t-test 
1 1.214 1.179 0.325 0.039 0.035 2.638 
2 1.077 1.066 0.110 0.027 0.026 1.047 
3 0.897 0.899 -0.031 0.022 0.021 1.264 
4 0.922 0.911 0.144 0.021 0.020 0.138 
5 0.929 0.935 -0.081 0.021 0.020 0.809 
6 0.969 0.978 -0.116 0.021 0.020 0.584 
7 0.951 0.963 -0.152 0.020 0.019 0.486 
8 1.029 1.032 -0.050 0.020 0.019 0.193 
9 1.005 1.009 -0.075 0.018 0.018 0.499 
10 1.052 1.063 -0.199 0.018 0.018 0.298 
The increase in estimation efficiency for the lowest priced stocks 
when returns are computed using the mean of the closing bid-ask spread 
suggest a potential source of low-price or size effects reported in the 
anomalies literature. Additional testing with larger samples of 
closing bid-ask data may be necessary to determine fully the extent of 
any efficiency increases. This type of data may also prove useful in 
helping to explain low-price effects. 
CHAPTER 7 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter begins with a review of the objectives underlying the 
current research effort and summarizes its findings. The review is 
followed by a discussion of the insights acquired into the structural 
relationships between theoretical price constructs and observed prices, 
theoretical returns and risk, and observed returns and risk measure¬ 
ments. The implications of those observations are also discussed. A 
note on the limitations of the current study completes the discussion 
and review. The chapter closes with a delineation of potential areas 
for further research. 
7.1 Review of Objectives and Results 
The following issues were investigated in this study: 
1. How accurately do observed closing prices approximate the 
theoretically expected closing prices? 
2. How accurately do returns computed from closing prices 
approximate returns computed from expected closing prices? 
3. To what extent are findings of empirical anomalies the result 
of a misspecification of the returns generating process? 
4. How sensitive are measures of relative risk (beta) when 
alternative price constructs are used? 
In addition to the issues listed above, an investigation was conducted 
on the nature of the serial correlational behavior of sequential stock 
prices. 
To evaluate the first issue, two stock price series were compared. 
The first price series was composed of the market closing prices for 
all stocks in the test and the verification samples for the time 
periods under observation. These prices were treated as approximations 
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for expected closing prices. The second price series was constructed 
from the mean of the closing bid and ask price quotes for all stocks in 
the samples. The second set of prices should be exactly equal to 
expected closing prices in an efficient market. Efficient market 
theory suggests that the means of the two price series should be equal. 
The empirical results based on the comparison of the two prices series 
from two separate samples indicate that: 
1. The means of the two price series are significantly different 
and the average magnitude of the difference is approximately 
equal to one cent. 
2. The magnitude and sign of the of the difference is sensitive 
to the effects of trends in closing prices. Bear trends 
produce negative biases, bull trends positive biases. 
3. Estimation errors are sensitive to price levels. The average 
magnitude of the error declines as prices get very large. 
The second issue was evaluated by computing two sets of returns. 
The first set of returns was computed utilizing observed closing prices 
and is typical of the method used to compute security returns. The 
second set was computed using the mean of the closing bid and ask 
prices. Returns computed using the latter series approximate true 
returns. A comparison of the two return series indicates that: 
1. Observed returns are typically less negative (more positive) 
than true returns and are slightly more volatile. 
2. The magnitude of the return estimation errors are non-linear 
in price. The estimation error is positive and random. 
3. No significant differences are observed between the two 
return series for the combined samples. 
The third issue dealt with the persistence of empirical anomalies 
when alternative price and return generating process specifications are 
considered. Returns were computed using three specifications for 
prices; close-to-close, ask-to-bid (market order), and bid-to-ask 
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(limit-order). A comparison of the three sets of returns indicates 
that: 
1. The persistence of the low price anomaly is dependent upon the 
method used to measure returns and the characteristics of the 
sample. Small low price effects were found in the test sample; 
much larger and more significant effects in the verification 
sample. 
2. The evidence indicates that the weekend effect may be sensitive 
to the number of stocks going ex-dividend on Mondays compared to 
Fridays. With very few exceptions, no weekend effect is observed 
in sub-samples of stocks which did not go ex-dividend on Mondays. 
3. The weekend effect is inconsistent across price ranges. Less than 
half of all deciles displayed strong weekend effects; three 
displayed no weekend effect and these three deciles included the 
lowest and highest price deciles. 
4. Samples containing substantial numbers of ex-dividend stocks 
result in significant weekend effects. 
5. The January effect appears to be more complex than a simple 
end-of-year or tax-induced phenomenon. It also appears to 
involve a broader spectrum of stocks. 
The last issue investigated required the estimation of relative 
risk (beta) measures using closing prices and expected closing prices 
(mean of the closing bid and ask price quotes). The results of this 
study indicate that: 
1. Relative risk estimates are not statistically different when 
expected closing prices are used to compute returns rather than 
using observed closing prices. 
2. The ex-post standard error of the estimate improves marginally when 
expected closing price equivalents are utilized to estimate 
relative risk. 
An investigation related to the fourth issue examined the nature 
of serial correlations observed in sequential prices. The objective of 
these tests was to determine if movements in a market index could be 
forecasted given knowledge of today's closing prices relative to the 
closing bid-ask price quotes. The principal question is whether a 
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relationship exists between today's closing price and tomorrow's 
expected return. The results of this investigation reveal that: 
1. Day (t+1) returns are systematically related to where stocks 
close day(t). Closes at the ask and inside the closing bid- 
ask spread are typically followed by significantly negative 
returns the next trading day. Closes at the bid are typically 
followed by positive returns the next trading day. 
2. Close-to-close returns are systematically greater in magnitude 
(positively or negatively) than close-to-open returns. 
3. The magnitude of the day(t+1) returns are inversely related to 
price; the lower the price, the greater the magnitude. 
4. The magnitude of next day returns are insufficient for one to earn 
trading profits when brokerage and spread costs are considered. 
5. The closing price location of stocks are significantly related 
to changes in the spread. Bid- and ask-side closes are typically 
followed by increases in the spread. Stocks which close inside the 
bid-ask spread experience significantly smaller next-day spreads. 
6. The magnitude of the change in spread is related to price for bid- 
side closes. The larger the price, the greater the magnitude of 
next day spread changes. When stocks close inside the bid-ask 
spread, the relationship is inverse; the larger the price, the 
smaller the spread change. Ask-side closes generally have smaller 
changes. 
7.2 Insights and Implications 
Are prior tests of market efficiency and the asset pricing models 
affected by the specification of price structures and return 
measurement models? The general results of this study suggest that 
significant problems exist with the results of all general market 
studies which rely on closing prices to measure returns. When closing 
prices are solely utilized to compute holding period returns, 
substantial biases are induced. The biases introduced result from the 
exclusion of market trading behavior from efficient market theory. 
Efficient market theory may be reasonably described as a normative 
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theory. When return computation methods incorporate market trading 
behavior, substantially different results obtain. The specification of 
expected closing prices by some researchers is viewed as an attempt to 
minimize price measurement errors. A more positive view requires that 
the prices most likely to be obtained by a public trader are the prices 
which ought to be used to compute returns. 
The most significant implication of this study pertains to 
anomalous findings in tests of market efficiency. When market trading 
patterns are incorporated in return measurement models, substantially 
different results are obtained. The significance of the low price 
effect is largely a function of the assumptions used to specify the 
price structures utilized in computing returns. Moreover, the presence 
and magnitude of low price effects are related to the methodology used 
to measure portfolio returns. Finally, research results reporting an 
unstable low price effect or an unstable size effect may be affected by 
the magnitudes of the market trends contained in the research sample. 
Blume and Stambaugh (1983), Keim (1983), et al., frequently subdivide 
their samples into smaller subsamples and examine the strength of the 
anomalies in each subsample. A frequent observation is that these 
effects are unstable over time. The relatively small sample used in 
the current investigation suggests that bear markets appear to produce 
the smallest low price effects; bull markets the largest effects. 
Additional research is indicated with larger samples of bid-ask data. 
In the case of the weekend effect, a substantial explanation for 
the anomaly may stem from poor controls for ex-dividend effects in 
prior studies. The tendency for large numbers of stocks to go ex- 
dividend on Mondays in contrast to Fridays appears to be the principal 
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cause of the evidence for a weekend effect. Also, the effect is not 
uniform across all price levels. It is statistically absent in the 
lowest and highest price deciles. 
7.2.1 Closing Prices and Returns 
Efficient market theory acknowledges the variation of prices over 
time as prices adjust to new information. In general, the mean of 
observed closing prices should be equal to the expected closing prices. 
In an efficient market, the expected closing price should be equal to 
the mean of the bid and ask prices. The results of this study indicate 
that, from the point of view of a statistical test for equality of 
means, the observed and expected means are different. The magnitude of 
the differences are also sensitive to the underlying market trend. The 
greater the volatility of the market, the larger the difference. The 
sign of the difference is dependent upon the bearish or bullish nature 
of the market: Bear markets produce negative magnitudes, bull markets 
positive magnitudes. The market trends examined in this study did not 
produce a difference with a positive sign. The results, however, 
clearly indicate that the sign and magnitude of the difference is 
related to the underlying market trend. An unresolved question is why 
the verification sample momentum indexes tended to indicate averages 
below .500 for a market in a major bull move. Recent research has 
suggested that market prices tend to move up toward the end of the 
trading session. This suggests a potential area for additional 
research. 
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7.2.2 Empirical Anomalies and Price Specifications 
How sensitive are findings of empirical anomalies to alternative 
price specifications in the return generating process? The results of 
this investigation do not provide a definitive answer. Low price 
effects were found in the test and verification samples for returns 
measured using closing prices. When market order-based returns are 
utilized, the effect is insignificant for the bear market sample and 
substantially significant in the bull market sample. Similar results 
are found using returns based on limit order executions. A partial 
explanation may be related to the behavior of the bid-ask spread and 
the minimum size of the spread for low priced stocks. 
Another possible explanation for the different results stems from 
the implicit assumptions of the normative character of efficient 
markets theory. The time series average of observed closing prices are 
very likely equal to expected closing prices for samples covering 
longer periods of time. But expected closing prices are not likely to 
be obtained by a public trader using a market order. Executions at the 
bid or the ask price are more likely, especially for lower priced 
stocks with narrow dollar spreads and low trading volumes. The 
immediate result is an increase in specialist participation; stocks 
are bought at the ask and sold at the bid. Computed returns based on 
trading patterns are substantially lower than returns computed from 
closing prices. The general result is an inconsistency between the 
behavioral implications of efficient market theory and the actual 
behavior of the market. Most market studies have relied on price data 
inconsistent with obtainable prices. The results have shown up as 
anomalous to market efficiency. The general implication of this study 
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is that at least some prior anomalous findings may be artifacts of the 
misuse of observed closing prices as obtainable prices rather than 
prices obtainable by public traders using market orders. The implied 
inefficiency of the market or inadequacy of the asset pricing models 
are critically tied to the fallacy implicit in positive implementations 
of a normative theory. The degree to which efficient market tests 
abstract from the real operation of the market may underlie the 
anomalous results reported in the literature. 
In the case of weekend effects, prior reports of behavior 
anomalous to the random walk hypothesis failed to control for the 
incidence of ex-dividend day effects. The results of this study 
indicate that the effects are related mainly to stocks going ex- 
dividend. Stocks which do not go ex-dividend on Monday do not exhibit 
significant negative weekend returns in contrast to Monday-Tuesday 
returns. Also, the effect is not generalized across all price ranges. 
It is strongly present in three of the ten deciles and totally absent 
in three others. The remaining four deciles exhibit varying degrees of 
weekend effects. The implication of these results is that the effect 
is sample specific. Samples with large numbers of dividend paying 
stocks have a high probability of ex-dividend dates falling on Monday. 
Accordingly, weekend effects are likely to be present. When samples 
exclude stocks going ex-dividend on Mondays, the effect is essentially 
absent. 
7.2.3 Autocorrelation and the Behavior of Stock Prices 
A startling discovery in this research is the additional insight 
provided by information on the position of the closing price relative 
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to the closing bid-ask spread. Several earlier studies in security 
market behavior reported the presence of negative serial correlation in 
sequential price series for individual securities. This study 
significantly expands those results. Specifically, the next-trading 
day returns are directly influenced by where stocks close. Also, the 
magnitude of the next-day returns are strongly and inversely related to 
price level; lower price stocks tend to have substantially larger 
relative (percentage) changes than higher priced stocks. These results 
suggest that a portion of the low price effect may be tied to the 
autocorrelational properties of sequential stock prices and to 
statistical artifacts arising from the price level and the magnitude of 
the change in dollar terms. Also, the mis-estimation of risk does not 
appear to be the reason for excess returns accruing to the low price 
stocks. The oscillation of recorded transaction prices between the bid 
and ask price spread appears to induce higher coefficients of variation 
(risk) in stock returns. When stock returns are measured using market 
or limit orders, substantially lower coefficients of variation (risk) 
are obtained. It would appear that the mis-estimation of risk due to 
nonsynchronous trading is an insufficient explanation for the size 
effect. The low price effect is also affected by the relative scales 
of the change magnitude (in cents) and the average dollar value of the 
security. Thus, one cent changes result in substantially larger 
effects for low priced stocks in comparison to higher priced stocks. 
7.2.4 Price Specifications and Relative (Beta) Risk 
Results reported in this study indicate that a small portion of 
beta estimation errors arise from the use of observed prices as 
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equivalents for expected closing prices. The magnitudes are small and 
generally insignificant for the sample examined. A larger sample might 
yield different results. 
Differences in betas estimated from closing prices or expected 
closing prices do not differ significantly. Marginal improvements in 
ex-post forecasting efficiency are obtained when expected closing 
prices are utilized rather than closing prices. This observation is 
most likely the result of removing the price estimation bias when 
observed closing prices are utilized instead of expected closing 
prices. Moreover, the estimation bias is strongest in the lowest price 
deciles. 
7.3 Limitations 
In drawing inferences from the empirical results of this study, 
the limited size and time frame of the samples need to be kept in mind. 
The underlying trends of the market may have biased the sign and the 
magnitude of the results reported. Also, the restriction of the sample 
to NYSE stocks may have attenuated the magnitude of low price effects 
for close-to-close returns. Finally, the attenuation of the low price 
effect when returns are measured ask-to-bid may be more pronounced for 
larger samples of lower priced stocks (such as might be found on the 
AMEX or OTC) and similar absolute spread characteristics. 
Notwithstanding these reservations, the results of this study shed 
important light on the methods by which normative theories are 
operationalized. Efficient market theory does not consider the 
practical aspects of the mechanics of trading in a market dominated in 
many instances by the market specialist. The strong effects of spreads 
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and limit-order price clustering may underlie findings of anomalous 
behavior. The regularity of next day price behavior is potentially 
troublesome. Statistical tests of samples require that the populations 
from which they are drawn be normally distributed. The evidence 
presented in this study indicates the existence of stronger 
regularities than previously thought. Also, these regularities may 
distort efficient market test results. 
The alternative methodologies employed in this study for measuring 
returns yield substantially less volatile day-to-day returns. The re¬ 
specification of the return generating process to reflect the operation 
of security markets dominated by specialist activity and liquidity 
costs are suggested as important corrections for analyzing efficient 
market operation. Specifically, in the absence of Walrasian market 
structures and strictly continuous trading among a large number of 
traders, the imposition of liquidity providing agents alters 
substantially the operationalization of efficient market theory. The 
effective result is an attenuation of one category of market anomalies; 
ie., the size effect. 
7.4 Extensions 
The results of this study suggest at least three major extensions 
for future research. The first extension would be to examine a larger 
data set of closing bid and ask prices. This expanded data set would 
include at least six full years of closing bid and ask prices, closing 
prices, and trading volumes. In order to prepare such a large data 
sample in computer readable form, a monthly time horizon would be 
advisable. Accordingly, 72 days of data would be utilized. The 
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expanded data set would include at least one complete market cycle. 
This sample would be used to test more fully the biases induced in 
computed returns when closing prices are utilized to compute returns in 
preference to expected closing prices. The results of the current 
study indicate a potentially rich topic for investigation. 
A second area for extending the current study relates to risk 
measures (beta) and market efficiency. The limited time sample used in 
this study did not permit a viable estimate of beta. The preliminary 
results indicated some increases in estimation efficiency. 
Accordingly, a data set with sixty months of historical data would 
permit estimates of beta utilizing expected closing prices as well as 
closing prices. The two risk estimates could then be tested on the 
sixth year of data. This study design would more closely resemble the 
more typical test of market efficiency using the CAPM. 
The third extension is a more detailed examination of bid-ask 
spread behavior, particularly for low price stocks. The results 
reported in this investigation indicate a spread magnitude larger than 
that predicted by regression analysis. A portion of the size effect 
may be related to the behavior of this variable. The bid-ask spread 
may also be a missing factor in the asset pricing model. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Alexander, S.S., 1961, Price movements in speculative markets: Trends 
or random walks? Journal of Finance 36, 1-12. 
Bagehot, Walter, 1971, The only game in town. Financial Analysts 
Journal (March-April), 12-14. 
Ball, Ray, 1978, Anomalies in relationships between securities' yields 
and yield-surrogates. Journal of Financial Economics 6, 103-126. 
Ball, Ray, and Philip Brown, 1968, An empirical evaluation of 
accounting income numbers. Journal of Accounting Research 6, 159-178. 
Banz, Rolf W., 1981, The relationship between return and market value 
of common stocks, Journal of Financial Economics 9, 3-18. 
Berges, Angel, John J. McConnell, and Gary Schlarbaum, 1984, The turn- 
of-the-year in Canada, Journal of Finance 39, 185-92. 
Blume, Marshall E., and Robert F. Stambaugh, 1983, Biases in computed 
returns: An application to the size effect. Journal of Financial 
Economics 12, 387-404. 
Branch, Ben, and Walter Freed, 1977, Bid-ask spreads on the AMEX and 
the Big Board, Journal of Finance 32, 159-63. 
_ and Kyungchun Chang, 1985, Tax-loss trading, is the game 
over or have the rules changed?. Financial Review, 55-69. 
_ and David P. Echevarria, 1986, Return computations and the 
impact of bid-ask spreads, presented to the October 1986 Financial 
Management Association, now under review. 
Brown, Philip, Allan W. Kleidon, and Terry Marsh, 1983, New evidence on 
the nature of size related anomalies in stock prices. Journal of 
Financial Economics 12, 33-56. 
Choi, J.Y., Dan Salandro, and Kuldeep Shastri, 1988, On the estimation 
of bid-ask spreads: Theory and evidence. Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis 23, 219-230. 
Cohen, Kalman J., Walter L. Ness, Jr., Hitoshi Okuda, Robert A. 
Schwartz, and David K. Whitcomb, 1976, The determinants of common stock 
returns volatility: An international comparison. Journal of Finance 31, 
733-40. 
Constantinedes, George M., 1986, Capital market equilibrium with 
transaction costs. Journal of Political Economy 94, 842-862. 
Copeland, Thomas E., and Dan Galai, 1983, Information effects on the 
bid-ask spread. Journal of Finance 38, 1457-1469. 
152 
Demsetz, Harold, 1968, The cost of transacting. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 94, 33-53. 
Dyl, Edward A., 1977, Capital gains taxation and year-end stock market 
behavior. Journal of Finance 32, 165-75. 
Fama, Eugene and Marshall Blume, 1966, Filter rules and stock market 
trading profits, Journal of Business 39, 226-241. 
Fama, E., Fisher, L., Jensen, M., Roll, R., 1969, The adjustment of 
stock prices to new information. International Economic Review 10, 1- 
21. 
French, Kenneth R., 1980, Stock returns and the weekend effect. Journal 
of Financial Economics 8, 55-69. 
Finnerty, Joseph, 1976, Insider's activity and inside information: A 
multivariate analysis. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 
11, 205-215. 
Garman, Mark B., 1976, Market Microstructure, Journal of Finance and 
Economics 3, 257-275. 
Glosten, Lawrence R., and Paul R. Milgrom, 1985, Bid, ask, and 
transaction prices in a specialist market with heterogeneously informed 
traders, Journal of Financial Economics 14, 71-100. 
_, and Lawrence Harris, 1985, Estimating the components 
of the bid-ask spread, working paper, (Northwestern University, 
Evanston, II., University of Southern California, Los Angeles, Ca). 
Harris, Lawrence, 1986, A transaction data study of weekly and 
intradaily patterns in stock prices. Journal of Financial Economics 16, 
99-117. 
_, 1986a, A day-end transaction price anomaly, working 
paper, (University of Southern California, Los Angeles, Ca). 
_, 1986b, Estimation of "true" stock price variances and 
bid-ask spreads from discrete observations, working paper, (University 
of Southern California, Los Angeles, Ca). 
Jaffe, Jeffrey, 1974, Special information and insider trading, Journal 
of Business 47, 410-428. 
Keim, Donald B., 1983, Size-related anomalies and stock return 
seasonality. Journal of Financial Economics 12, 13-32. 
_, 1985, Dividend Yields and stock returns. Journal of 
Financial Economics 14, 473-89. 
_, 1986, The CAPM and equity return regularities. 
Financial Analysts Journal, May-June, 19-34. 
153 
Lakonishok, Josef, and Seymour Smidt, 1984, Volume and turn-of-the-year 
behavior. Journal of Financial Economics 13, 435-55. 
Neiderhofer, Victor, 1965, Clustering of Stock prices. Operations 
Research 13, 258-65. 
_, and M.F.M. Osborne, 1966, Market making and reversal 
on the stock exchange, Journal of the American Statistical Association 
61, 897-916. 
Nunn, K., G. Madden, M. Gambola, 1983, Are some insiders more ’inside* 
than others?, Journal of Portfolio Management, Spring, 1983, 18-22. 
Philips-Patrick, Frederick J. and Thomas Schneeweis, 1987, The "Weekend 
Effect" for stock indexes and stock index futures: Dividend and 
interest rate effects, a working paper. School of Management, 
(University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Massachusetts.) 
Reinganum, Marc R., 1981, Misspecification of capital asset pricing: 
Empirical anomalies based on earnings' yields and market values. 
Journal of Financial Economics 9, 19-46. 
_, 1982, A direct test of Roll’s conjecture on the firm 
size effect. Journal of Finance 37, 27-35. 
_, 1983, The anomalous stock market behavior of small 
firms in January, Journal of Financial Economics 12, 89-104. 
Roll, Richard, 1983, On computing mean returns and the small firm 
premium. Journal of Financial Economics 12, 371-86. 
_, 1983a, Vas is das? The turn-of-the-year effect and the 
return premia of small firms. Journal of Portfolio Management 9, 18-28. 
_, 1984, A simple implicit measure of the effective bid-ask 
spread in an efficient market. Journal of Finance 39, 1127-1139. 
Rozeff, Michael S., and William R. Kinney, Jr., 1976, Capital market 
seasonality: The case of stock returns. Journal of Financial Economics 
3, 379-402. 
Smidt, Seymour, 1971, Which road to an efficient stock market?. 
Financial Analyst Journal (September-October), 18-ff. 
Spurr, W. A., and C.P. Bonini, 1973, Statistical Analysis of Business 
Decisions, Homewood. II, Richard D. Irwin. 
Stock Quotations on the New York Stock Exchange, 1981, 1982, (Francis 
Emory Fitch, New York). 
Stoll, Hans R., 1978, The supply of dealer services in securities 
markets. Journal of Finance 3, 1133-51. 
154 
_, and Robert E. Whaley, 1983, Transactions costs and the 
small firm effect. Journal of Financial Economics 12, 57-79. 
Tinic, Seha M., 1972, The economics of liquidity services, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 86, 79-93. 
\ 

